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ABSTRACT 
Income inequality stalls economic growth with undesirable socio-economic consequences. 
Despite measures targeted towards reducing the inequality gap, disparities in income 
distribution persists. The link between financial reforms and income inequality is still relatively 
unexplored in the literature. This study appraises the impact of financial reforms including 
credit growth on income inequality using a sample of twenty selected countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) from 1980 to 2015. The broad objective is to assess the financial reforms and 
credit growth nexus on income inequality and establish if the reform-credit-inequality nexus 
exists. To achieve this, the analytical structure is designed to (1) observe the state of the 
financial system after the reform, (2) evaluate if credit growth is stimulated by financial reforms 
and (3) if credit growth has an equalising effect on income inequality. This analytical approach 
(general-to-specific) is conducted on the broad sample, the four sub-regions (Central, East, 
Southern and West Africa) and four representative countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa). Five estimation techniques pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects 
(FE), dynamic fixed effects (DFE), system generalised method of moments (sys-GMM) and 
error correction model (ECM)) are used in evaluating these interactive relationships. In line 
with the theoretical and empirical literature, the real interest rate, deposit rate, domestic credit 
to the private sector and the Gini index are the respective proxies for financial reforms, credit 
growth and income inequality. For the broad sample, findings reveal that financial reforms 
exhibit an indirect relationship with income inequality. For instance, from the FE results a 
percentage point change in the real interest rate is associated with 0.9% increase in credit 
growth, and a percentage change in credit growth is associated with 0.045% decrease in income 
inequality, on average, ceteris paribus. Similarly, results from DFE show that a percentage 
change in credit growth is associated with 0.062% decrease in income inequality, on the 
average. Results across the four regions vary. Credit growth reduces inequality significantly in 
Southern Africa by 0.207% while it aggravates inequality in East Africa by 0.036%. For 
Cameroon, Nigeria and South Africa, credit growth exhibits equalising impact on income while 
the reverse is the case in Kenya. Hence, contribution is made to the literature by providing 
evidence that the reform-credit-inequality nexus exists in addition to validating both the 
McKinnon-Shaw (1973) hypothesis that at a higher interest rate, financial intermediation 
improves. Results also validate the extensive margin theory of Greenwood and Jovanovich 
(1990) that as credit is extended and made available to those initially excluded income 
inequality reduces. Another contribution made to the scholarship methodology is empirically 
unbundling the effect of financial reforms on income inequality. Given these findings, one of 
the recommendations is that financial reforms policies that drive financial intermediation be 
pursued by stakeholders as these will indirectly lead to a reduction in income inequality. In 
other words, the ability to stimulate credit growth may be one of the avenues to reducing the 
income inequality gap in SSA and in developing economies in general. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Income inequality is the uneven or inequitable distribution of income among a given population. 
In recent times, global policy debates about this menace have intensified with concerns about 
stemming the rising tide. The positioning of this research on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  may 
be motivated by the fact that the 2015 World Bank Report on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) reveals that extreme poverty had been decreasing in all regions of the world 
with the exception of SSA, in spite of the fact that the sub-region enjoyed more than two 
decades of growth resurgence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).  
 
Despite the various measures targeted towards reducing the inequality gap, disparities in human 
development, health and education still persist with vast discrimination particularly in relation 
to indigenous peoples, those with disabilities and those resident in rural communities (Dabla-
Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka & Tsounta, 2015). Consequently, in adopting the 
Sustainable Development Declaration in 2015, world leaders pledged to create a more equitable 
world by 2030. Perhaps, while taking cognisance of rising global income inequality, one of its 
goals (i.e. Goal 10) which is also linked to Goals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8, is to reduce inequality within 
and among nations. Statistics and studies have shown growing inequality, thus policies 
addressing income inequality at the national level remain pivotal to economic growth and 
development. 
 
Furtherance to situating this study on SSA, the UNDP (2017) Report confirms that SSA remains 
as one of the most unequal regions in the world even when its average unweighted Gini declined 
by 3.4 percentage points between 1991 and 2011. The Report further states that the region 
inhabits 10 of the 19 most unequal countries globally with seven outlier African countries 
(mostly located in Southern Africa) driving this inequality. Rising income inequality stalls 
economic growth and has undesirable socio-economic and political consequences, such as high 
crime rate, high mortality rate, distorted educational structures, corruption, and social unrest to 
mention a few (George, Olayiwola, Adewole & Osabuohien, 2013). Generally, high levels of 
income inequality have historically persisted across the globe with the most skewed income 
distributions found in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
South Asia (SA), with Europe having the lowest average inequality index (Dabla-Norris et al., 
16 
 
2015). There is no doubt that income inequality is a deeply rooted and multifaceted problem, 
with both moral and economic aspects, which is why the topic spurs a continuous global 
discussion.  
 
In general, income inequality is rising at the global level and particularly in developing 
economies relative to others (United Nations Development Programme-UNDP, 2011). 
However, according to UNDP (2013), income inequality increased the highest in the developed 
economies of Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (ECIS) by 35 percent. It 
increased by 13 percent in Asia and the Pacific region (A&P) while there was no noticeable 
change in the Arab States. Thus, despite having the second highest average Gini index1 from 
the early 1990s to late 2000s, the SSA region is the only region with the highest decline in 
income inequality at 7 percent followed by LAC at 5 percent. Close examination of the data 
reveals that although inequality declined on average in SSA, there has been a mix of countries 
with rising and falling inequality within the region (Solt, 2009, 2014) suggesting that inequality 
differs across regions and time periods and that country/region specific-policies are likely to 
play vital significance in these variations. 
 
According to UNDP (2013), for the group of high-income countries in the study, an increase of 
9 percent occurred on household income inequality while those of low- and middle-income 
countries increased by 11 percent of which SSA is classified. Likewise, according to African 
Development Bank-AfDB (2012), Africa is also the world’s second most unequal region after 
Latin America in addition to being one of the poorest regions in the world, (Solt, 2009; UNDP, 
2011, 2013; United Nations, 2013; Milanovic, 2014) coupled with the fact that, on average, 
global inequality has not diminished over time (United Nations, 2013). Substantiating the 
above, in 2010, six out of the ten most unequal countries worldwide were in SSA, and the bulk 
of countries suffering from extreme high income inequality are concentrated in the sub-region 
of southern Africa (AfDB, 2012). A prominent feature in most African countries is that, when 
measured by the share of income that goes to the poorest, inequalities are striking because the 
wealthy-class appropriates the largest proportion of income.  
 
                                                 
1In the early 1900s, the Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini developed the Gini coefficient (from the 
Lorenz (1905) curve) which is a numerical statistic to measure income inequality in the society. The coefficient 
lies between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). The Gini index is simply the Gini coefficient multiplied 
by 100 and, by intuition, lies between 0 and 100. This study prefers to use the term ‘Gini index’ in its explanations 
and analyses. 
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On financial  liberalisation, Schumpeter (1911), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) pioneered 
the work on the relationship between finance and economic growth. The authors consider 
financial liberalisation to be the backbone of economic reforms in lagging economies (Balassa, 
1989; Levine & Rubinstein, 2009; Edo, 2012). They explained it to mean the creation of higher 
interest rates that equate the demand and supply for savings and opinionated that higher rates 
of interest will lead to increased savers (i.e. more deposits), increased financial activities (i.e. 
financial intermediation) as well as improving the efficiency of using savings (i.e. generating 
credits) (Balassa, 1989; Akinlo & Egbetunde, 2010; Ogundipe & Alege, 2014). Both McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) agree that once the real rate of return falls below the equilibrium rate 
due to rising inflation rate, capital flight results. That is, domestic savers have no incentive to 
increase the stock of funds available for domestic investment (shifting preference for the 
acquisition of real assets) which in turn affects economic growth. However, while Schumpeter 
highlighted the importance of finance for economic growth, McKinnon and Shaw both 
acknowledged that finance and economic growth are positively correlated but refrained from 
ascertaining the direction of causality.  
 
Earlier works on the finance-growth literature ‘birthed’ the supply-leading and demand-
following relationships. The former states that causality goes from financial intermediation to 
economic growth (Schumpeter, 1911; Jao, 1976; Tun Wai, 1980; Lanyi & Saracoglu, 1983; 
Gelb, 1989) while the latter postulates that economic growth creates the demand for financial 
services (Robinson, 1962; Goldsmith, 1969). More recent works show that economists still 
disagree sharply on the role of finance in economic development more so on the direction of 
causality. The debate has taken an interesting dimension of the ‘chicken-egg’ analysis such that 
opinions and findings differ on whether finance causes economic growth or if economic growth 
creates the demand for financial services (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Saibu, Bowale, & 
Akinlo, 2009; Adusei, 2013; Cubillas & González, 2014). Largely, finance influences the 
realisation of economic aspirations and the achievement of entrepreneurial goals, that is, who 
can start a business and who cannot. Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) analyse the impact of 
remittance inflows as a key source of finance to low-income households which is driven by the 
desire of nationals in the Diaspora to support their households who may be facing financial 
challenges.  
 
The financial sector is an engine for economic growth of which, the empirical literature focuses 
on the importance of the finance-growth nexus for sustainable development. However, recent 
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studies have started a discourse about how financial reforms or financial liberalisation can have 
an effect on income inequality. Finance, inflows or credits shapes the gap between the rich and 
the poor and augments the extent to which that gap widens or contracts across dynasties. Also, 
credit shocks to some economic agents can affect the distribution of capital; adjust the rate of 
economic growth and the quest for production inputs (particularly labour) with adverse 
consequences on poverty and income distribution.  
 
The first generation financial reforms, for most African countries, which took place in the early 
1980s led to, among others, the abolishment of credit controls, relaxation of controls on 
international capital movements, the removal of state intervention on interest rate and bank 
credit allocation (Batuo, Guidi, & Mlambo, 2010). The second generation reforms took place 
in the 1990s and led to the strengthening of regulatory, legal, institutional and structural 
frameworks, restoration of bank confidence, and the rehabilitation of financial structures 
(Asongu, 2015b). Consequently, when financial systems are liberalised, several restrictive 
controls are removed and financial institutions are able to make credits more readily available. 
Hence, with increased access to credit, poor households are economically empowered and 
income inequality will decline (Johansson & Wang, 2013; Kus & Fan, 2015) 
 
On what drives income inequality, the exogenous drivers are financial globalisation and 
technical change while the endogenous drivers are macroeconomic policies, labour market 
policies, fiscal policies and wealth inequality. In the same vein, some argue that inequality 
increases with inequitable government spending on social infrastructure/development 
(Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2012); high unemployment rate (Østergaard, 2013) and trade 
openness (Dastidar, 2012), just to mention a few. In the light of the attendant consequences of 
income inequality, this study is motivated by three reasons: (1) where markets are 
underdeveloped, inequality inhibits growth through economic mechanisms (Barro, 2008; 
Dastidar, 2012); (2) where institutions of government are weak, inequality aggravates the 
problem of establishing and enforcing a government that is responsive to the needs of the people 
thereby increasing the likelihood of economic and social policies that hinder growth and 
poverty reduction (Dhongde & Miao, 2013; Saastamoinen & Kuosmanen, 2014); and (3) where 
social institutions are delicate, inequality further dampens the civic and social life that 
reinforces the effective collective decision-making that is necessary to the functioning of 
healthy societies (Chong & Gradstein, 2007; Dastidar, 2012).  
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Empirically, high or rising national income inequality can have negative effects on the rate of 
economic growth or the length of growth spells (Odedokun & Round, 2001; Cobham & 
Summer, 2013). Also, studies may have found that high or rising national income inequality is 
likely to be a drag on poverty reduction (UNDP, 2013; United Nations, 2013; Klasen, 2016). 
In the economic theory of crime, inequality encourages criminal behaviour (Merton, 1938; 
Shaw & McKay, 1942; Becker, 1968). Inequality encourages corruption (Owoye & Bissessar, 
2012; Transparency International, 2015) and distorts the equitable allocation of resources 
(Ademu, 2013; Kato & Sato, 2014). In addressing the problem of income inequality, some 
studies theorise that inequality is reduced with increase in per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) (van der Hoeven, 2010; Delis, Hasan, & Kazakis, 2014; Davtyan, 2016); improved 
human capital through equal access to quality education at all levels (Barro, 2008; Lo Prete, 
2013); eradication of corruption and the existence of quality institutions (Kar & Saha, 2012; Li 
& Yu, 2014).  
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Despite various measures (such as education reforms, health reforms, tax reforms and so on) 
undertaken by governments, global income inequality is still rising (UNDP, 2011, 2013; United 
Nations, 2013). However, between early 1990s and late 2000s, the average Gini index has been 
on the decline in LAC and SSA countries (UNDP, 2013; Klasen, 2016) howbeit with a mix of 
rising and falling within-country inequality in these regions. Measures proposed and deployed 
in combating income inequality include education (affordable or free education from primary 
to secondary levels), health reforms (necessitating free health care in some cases), transfer 
payments, subsidies, tax reforms, increased government expenditure on public utilities, trade 
reforms, finance and so on. This study aligns with the finance approach to reducing income 
inequality because while education, health or tax reforms may require a lag of time before the 
impacts are felt on income distribution, the distributive impact of access to finance is more 
instantaneous leading to economic empowerment and the reduction of income inequality. 
 
This study builds on two theories of income inequality – the financial market imperfections 
theory and the extensive margin theory. The first explains that imperfect financial systems are 
necessary for sustaining a persistent class of poor cohorts. According to this theory, a perfect 
financial system implies that households have access to finance to cater for schooling, acquiring 
skills or setting up a business based only on individual talents and initiative, not on parental 
wealth (Becker, 1957; Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986). Thus, a perfect financial market ensures 
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the equalisation of economic opportunities by reducing the emphasis placed on having ancestral 
wealth. From this perspective, financial development might exert a disproportionately positive 
influence on the poor. On the other hand, the extensive margin theory states that financial 
development might be broadened by increasing the disposal and use of financial services by 
individuals or small- and medium- scale entrepreneurs who had not been employing those 
services because of price or other impediments (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990). Price, in this case, refers to interest rate charged on loans and advances and 
other ancillary charges. Other impediments can be discriminatory factors such as gender-related 
(i.e. financial intermediaries being more disposed to lending to males rather than females), 
demographic (those living in urban areas are favoured to have access to credits than those in 
the rural areas or being too old or young to file a loan application), health-related (those 
physically-challenged not often considered for credit-extensions), logistics (distance to the 
nearest financial intermediary) and so on (Bowale, 2011; Odhiambo, 2014; Orji, Aguegboh, & 
Anthony-Orji, 2015; Chiwira, Bakwena, Mupimpila, & Tlhalefang, 2016). 
 
Also, evidences from several empirical studies show that financial reform is an income-
equalising channel to addressing the problem of income inequality (Levine, 2008; Agnello, 
Mallick, & Sousa, 2012; Hamori & Hashiguchi, 2012; Rewilak, 2013; Li & Yu, 2014; Asongu, 
2015c). Financial reform or liberalisation, hitherto, is carried out via various channels such as 
interest rate deregulation, maintaining credit ceilings and credit control, liquidity control, 
security markets deregulation, mergers and acquisition, free entry, banking supervision, and 
flexible international capital flow and so on. Meanwhile, credit growth, an outcome of financial 
reform is indicative of the success of any financial sector reform. This is because financial 
deregulation spurs the removal of various restrictive credit measures in the financial system 
thus, enabling financial institutions the mechanism to increase credit availability and access. 
Hence, financial development will magnify the economic opportunities of deprived groups and 
reduce the inter-generational tenacity of comparative incomes (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; 
Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Bae, Han, & Sohn, 2012; Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015). 
Financial reform in itself is not readily observable, but are captured using proxies and indicators 
such as the real interest rate, capital account liberalisation, maintaining credit ceilings and credit 
control, liquidity control, security markets deregulation, and so on. Each of the financial sector 
reforms is likely to impact all these proxies. For example, the liberalisation of interest rate could 
affect the real interest rate, the volume of intermediation and banking sector efficiency by 
permitting greater competition. There is also no necessary strict one-to-one relationship 
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between these proxies and the channel through which the financial system affects the real 
sector. For example, the level of the real interest rate would have an impact on the interest cost 
of capital, the volume of savings and possibly the distribution of funds through adverse 
incentives. By entering all the three proxies simultaneously, however, into the equations for 
economic growth and efficiency, it should be possible to distinguish somewhat better the 
importance of the difference channels. Thus, including the volume of intermediation and a 
measure of banking efficiency along the real interest rate in the estimation equations should 
allow the real interest rate term to primarily proxy the impact of financial system on the interest 
cost of capital, while the savings/investment effect would be reflected in the volume of 
intermediation and the allocative efficiency proxy. 
 
Therefore, this study takes a new direction of inquiry which, to the best of knowledge, has not 
been sufficiently explored in empirical literature and in line with theoretical literature 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), the financial reform variable is real interest rate while domestic 
credit is the proxy for credit growth. The approach is to investigate the indirect effect of 
financial reforms on income inequality through credit growth rather than analyse the direct 
effect of financial reforms on income inequality. This choice is motivated by the substantially 
documented evidence on surplus liquidity in the region which  translates the inability of 
financial institutions to optimally transform mobilised deposits into credit (Asongu, 2014). That 
is, this study is concerned about how financial reforms via credit growth or increased access to 
credit can contribute to the falling trend in income inequality in SSA and also address the 
problem of high income inequality index. This is because financial reform  influences the 
dissemination of income, as growing inequality is a reflection of the unequal access to 
productive opportunities (Batuo & Asongu, 2015). Also, it can improve the competence of the 
domestic financial structures by equalising access to credit and reducing the disparities 
associated with expected marginal returns (Abiad & Mody, 2005). In addition, it can lead to 
improved allocation of risk and socialisation of costs, which is needful during financial crises 
(Ugai, 2006; Claessens & Perotti, 2007). These outcomes, in turn, can help alleviate the burden 
of income inequality.  
 
In the light of the above, the link that credit growth is an equalising mechanism has been 
corroborated empirically by several scholars who demonstrate that increased access to credit 
(that is, loans and advances) from the financial sector equalises income (Haber & Perotti, 2008; 
Benmelech & Moskowitz, 2010; Rajan & Ramcharan, 2011; Agnello & Sousa, 2012; Li & Yu, 
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2014). Likewise, when regulators direct that some minimum amount of bank lending be given 
to certain ‘priority’ sectors in order to promote developmental agendas, these policies are often 
detrimental because it contributes to aggravating income inequality. Similarly, income 
inequality worsens where reserve requirements are excessive since because financial legislation 
mandates financial intermediaries, most especially banks, to deposit a large percentage of 
liabilities as reserves to the central bank. This policy is likely to contribute to widening income 
inequality owing to decreased possibilities for financial access which is needed to boost social 
mobility and mitigate unemployment vulnerability. Given the above, this research examines 
financial reform and credit growth nexus on income inequality. It seeks to identify whether the 
reform-credit-inequality nexus exist for SSA countries. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The main research question of the study is, “to what extent financial reforms and credit growth 
nexus on income inequality hold sway in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)”? The sub-research 
questions include: 
1. How stable is the financial sector after reforms in SSA? 
2. In what ways have financial reforms affected credit growth in SSA? 
3. How has credit growth impacted on income inequality in SSA? 
4. How does the financial reform and credit growth nexus on income inequality differ across 
SSA sub-regions? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of the study is to assess the financial reform and credit growth nexus on 
income inequality in SSA. Towards achieving this, the following specific objectives are 
addressed. They are as follows, to: 
1. ascertain the stability of the financial sector after reforms; 
2. evaluate how credit growth is stimulated by financial reforms; 
3. examine how credit growth impacted on income inequality in SSA; and 
4. appraise how the financial reforms and credit growth nexus on income inequality differ 
across SSA sub-regions.  
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1.5 Research Hypotheses 
In line with the research questions, the four (4) hypotheses stated in their null (H0) and 
alternate (H1) forms are: 
(i) H0: The financial sector is not significantly stable after financial reforms. 
H1: The financial sector is significantly stable after financial reforms. 
(ii) H0: Credit growth is not stimulated by financial reforms in selected SSA countries. 
H1: Credit growth is stimulated by financial reforms in selected SSA countries. 
(iii) H0: Credit growth has no equalising effect on income inequality in SSA. 
H1: Credit growth has equalising effect on income inequality in SSA. 
(iv) H0: The financial reforms and credit growth nexus on income inequality do not differ 
across SSA sub-regions.  
H1: The financial reforms and credit growth nexus on income inequality differ across SSA 
sub-regions. 
 
1.6  Scope of the Study 
The study scope is limited to a significant part of the financial system, the bank financial 
institutions and not the non-bank financial institutions, micro-credit and informal institutions 
basically due to two reasons: (1) the lack of comprehensive data to capture activities of the non-
bank financial institutions and (2) the lax regulatory control on that segment of the financial 
sector. The bank financial institutions are composed of commercial banks, central banks, 
merchant banks, investment banks and development banks while building societies, hire 
purchase companies, discount houses, mortgage trusts, insurance companies, pension funds, 
and investment trusts generally comprise non-bank financial institutions globally. One of the 
reasons for concentrating on bank-financial institutions is that liabilities of the banking sector 
form part of the money supply, while those of non-bank financial institutions do not; for they 
are referred to as near money. Besides, the banking sector accommodates transactions from the 
larger population with the greater likelihood of affecting their income streams while a fraction 
of the population have dealings with non-bank institutions owing to their specialised functions. 
At some point, it is necessary to differentiate between formal and informal financial systems. 
Financial sector development includes contractual and institutional arrangements that reduce 
intermediation and information costs associated with valuating and monitoring of projects and 
managing risk (Levine, 2004, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009). First, it is that part within 
the financial system that witnessed the most intermediation. Second, all countries have general 
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laws and regulations governing the banking sector, thus providing the most appropriate 
platform to analyse the effect of financial policies on income inequality. Third, when informal 
financial arrangements become parsimoniously applicable at a national level, they are migrated 
to the auspice formal regulations. Consequently, the focus of the study is the role played by 
formal financial sector policies in influencing income inequality. 
 
In addition, the scope of this study which is from 1980 to 2015 is constrained not only by the 
measures of inequality data but because most SSA countries embarked on financial within the 
1980s. For instance, the Gini index (income inequality measure) data sourced from Lahoti, 
Jayadev and Reddy (2016)2 Global Consumption and Income Project ended in year 2015 for 
most of the 161 countries in the database. Other alternative sources are Solt (2014) Standardised 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)3 data but the years coverage ended at 2011, at the 
most, for SSA countries and Milanovic (2014) data is only up to 2014. Both Solt (2014) and 
Milanovic (2014) datasets have too many data gaps and because of these shortcomings, this 
study strictly uses the inequality data from Lahoti et al. (2016). To comprehensively address 
the research questions, a general (panel data of 20 countries) to specific approach (4 countries) 
is adopted. The 20 countries are Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania, selected on 
the basis of having sufficient data on the Gini index, interest rate, and domestic credit volume. 
Likewise on the basis of population size and average gross domestic product, these countries 
are representative sample coverage for SSA. From this pool of countries, 6 are from Central 
Africa, 7 from East Africa, 4 from Southern Africa and 3 from West Africa (see Appendix 
Table A1). The specific 4 countries which represent each sub-region are Cameroon, Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa.  
The choice of these selected countries is intuitive in addition to four criteria that are summarised 
below: 
1. Cameroon: is in Central Africa with strong presence in its regional bloc, the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The country has made significant progress 
in regional integration, as evidenced by its trade volume with other Central African countries 
and the development of the transport system linking the country with other member countries 
                                                 
2Global Consumption and Inequality Project is one of the latest datasets on income inequality. Released in April 
2016, it covers 161 countries from 1960 to 2015. 
3The SWIID version 5.0 covers 172 countries from 1960 to 2011. Only a handful has coverage up to 2012 or 2013. 
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of the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC). However, the average 
Gini index for the period under review is 58.084 (see Figure 3.4) which is classified as very 
high income inequality5 (UNDP, 2017). 
2. Kenya: is a country that has shown tremendous improvement in most of its socio-economic 
indicators. A foremost player in the Eastern African region and in its regional bloc, the East 
African Community (EAC). The country has an average Gini index of 60.35 which by 
comparison is considered as very high. 
3. Nigeria: is a dominant player in West African region with a formidable presence in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Its average Gini index is 56.57 
in its sub-region and currently experiencing high income inequality. 
4. South Africa, a Group of Twenty (G20) member, is a dominant player in Southern African 
region and in its regional bloc, Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 
addition to having one of the highest average Gini index of 66.82, it also has the highest 
inequality rate in its sub-region and one of the highest in the world.  
 
Thus, with each country’s varying characteristics, heterogeneity and representing a sub-region, 
the choice of these countries makes comparative analysis relevant and intuitive in channelling 
a regional course of action in addressing the problem of income inequality.  
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
The focus of this study is to address the socio-economic problem of income inequality using 
the finance-credit approach. Some efforts have been made by examining the link between 
income inequality and financial reforms. However, our direction of enquiry which to the best 
of our knowledge has not been explored in the light of challenges to Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), is to attempt to link credit growth as an equalising mechanism to reducing 
income inequality. In an attempt to contribute to the literature, this study will deepen the 
empirical analysis by modifying the current scholarly methodology and show that credit growth 
is an outcome of financial reforms; thus financial reforms have an indirect relationship to 
income inequality. This approach corrects the endogeneity bias created with the inclusion of 
financial indicators variables and credit variables when explaining income inequality. Thus, 
leading to the cloudy effects of credit on income inequality. The outcome of this study is 
                                                 
4This figure is obtained by taking the average value of the Gini index from 1980 to 2015. 
5The Gini index is further categorised as follows: 0 – 0.399 (very low inequality); 0.4 – 0.449 (low inequality); 
0.45 – 0.529 (medium inequality); 0.53 – 0.599 (high inequality) and above 0.60 (very high inequality). Most 
developing economies are within the bracket of ‘high’ and ‘very-high’ income inequality. 
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relevant to monetary policy regulators as it shows the need to identify the necessary policy 
instrument and also engage in policy-mix that will not only lead to credit growth but also 
impacts on needy micro-units such as households and firms. To the households and firms, 
increased access to credit will create more economic opportunities and reduce the inequality 
gap. Since the larger percentage of SSA economies are still developing, the outcome of this 
study can be generalised such that researchers and other institutional stakeholders both in the 
region and other regions with similar features to Africa will find the outcome of this research 
relevant.  
 
1.8       Method of Analysis 
The study employs a three-equation model to establish the channel of influence by which 
financial reforms impact on income inequality through credit growth in addition to adopting a 
general-to-specific approach. The general approach involves a panel data analysis of 20 selected 
SSA countries from 1980 to 2015. The estimation structure further divides the sample into four 
sub-regions (Central, East, Southern and West Africa) to capture variation across the sub-
regions and also divide the coverage years to four periods namely 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09 
and 2010-15 to capture changes across these periods. The specific approach is the country-level 
analysis of the four selected countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa). In total, 
five estimation techniques are used - four estimators used for the panel data analysis and one 
estimator for the country-level analysis. The panel data estimators are (1) pooled ordinary least 
squares which assumes that all the units are identical and does not account for heterogeneity; 
(2) fixed effects that accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity among the units; (3) dynamic 
fixed effects only used to analyse the credit-inequality relationship because it accounts for 
hysteresis or persistence in income inequality; and (4) system generalised method of moments 
which controls for endogeneity and for estimator robustness. The error correction model which 
explains how deviations from long-run equilibrium are corrected is used on each of the four 
selected countries. 
 
1.9       Outline of the Study 
The study is divided into six chapters. Apart from the introductory chapter, chapter two details 
the definitions on the three subject matters – income inequality, financial reform and credit 
growth, a detailed review of the theoretical, empirical and methodological literature summed 
up with the identified gaps. Chapter three entails the stylised facts. Using data, descriptive and 
comparative analysis on the historical trends of the Gini index (measure of income inequality) 
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are carried out on the global scale, SSA, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa and West 
Africa. In addition to analyses on Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.  
 
Chapter four presents the methodology and the general-to-specific approach adopted for this 
work. The general approach is a panel data of 20 countries while the specific approach is on the 
four selected countries. Other areas covered are theoretical and analytical frameworks, 
modelling structures, estimation techniques, scope of study, sample sizes, variables description, 
sources, a priori expectations and issues with data compilation. Chapter five presents the results 
and their interpretations. The results for the general approach are highlighted first followed by 
those from the specific approach. Other results are those from pre- and post-estimations and the 
implications of findings. Lastly, Chapter Six concludes with policy recommendations, 
limitations of the study and areas that may require further research. 
 
1.10       Operational Definition of Terms 
i. Control variables: Independent variables that are not of particular interest in the 
econometric models but have influence on the independent variable of interest.  
ii. Credit growth: Refers to the increase in the volume of loans and advances given out to 
borrowers by financial intermediaries with agreement on repayment at some future date 
with interest. 
iii. Deposit rate: The rate of interest paid by financial intermediaries on depositors funds 
iv. Estimation technique: The econometric method employed in analysing the data. In this 
study it is pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects, dynamic fixed effects, system 
generalised method of moments, error correction model. 
v. Financial reform: The process of moving towards market-determined rates of interest, 
as well as market-determined prices, as opposed to government-regulated rates of interest 
(known as an interest rate ceiling). In this study, it is proxied by the real interest rate and 
the deposit rate. 
vi. Gini coefficient: The measure of income inequality. Ranges between 0 (perfect equality) 
and 1 (perfect inequality) 
vii. Gini index: The measure of income inequality. Ranges between 0 (perfect equality) and 
100 (perfect inequality) 
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viii. Growth rate: Percentage change in the variables employed in the analysis within 
specified time period. It is derived by dividing the difference between the past and the 
present value by the past value and then expresses the result in percentage.  
ix. Income inequality: The unequal distribution of household income across the various 
participants in an economy. It is measured by the Gini index in this study. 
x. Lending rate: The rate of interest charged by financial intermediaries on credits (loans 
and advances). 
xi. Nexus: An important connection or series of connections linking two or more things; a 
causal link or bond; a relationship. 
xii. Real interest rate: The rate of interest an investor, saver or lender receives (or expect to 
receive) after allowing for inflation 
xiii. Robustness and sensitivity check – Examining the regression co-efficient estimates 
obtained from a technique of analysis with another method of analysis for the purpose of 
confirming stability of the estimates.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter borders on the review of the definitions of the three main issues underlying this 
research – income inequality, financial reforms and credit growth. These are closely followed 
by the theoretical review of literature on income inequality vis-à-vis empirical and 
methodological reviews on the finance-credit-inequality nexus. The section also summarises 
gaps identified in the literature. 
 
2.1 Conceptual Issues 
2.1.1 Income Inequality 
The dialogue on inequality often makes a distinction between inequality of outcomes (measured 
by income, wealth, or expenditure) and inequality of opportunities (measured by health 
services, education, financial services and so on).  When differences occur due to circumstances 
beyond an individual’s control such as family background, ethnicity, gender or location of birth, 
such a situation is classified as inequality of opportunities. Likewise, inequality of outcomes is 
a combination of differences in opportunities and individual’s efforts and talent (Dabla-Norris 
et al., 2015). Out of the three components of inequality of outcomes, income inequality is the 
most cited because it is easily measurable unlike wealth or expenditure inequality that is subject 
to variations in individual incomes.  
 
According to Piketty (2014), inequality is more severe in wealth than income and the plausible 
explanation for this include wage stickiness which makes it difficult for middle and low-income 
households to set aside money for savings, in addition to the lower propensity to consume by 
the upper class (Sheng, 2015a). In advanced countries, wealth inequality is driven by rising 
concentration of wealth by the top 1 percent (Piketty, 2014; Saez, 2014), while in emerging and 
advanced countries, it is driven by wealth polarisation between rural and urban dwellers 
(UNDP, 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). 
 
Following earlier studies, this study is limited to income inequality6. It measures how much of 
a country’s income goes to the richest 10 or poorest 20 per cent of the population and how far 
                                                 
6The wordings ‘income inequality’ and ‘inequality’ are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, unless 
something else is specifically stated.  
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each country lies from perfect income equality each year. It does not, however, estimate 
deprivation, disease or destitution. Nevertheless, the distribution of income provides 
information on a relevant conception of poverty. It is the measurement of the distribution that 
highlights the gap between the rich and poor. In addition, inequality is a relative term as it solely 
covers the degree of income disparities between people of a given population. To capture the 
extent of income inequality within or between countries, studies have used varying measures 
such as the Gini index, the Palma ratio, the Atkinson index, Theil index, purchasing power 
parity, income shares, variance of log-income, the Robin Hood index and the coefficient of 
variation. However, the most widely used measure by researchers and policy makers is the Gini 
index which is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter  while other measures of income 
inequality are discussed herein:  
 
Other Measures of Income Inequality 
1) The Palma 
The seminal work of Gabriel Palma in 2006 titled “‘Globalizing inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and 
‘centripetal’ forces at work” has inspired an alternative measure of income inequality – the 
Palma (Cobham & Summer, 2013) which measures the share of income of the richest 10% and 
the poorest 40%. This is a clear departure from the computation of Gini index which is more 
sensitive to changes in the share of income of middle-income groups. The Palma, on the other 
hand, emphasises more on the income changes at the top and bottom ends. Given that the Gini 
index captures the income share of the middle class which are often stable, that is, the least 
susceptible to change, this approach may not be totally helpful as it does not adequately provide 
information on the income share of the poor when there is a change in the income share of the 
rich, something the Palma directly measures. As shown by the study on the Palma, countries 
which reduce their Palmas have rates of progress thrice higher in reducing extreme poverty and 
hunger compared to countries with rising Palmas (Cobham & Summer, 2013).  
 
Also, the Palma falls within a branch of “inter-decile ratios” for inequality measures. The most 
notably used is the ratio of the bottom 20% (B20) to the top 20% (T20), or the inverse. The 
Palma is the ratio of national income shares of the top 10% (T10) of households to the bottom 
40% (B40). Thus, if the richest 10% in a country earn between them half of the national income, 
and the poorest 40% earn one-tenth of the national income, the Palma is 0.5 divided by 0.1, 
which is 5. However, this data is mostly available for developed economies and it is not readily 
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available for developing economies like SSA. Other less-commonly adopted measures of 
income inequality, perhaps due to the complexities in their measurements are:  
 
2) Income Share Ratio 
This measure of inequality is the closest alternative to using the Gini index by researchers and 
policy makers. These are ratios measuring the percentiles, deciles, or quintiles ratio in the 
income distribution. For instance, 90/10 ratio is the ratio of the average income of the richest 
10% of the population divided by the average income of the bottom 10%. Similarly the 80/20 
ratio compares the average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% of the population. The 
same rule applies for measuring the 90/50 and 50/10 ratios (d'Hombres, Weber, & Elia, 2012).  
 
3) Atkinson Index 
This index ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality and 
1 maximum inequality. The index 𝐴𝜀, is an inequality measure given by:  
𝐴𝜀 = 1 − [
1
𝑛
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Where ?̅? is the average income, 𝑦𝑖 is the income of the individual/household i, n is the number 
of individual/households and 𝜀 indicates the degree of aversion to disparity. If 𝜀 > 0, then 
equality is preferred. Thus, as 𝜀  increases, more preference is given to income transfers to those 
at the lower end of the income distribution and less to those at the top of the distribution 
(d'Hombres et al., 2012).  
 
4) Robin Hood Index  
This index ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality) and depicts the 
income that would have to be redistributed (taken from the richer half of the population and 
given to the poorer half) for the society to be perfectly equal. It is also based on the Lorenz 
Curve and is equivalent to the maximum vertical distance between the Lorenz curve, and the 
perfect equality line (diagonal). The Robin Hood index RH formula is as follows:  
𝑅𝐻 =
1
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∑ |
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Where q is the number of quantiles, a is the width of the quantile, 𝑦𝑗 is the income in the quantile 
j and 𝑎𝑗 is the number (absolute or relative) of income earners in the quantile. 𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the sum 
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of incomes of all N quantiles and 𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the sum of the income earners in all N quantiles 
(d'Hombres et al., 2012).  
 
5) Variance/Coefficient of Variation  
The variance (𝜎2) is a measure of how far each value in the data set is from the mean 
(dispersion) (d'Hombres et al., 2012). Given as: 
𝜎2 =
1
𝑛
∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the individual/household income, ?̅? is the average income and n is the number of 
individuals/households. It is thus possible to compute the coefficient of variation CV as follows:  
𝐶𝑉 =
√1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
?̅?
 
 
2.1.2 Financial Reforms 
In line with McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial reform is defined as a government 
initiative taken to stimulate borrowing, investment and consumption by way of easing pressure 
in the credit market (Chipote, Mgxekwa, & Godza, 2014; Asongu, 2015a). It uses a combination 
of measures such as interest rate adjustments, regulating liquidity ratios, cash reserve 
requirements, credit ceilings, capital markets moderations, controlling international capital 
flows, banking supervision, branch expansion, mergers and acquisitions, microfinance banking 
regulations and so on. The essence of financial reforms is to achieve efficiency in the sector 
and foster financial access, deepening and intermediation (Obamuyi & Olorunfemi, 2011; Bae 
et al., 2012; Edo, 2012; Asongu, 2013). The financial liberalisation process is often 
characterised by countries experiencing some financial crises such as various combinations of 
banking sector insolvency, inability to manage government deficits, currency depreciation, and 
reversal of foreign capital inflows (Law, Tan, & Azman-Saini, 2014; Agnello, Castro, Jalles, & 
Sousa, 2015).  
 
The macroeconomic objectives of stabilising prices, maintaining full employment, ensuring 
high economic growth, and internal and external balances are the main goals of economic 
reforms, therefore financial reforms are an integral part of the country-wide economic reforms 
undertaken to shift any given economy (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Saddled with the 
responsibility of achieving this macroeconomic goal is the banking sector - often the targeted 
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sector within the financial system. The banking sector is expected to play its role in 
intermediation and be strong enough to be among equal players in international financial 
markets (Adelakun, 2010; Shittu, 2012; Kotarski, 2015). The evolution of financial reforms is 
as a result of proffering responses to challenges posed by developments in the financial system 
such as systemic crisis, globalisation, technological innovation and financial crisis. The 
deregulation of the banking system often provides the impetus for structural changes and a 
policy shift to a market-based financial system from direct control (Ikhide & Alawode, 2001; 
Olofin & Afangideh, 2008; Omankhanlen, 2012). In this vein, financial reforms result in new 
banking models intended to broaden the scope of financial services offered by banks leading to 
more efficient and disciplined financial systems. 
 
In countries where the government own and control banks, the interest rates charged on loans 
are subject to ceilings or other forms of regulations while the distribution of credit is constrained 
and strictly regulated (Chipote et al., 2014). Other features in such countries are that explicit or 
implicit taxation also weigh on the volume of financial intermediation (Abiad, Detragiache, & 
Tressel, 2010) in addition to entry restrictions and barriers to foreign capital flows which limits 
both domestic and foreign competition. From the 1980s, many economies have liberalised and 
relaxed their financial sectors, although the process is by no means complete and uniform across 
countries (Agnello et al., 2012) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
have played a major role in some countries advising the authorities about their various reform 
process. Thus, whether the economic crises have been fuelled by the liberalisation process, 
perhaps because of improper sequencing of reform policies or simply as a result of lack of 
sufficient supervisory infrastructure, are often discussed in policy circles.  
 
2.1.3 Credit Growth 
This research limits credit to ‘domestic credit to the private sector’ from the banking system 
without capturing public sector credits. This indicator is used because the inclusion of public 
sector credit bloats the volume of credit exposure in the economy and clouds the actual volume 
of credit extended to the private sector. The increase in credit is one of the probable outcomes 
of financial reforms and signifies the stability of any financial system (Balassa, 1989). 
Economic growth and development hinges on the extent to which households and firms have 
access to credit (Bae et al., 2012). Thus, credit is defined as a contractual agreement in which 
a borrower receives something of value now and agrees to repay the lender at some date in the 
future, generally with interest. The term also refers to the borrowing capacity of an individual 
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or company and it is the amount of loans and advances made available by a bank or financial 
intermediary to a person or a firm. It is the sum of the amount of funds financial institutions are 
willing to provide to individuals or firms (IMF, 2010).  
 
Most researchers (Adusei, 2013; Boateng & Abdulrahman, 2013; Frey & Volz, 2013; Chiwira 
et al., 2016) capture credit growth by the volume of domestic credit to the private sector which 
is a function of several macroeconomic factors. As an economy witnesses rapid development 
of its financial sector, credit growth occurs (Iossifov & Khamis, 2009). However, in a bid to 
foster financial deepening is the risk of triggering a ‘credit boom’ which is defined as when 
some measure of credit experience extreme deviations from its trend, with the implicit 
supposition that such abnormalities are not supported by fundamentals (Iossifov & Khamis, 
2009). An important outcome of the credit boom literature is that incidences of excessive credit 
growth tend to be synchronised across countries (IMF, 2010). Lastly, the observed growth rate 
of credit also depends on the development of the financial sector at its initial state in addition 
to being driven by the interaction of factors of demand and supply. 
 
On the demand side, bank credit is determined by robust economic growth and falling lending 
rates. The robustness of real economic activity strengthens consumer confidence, increases 
business drive, driving up consumption demand and the need to secure more loans to finance 
investment expansion (Igan & Pinheiro, 2011). In addition, households demand credit in order 
to smoothen out consumption over their life-cycle while firms require finance to expand 
production lines to meet consumption. Accordingly, credit demand has a negative relationship 
with borrowing costs but is positively associated with individuals’ current income and wealth, 
borrowers’ expectations about future income and asset valuations, and the current and future 
rates of return on capital (Iossifov & Khamis, 2009; IMF, 2010; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016).  
 
On the supply side, credit growth is encouraged by both reduced liquidity ratios and cash 
reserve requirements, improved liquid liabilities and bolstered by the high system-wide capital 
adequacy ratios enabling banks the opportunity to expand their credit portfolios without 
contravening regulatory standards. So long as lending operations are expected to yield a rate of 
return on equity that is above the opportunity cost of shareholder funds, the supply of credit 
will be further driven by the profit-maximising behaviour of banks as this expands their credit 
profiles. It is appropriate to say that since the expected rate of return on bank lending depends 
on the interest rate differential between assets and liabilities, operating costs, and the probability 
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that contracts will be honoured, then the supply of credit is positively related to the rate of return 
on equity, disposable income, and the prices of assets that can be used as collateral. Therefore, 
changes in bank creditors’ and bank shareholders’ perception of the riskiness of their 
investments can also affect the supply of credit, by influencing the cost of borrowed funds and 
the opportunity cost of owned funds, respectively (Iossifov & Khamis, 2009; Igan & Pinheiro, 
2011; Olusegun, Akintoye, & Dada, 2014; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016). 
 
2.2 Review of Theoretical Issues 
This sub-section reviews several theories underlining the concept of income inequality. A key 
underpinning theory which influences other theories of persistent income inequality is the 
financial market imperfections theory. This theory explains how financial market imperfections 
affect cross-dynasty wage differences among individuals with the same human capital 
endowment. It states that imperfect market increases the ancestral disparities in human capital 
with corresponding implications for the persistence of dynastic differences in income and 
wealth (Becker, 1957; Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Baland & 
Robinson, 2000). From this perspective, financial development might be disadvantageous to 
the poor. Imperfect financial market influences inter-generational persistence of inequality 
because with perfect credit market, the ability of people going to school increases, irrespective 
of parental wealth (Levine, 2008; Piketty & Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2014). 
 
In furtherance are the extensive and intensive margin theories. The extensive margin theory 
borders on broadening the availability and use of financial services by individuals who had not 
been employing those services because of price or discriminations (Odhiambo, 2014; Orji et 
al., 2015; Chiwira et al., 2016). That is, financial development will increase the economic 
opportunities of those who are at a disadvantage and reduce the cross-dynasty persistence of 
relative incomes (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Bae et al., 
2012; Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015). On the other hand, the intensive margin theory states that 
finance can affect inequality through an indirect mechanism and directly by enhancing financial 
services of those already accessing them and these are usually high-networth individuals and 
well-established organisations (Chipote et al., 2014; Olusegun et al., 2014; Asongu & 
Tchamyou, 2015).  
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In the same vein, the shaping of persistent inequality through human capital accumulation is 
emphasised by human capital theory. It states that the decision of parents to invest in their 
children's human capital development determines whether there will be persistence in relative 
incomes across generations and that ability endowments and schooling are complements in the 
production of human capital (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986). Human capital is embodied in 
individuals while physical capital is not; thus the maximisation of economy-wide return to 
investment in human capital is by spreading this investment equally across all individuals, but 
this is not the case with spreading capital ownership across many individuals.  
 
On education, Galor and Moav (2006) argue that unless the capitalists exert the political will to 
finance public education or the financial markets be developed to facilitate more human capital 
accumulation by poor families, inequality will persevere and the economy will stagnate. Lastly, 
the profit theory emanates from the premise that banks’ profit maximising behaviour propel 
them to lend to wealthier firms and households and avoid lending to poor households with low 
levels of guarantee. This is because, it is assumed that it is riskier lending to them which might 
contradict a bank’s incentive to earn maximum yields on risky assets leading to greater income 
disparity between the two groups.  
 
Establishing the non-linear relationship is the Kuznets (1955) inverted-U hypothesis which 
states that income inequality initially increases at the early stages of economic development 
and thereafter falls. That is, as economic development progresses – in the early stages of 
economic development, financial markets are either non-existent or under-developed; as the 
economy grows financial superstructures begin to develop. At this stage the growth and savings 
rate increase and inequality widens. However, as the economy reaches its final developmental 
stage, the distribution of income in the economy stabilises, the savings rate falls and the 
economy converges. Thus, it is expected that inequality will rise at the onset of financial 
reforms and thereafter falls as the reforms take effect (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Banerjee 
& Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). Goldsmith (1969) also theorise that financial 
superstructures of an economy speed-up economic growth and enhance economic performance 
to the best that they help in facilitating funds from the surplus to needy areas where such funds 
will yield the maximum social return and income inequality reduces. 
Another is the liquidity constraints theory which states that liquidity constraints impede the 
business opportunities of the poor thus exacerbating income inequality among economic agents 
(Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994; Black & Lynch, 1996; 
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Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2006). Closely related is the 
investment opportunity theory which states that finance can affect cross-dynasty returns to 
investment. That is when individual investments are constraint by parental wealth, it can create 
another convexity that fosters persistence inequality (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009) and that 
better access to finance enables the wealthy to invest either through entrepreneurship or in 
higher-return projects to earn additional income in the form of interests or dividends. 
 
Recently, Sheng (2015b) propounded the savings rate theory by extending the post-Keynesian 
model that introduces household leverage. The theory states that income inequality is positively 
associated with the savings rate if savers’ funds are allocated to investing firms for production 
and it is negatively associated with the savings rate if savers’ funds are lent to spending 
households via financial intermediation for consumption (creating income illusion and 
consumption constraint). With poor households having a higher marginal propensity to 
consume and a lower marginal propensity to save relative to wealthy households, there is 
always the need by the former to borrow from the latter to satisfy consumption needs thereby 
exacerbating income inequality (Scott & Pressman, 2013; Berisha, Meszaros, & Olson, 2015; 
Sheng, 2015a). Also, in relation to financial globalisation, the negative association between 
income inequality and savings rate is caused by habitual consumer credit use for deficit 
spending which aggravates bubble speculation occasioned by lower interest rates (Lambie, 
2009; Sheng, 2011). 
 
Lastly, the discrimination theory of Becker (1957) states that discrimination can contribute to 
inter-generational persistence of inequality. It could be on race, colour, religion, sex, and 
ethnicity and so on. Discrimination is easily entrenched when little competition exists, but 
competed away if the barriers of entrance of new firms are sufficiently low. Financial reforms 
will spur more intermediation resulting in banks seeking-out the best firms to lend to rather than 
simply granting credit to acquaintances. Therefore, financial system reforms that deepen 
competition reduce segregation and expand the economic opportunities of excluded groups 
thereby reducing income inequality. Table 2.1 summarises the theoretical literature on finance 
and income inequality. 
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Table 2.1:     Main Theoretical Construct on Finance and Income Inequality 
S/No. Theory Explanation 
1 
Discrimination Theory When there is little competition, discrimination is enforced, but such 
is competed away if the barriers of entrance of new firms are 
sufficiently low. Thus, any financial sector reforms that intensify 
competition will lead to the reduction discrimination and expand the 
economic opportunities of disadvantaged groups thereby reducing 
income inequality. 
Becker (1957) 
  
2 
Extensive Margin Theory When financial services are increased and made available to those 
initially excluded due to price, cost of funds or other impediments, 
income inequality falls. 
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
3 
Financial Imperfection Theory Imperfect market increases the cross-generational differences in 
human capital with corresponding implications for the continuation 
of wealth and income inequality across dynasties. 
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) 
Baland and Robinson (2000) 
4 
Human Capital Theory The decision of parents to invest in their children's human capital 
development determines the extent of persistence of relative incomes 
across generations. 
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) 
  
5 
Intensive Margin Theory Finance can affect inequality through an indirect mechanism and 
directly through the enhancement of financial services of those 
already accessing the financial system. 
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
6 
Inverted-U Hypothesis Income inequality initially increases at the early stages of financial 
reforms and thereafter falls as the reforms takes effect. 
Kuznets (1955) 
7 
Investment Opportunity Theory Finance can affect cross-dynasty returns to investment. That is when 
individual investments are constraint by parental wealth, it can 
create another convexity that fosters persistence inequality. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) 
  
8 
Liquidity Constraints Theory Constraints on liquidity hinder the business opportunities of the poor 
thus exacerbating income inequality among economic agents. 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) 
Black and Lynch (1996) 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) 
9 
Savings Rate Theory 
Income inequality is positively associated with the savings rate if 
savers’ funds are allocated to investing firms for production and 
negatively associated with the savings rate if savers’ funds are lent to 
spending households via financial intermediation for consumption 
(income illusion and consumption constraint). 
Sheng (2015) 
  
Source: Researcher's Compilation 
 
2.3 Review of Empirical and Methodological Issues 
There remains no general consensus on how best to model the finance-credit-inequality nexus 
as the empirical evidence varies substantially. While some studies use the computable general 
equilibrium modelling approach, some analyses are based on natural experiments, firm- and 
household-level surveys, as well as cross-country regressions. Scholars focus on the 
microeconomic apparatuses connecting finance and economic opportunity as well as the 
macroeconomic assessments of an economy’s income distribution. Studies also differ in the 
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empirical approaches, the extent to which they assess causal relationships, and the empirical 
representations with which income inequality and access to finance are captured. However, 
each methodological approach has its own weaknesses.  
 
Much of empirical literature investigate the relationship between finance and income inequality 
using instruments (channels) of financial reforms as indicators with focus mostly on developed 
and emerging economies with very sparse scholarly focus on the effect of credit on income 
inequality even in these economies. Exclusive studies on SSA are also few due to poor data 
availability constraints. Thus, this empirical review will be a blend of various reviews on 
income inequality as it pertains to financial reforms, financial deepening, financial crises and 
micro-credits. Also, owing to different measures of inequality, methodologies, sample size, 
geographical coverage and different instruments of finance, there are conflicting results as to 
the impact of these variables on income inequality.  
 
A strand of the empirical literature has established the determinants of credit growth or bank 
lending (proxied by domestic credit to the private sector) to be liquid liabilities, non-performing 
loans, liquidity ratio, cash reserve requirements, banks’ capital structure, cyclicality, business 
cycles, lending rates/interest spread, loan-to-deposit ratio amongst others (Tomak, 2013; Eze & 
Okoye, 2014; Raunig, Scharler, & Sindermann, 2014; Cucinelli, 2015; Chimkono, Muturi, & 
Njeru, 2016; Moussa & Chedia, 2016). With particular reference to the banking sector, these 
studies establish the relationship between credit to the private sector and its determinants and 
further conclude that movements in the variation of credit volume or bank lending are explained 
by these factors. That is, the extent to which banks lend is dependent on the performance of the 
aforementioned determinants. 
 
In the same vein, another branch of empirical literature establishes the existence of a strong and 
direct relationship between finance and income inequality as there are grounds for assuming 
both beneficial and harmful effects. That is, countries with more developed financial sectors 
typically grow faster, notably because of  improved efficiency in the sector and better allocation 
of capital, which result in an income-equalising effect (Agnello et al., 2012; Bordo & Meissner, 
2012; Asongu, 2013; Delis et al., 2014; Lee, 2014; Anyanwu, Erhijakpor, & Obi, 2016). These 
studies in their analyses, include domestic credit to the private sector with other financial sector 
variables – interest rate, entry requirements, cash reserve requirements, broad money supply 
(M2), liquidity ratio and so on – in explaining this relationship. This is the gap identified in the 
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literature. That is, the inclusion of domestic credit to the private sector with other financial 
sector indicators in explaining variations in income inequality, creates an estimation problem 
resulting in endogeneity bias. 
 
Given the two strands of scholarship (the credit determinants and income inequality theses) and 
the identified gap, this study conjectures that credit growth is a direct outcome of financial 
reforms and that financial reform may not have a direct but an indirect relationship with income 
inequality through its influence on credit growth. This modification shows that, given 
favourable reform indicators, the likelihood of credit volume increasing is high, and with the 
increase in credit, income inequality declines, ceteris paribus. To address the research 
hypotheses, the impact of financial reform on financial system stability will be examined first 
because stability is an important factor for any financial system to evaluate the transitory impact 
on financial reforms on other aspects of the financial market.  
 
The next is the examination of the effects of financial reform on credit growth and thereafter 
the effect of credit growth on income inequality. In addressing the major arguments of credit 
growth and income inequality, the combination of financial and some control variables is 
employed as explained in the data section. To explain the determinants of credit growth while 
controlling for the effects of GDP growth and inflation rate are liquidity ratio, cash reserve 
ratio, number of bank branches, liquid liabilities, interest rate spread, and loan to deposit ratio. 
It is hypothesised that positive movements in these variables will lead to an increase in credit. 
 
Abiad and Mody (2005) pursue a political economy approach in explaining the timing, pace 
and extent of financial sector reforms since large literatures examine only the consequences of 
financial sector reforms while the causes of reforms receive less attention. Using an ordered 
logit estimation technique on 35 countries from 1973 to 1996, they find that international 
interest rate and balance of payment crises trigger reforms, banking crises have negative impact 
on reforms, highly repressed economies remain unchanged but once reforms occur they gain 
momentum overtime, legal systems do not hinder reforms, ideology and structure seem to have 
less influence on the reform process, left-wing governments are no less reform-oriented than 
right-wings, presidential and parliamentary governments are also inclined to reforms and 
greater trade openness appear to increase reform where the level of liberalisation is low. They 
conclude that countries with a repressive financial systems have the strongest tendency to stay 
repressed such as Japan, a country is prone to reform the greater the disparity from the region's 
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reform level, shocks alter status quo through both reforms and reversals, IMF programme 
conditionality appears to have a strong influence under conditions of high repression with a 
declining effects thereafter. The paper, though, one of the earliest works on the finance-
inequality dynamics, omitted the effects of traditional finance variables such as liquidity ratio, 
reserve requirements and domestic credit on income inequality. 
 
Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) critique of the theories and evidence on finance 
and income inequality use the human capital approach of intergenerational ability, education 
and wealth. They conclude that given theoretical and empirical research, there are potentially 
high returns on the impact of finance on economic opportunity. According to them, other factors 
that affects the degree to which an individual’s future income is the result of talent and good 
investment ideas or inherited income are the intergenerational persistence of relative incomes, 
the distribution of income, improvements in financial markets, contracts, and intermediaries. 
These reduce income inequality because of financial development. In addition, the ability of 
parents to invest in their children’s education has a positive impact on the child’s future income. 
 
Following the econometric pattern of Beck et al. (2000) and Calderón and Servén (2004), Batuo 
et al. (2010) examine financial development and income inequality in 22 African countries. 
Using the system generalised method of moments (Sys-GMM) technique, they find no evidence 
of Kuznets hypothesis in the data (Clarke, Xu, & Zou, 2003), but that inequality reduces with 
index of financial reform, broad money (M2), liquid liabilities and domestic credit to the private 
sector (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993); increases with primary education 
(Barro, 2000). Their findings also establish that the relationship between financial development 
and inequality is both correlative and causal and that causality may run in both ways. The 
identified gap is that the 22 countries were not grouped regionally to give the inequality level 
on a region-basis. 
 
Agnello and Sousa (2012) also analyse the impact of banking crises on income inequality. 
Using the Gini index as the inequality variable, they conduct a dynamic panel data analysis with 
instrumental variables general method of moments (IV-GMM) estimation method on 62 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries 
from 1980 to 2006 and find that in OECD countries, access to the banking sector helps to reduce 
inequality and that inequality rises in some periods before a banking crisis and declines 
afterwards (Kuznets, 1955). Also, inequality is a very persistent variable, which reflects that 
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changes in the income distribution within the country do not often occur. A major gap in the 
paper is that the composition of non-OECD countries is unknown thus creating the problem of 
knowing how many SSA countries are captured in the study. 
 
In the same vein, Agnello et al. (2012) extend the works of Abiad et al. (2010) by analysing the 
impact of financial reforms on income inequality with an unbalanced panel data on 62 countries 
from 1973 to 2005. Using the fixed effects (FE) estimation technique, they find that removing 
policies toward directed credit, removing or reducing excessive high reserve requirements, 
improving the securities markets, making the expansion of bank branches easier, having wider 
banking services and lowering regulation in more democratic societies reduce income 
inequality. Thus corroborating the works of political-economy researchers (Haber & Perotti, 
2008; Benmelech & Moskowitz, 2010; Rajan & Ramcharan, 2011) while the existence of 
minimum amount of lending to certain 'priority' sectors and trade openness exacerbates income 
inequality. In spite of the subtlety of the study, only five SSA countries are included and this is 
not a strong representation of the continent. 
 
Delis et al. (2014), using the poverty rate and three typologies of inequality - the Gini index, 
Theil index, and income percentiles examine how banking regulations affect the distribution of 
income in some selected countries. The study acknowledges that previous literatures on the 
relationship between finance and income inequality did not explicitly account for the dynamic 
nature of regulatory policies relating to the banking sector. They also did not address the 
specific characteristics of banking regulations in different countries and the evolution of these 
regulations as a source of income inequality and thus, claim to be the first to analyse this 
relationship. Using a dynamic unbalanced 3-year average country-level panel data on 87 
countries from 1973 to 2005 and while adopting the Sys-GMM and two-stage least squares 
instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) estimation techniques, they conclude that economic and 
institutional developments are a precondition for reforms to have a positive effect on the real 
economy following Laffont (2005). On the Gini index they find that banking deregulation, bank 
liquidity, overall liberalisations, eliminating credit and interest rate controls, removing entry 
barriers, enhancing privatisation laws and liberalisation of international capital flows increase 
the income share of both rich and poor, thus reducing income inequality confirming earlier 
findings (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Agnello et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013; Eriemo, 2014) 
while trade openness, inflation rate, liberalisation of equity market increases inequality. Results 
from other inequality variants are divergent. 
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On the impact of income inequality on financial systems, Kaboub, Todorova, and Fernandez 
(2010) analyse how income inequality led to the US financial crises of 2007-2009. The paper 
uses Minsky's financial instability hypothesis (FIH) to analyse the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
and for introducing adequate reforms to restore economic stability. According to Minsky and 
Whalen (1996), structural inequality leads to financial instability such as real wage income 
stagnation, increasing real estate prices mean that poor households will never be able to buy a 
home, and such will only buy homes if real income rises, or if real estate prices decline or 
government subsidies via down-payment assistance or through low fixed interest rates. The 
study gives a chronology of the disparity of the income distribution in the US vis-à-vis unethical 
banking activities in the sub-prime mortgage sector that eventually led to a financial meltdown. 
Considering the spill-over effects of the US financial crises, perhaps this study should have 
been extended to analyse the impact of the financial crises on the global economy including 
SSA countries. 
 
Kaboub et al. (2010) and Rajan (2010) attributes the 2007 US financial crisis to rising inequality 
in the past 30 years while Kregel (2008) attributes it to a failing banker-borrower relationship 
and the absence of lenders’ ability to evaluate risk. Since 1980, persistent economic inequality 
has intensified in the US and the Gini index has been on a steady rise. Between 1980 and 2004, 
real hourly wage was $15.68/hour and for the same period worker productivity increased by 68 
percent (United for a Fair Economy, 2006). In 2007, the Federal minimum wage level was 57 
percent of the living wage, down from 81 percent in 1979 and 94 percent in 1964 (United for a 
Fair Economy, 2006). From 1979 to 2006, real average family income barely changed for the 
poorest 20 percent but income for the richest 20 percent increased by 57 percent and the richest 
5 percent by 87 percent (United for a Fair Economy, 2006). Also, since 1980, tax policy took a 
regressive turn for the poor households: capital gains tax fell by 31 percent; estate tax dropped 
by 46 percent while payroll tax increased by 25 percent (United for a Fair Economy, 2006). In 
all these, the Federal Reserve failed to see the destabilizing impact of economic inequality and 
saw the situation as a way of keeping workers in-check and preventing inflationary pressures. 
 
On the credit-finance-inequality nexus, Bordo and Meissner (2012) use banking and credit data 
on a study of 14 advanced countries from 1920 to 2008 to analyse the impact of credit boom on 
financial crisis and secondly, the impact of income inequality on credit growth. The study 
deploys a mixture of econometric methods ordinary least squares (OLS), linear probability 
(LPM) and logit models to conclude among others that economic growth drives credit boom 
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and not inequality. Their results show that a fall in short-term interest rates can lead to a credit 
boom (Borio & White, 2003; Lambie, 2009; Sheng, 2011); income inequality is not a significant 
determinant of credit boom and there exist a positive relationship between credit boom and 
banking crisis (Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; Kaboub et al., 2010; Rajan, 2010). The gap in the 
literature is the inability to show that inequality can lead to financial crises (Iacoviello, 2008). 
That is, a widening gap in the income distribution can stimulate reforms in the financial sector 
that will lead to more financial deepening and efficiency. 
 
In addition, Kumhof and Rancière (2011) using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model find that households in the lower deciles borrow to maintain consumption 
growth due to rising income inequality and stagnant incomes and the increase in debt eventually 
leads to financial crisis (Sheng, 2015a). According to Atkinson and Morelli (2010), the evidence 
that income inequality leads to financial crisis is inconclusive. On the widening inequality in 
the US, McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) point out that the polarised political system has 
not been able to use the tax structure to redistribute income and fix the educational system thus 
further exacerbating inequality. Pursuing a similar argument, rising inequality in the US since 
1970s is largely due to problems in the educational sector (Goldin & Katz, 2008; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Levine, 2009; Rajan, 2010). However, in analysing the US financial crisis, Goldin and 
Katz (2008) attribute rising inequality to the following factors. First is the stagnating wages and 
income for lower deciles in the US; second, the median wage has not risen for male workers 
since 1973; and third, public education has failed to provide the type of training required to get 
skilled jobs which would have boosted real income and reduced the inequality gap. 
 
Furthermore, Asongu (2013) introduced the concepts of formalisation, semi-formalisation and 
informalisation and draws motivation from the increasing phenomenon of knowledge economy 
(Asongu, 2015c) and soaring mobile banking activities (Asongu, 2012) mostly captured by the 
informal financial sector. The study investigates how financial reforms address the problem of 
income inequality in Africa through financial sector competition and informal sector inclusion 
(known as financial inclusion). Using 2SLS-IV technique and panel data on 28 African 
countries from 1996 to 2010, he finds that improvement of the formal financial sector reduces 
inequality, improvement of the semi-formal financial sector increases inequality, improvement 
of the informal financial sector reduces inequality and improvement of the non-formal financial 
sector reduces inequality.  
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Other findings are that while formal financial development decreases inequality (Kai & Hamori, 
2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Beck, Levine, & Levkov, 2010) financial sector formalisation 
increases it. Whereas semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of 
financial semi-formalisation is unclear; both informal financial development and financial 
informalisation have an income equalising effect and non-formal financial development is pro-
poor. Also, the study noted that a large chunk of the monetary base in developing countries 
does not transit through formal financial institutions; thus the equation of financial depth in the 
perspective of money supply to liquid liabilities has substantially placed a huge gap in the 
financial development literature (Asongu, 2015c). 
 
In addition, Lee (2014) investigates the effects of financial globalisation on long-run income 
inequality and poverty across countries from 1976 to 2004, using cross-country regressions. In 
similar studies, trade openness is the most commonly used variable for globalisation (Milanovic 
& Squire, 2005; Epifani & Garcia, 2008) and claims to be the first to use financial integration 
as a proxy for financial globalisation in inequality models. Using the Gini index data from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) and the OLS empirical technique, the results show that 
financial integration increases income inequality while trade openness, education, natural 
resources and socialism have income-equalising effects. On critically reviewing the paper, it is 
observed that the study covers some low and lower middle income countries while the exact 
number of sub-Saharan countries is not indicated. Also, a composite financial integration 
variable (i.e. the total foreign liability + assets/GDP) is used in addition to domestic credit to 
the private sector. While the former shows that it exacerbates inequality the latter is not 
statistically significant. Thus, there is the need to include more financial indicators such as 
liquidity ratios, interest rates, cash-reserve requirements, level of broad money (M2) and so on, 
to test their impact on income inequality.  
 
In analysing the key drivers of income inequality in 17 West African countries from 1970 to 
2011, Anyanwu et al. (2016) adopt a dynamic sys-GMM on an unbalanced panel and find 
evidence of existence of the Kuznets curve in the sub-region, which proposed that inequality 
may rise with the initial increase in per capita income but declines subsequently. Key drivers 
of inequality in the region are identified to be past levels of income inequality, level of 
economic development, demographic variables, human capital, natural resources, domestic 
investment rate, government size, globalisation, democracy, unemployment, foreign aid and 
civil war. The study omits finance as a key determinant of inequality. That is, credit access to 
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those in lower- and middle-income groups to consume an array of products and services that 
they hitherto would not be able to afford. The financial sector is an important aspect of any 
economy such that lack of access to credit and financial services (financial exclusion) for the 
low- and middle-income groups further widens the inequality gap. This is because poor 
households (micro-entrepreneurs) are not availed the necessary financial opportunities required 
to improve their businesses and earnings/income.  
 
Investigating the effect of credit on citizens’ support for redistributive policies, Kus and Fan 
(2015) using data from the International Social Survey (ISS), the OECD and the European 
Credit Research Institute (ECRI) find a negative association between citizen support for 
redistribution and credit use. The study submits to the assertion that attitudes towards 
redistribution is shaped by credit. That is, the extent by which lower-income households can 
consume is significantly affected by it and mitigates the impact of income inequality. Since the 
study is limited to only 17 OECD countries the results may not be generalisable to developing 
economies. It is therefore imperative to test the hypothesis on low- and middle-income 
economies such as SSA countries. 
 
In the same vein, Malinen (2013) uses data on the income share of top 1% income earners and 
bank loans on eight developed economies to analyse the relationship between income inequality 
and bank credit in a panel co-integration framework and finds that they have a long-run 
dependency relationship – estimating the relationship between income inequality and credit as 
a percentage of the real GDP from 1959 to 2008. Results indicate that both the top 1 percent 
income share and the share of bank loans are driven by stochastic trends and that income 
inequality has contributed to the increase of bank credit in developed economies after the 
Second World War. The study shows that credit fluctuations are driven by income inequality; 
however given the sample size of only eight advanced countries, this outcome may not be easily 
generalised. 
 
Johansson and Wang (2013) analyse the relationship between oppressive financial policies and 
inequality across countries. The study shows that financial oppression increases income 
inequality because it disproportionately affects economic opportunities across a country's 
population. The study points out that if an economy is financially repressed, its wealthy 
individuals will have better access to financial support while the poor are inhibited by limited 
economic opportunities due to constraints in the financial system, often resulting in widening 
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inequality gap. Argued is the fact that planning authorities often devise and adopt suppressive 
financial policies, such as interest rate restrictions, credit allocation regulations, capital account 
controls, and ensuring barriers to entry in the banking sector in order to achieve faster economic 
growth (Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 1998, 2000; Chipote et al., 2014). Likewise, in the 
presence of incomplete information, such policies can be Pareto-inefficient by providing a 
direct allocation of limited financial resources, thereby at least partly solving the problems of 
market failure and financial instability.  
 
Analysing the causes and impact of income inequality from a global perspective, Dabla-Norris 
et al. (2015) investigate the drivers of income inequality using a broad sample of 162 advanced 
economies, emerging markets and developing countries (EMDC). The empirical approach of 
pooled OLS and FE estimation techniques is based on a simple model of within-country 
variation in inequality. They also controlled for disparities in in income levels across countries 
using a panel of five-year data averages over the period 1980 to 2012. They find among other 
things that in advanced economies, increase in the skill premium exacerbates market income 
inequality, reflecting the fact that education gains accrue more to those at the higher end of the 
income chain. Also, relaxation of labour market conditions is linked to higher market inequality 
and increase the income share of the top 10 percent. Increase in government redistributive 
spending relative to total spending is associated with a decrease in income inequality.  
 
The study further shows that the income share of the poor and the middle class irrespective of 
the level of economic development of a country is raised from better access to education (as 
captured by declining educational inequality), improved health outcomes, and redistributive 
social policies. Relative to what obtains in emerging economies (EMDCs), financial deepening 
raises the income shares of the poor and the middle class in advanced economies. This is 
probably a reflection of the differences in credit allocation and the extent of financial inclusion. 
The authors conclude that financial deepening in EMDCs must be supported by greater 
integration in order to close the inequality gap. Central governments must play a central role in 
alleviating impediments to financial integration with the creation of necessary legal and 
regulatory frameworks, supporting the information environment by promoting credit 
information-sharing systems. 
 
The report on income inequality using trade globalisation, financial globalisation and technical 
change as drivers of inequality shows a rising trend from the early 1990s to the late 2000s in 
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most countries (United Nations, 2013). From a study of 116 countries, household income 
inequality increased by 9 percent for the group of high-income countries and by 11 percent for 
low- and middle-income countries. According to the report, Africa is the region with the largest 
average decline in inequality about 7 percent, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, 
with a decrease of 5 percent. Of particular interest is the impact of financial globalisation and, 
to a certain extent, skills-based technical change, as important exogenous drivers of inequality. 
These drivers have in various cases fostered existing patterns of inequality through a stubbornly 
high-wealth inequality. Likewise, inequality has been aggravated in the past three decades by 
the adverse effect of exogenous drivers, such as financial and trade globalisation. 
 
In like manner, Kotarski (2015) investigates the evidence of the Kuznets hypothesis on financial 
deepening and income inequality in China. He finds that China’s political economy combines 
both elements of financial repression, such as the frequent use of reserve ratios to adjust the 
monetary system. It also uses a repressive deposit rate, and enforces capital allocation to 
selected policy initiatives to compensate certain social and political agents. This selective 
monetary policy approach raises income inequality and supports the claim that the financial 
repression hinders the majority of population from using the benefits of financial deepening.  
This unequal access does not only translate into economic constraint but is also upheld as a 
political constraint by insider elite to preserve the existing distribution of political and economic 
power. Also, in relation to financial deepening, a distinction is made between productive and 
speculative credit and their impact on income distribution. Overall, the author finds no evidence 
of the Kuznets hypothesis and concludes that income inequality is predominantly high in China 
and takes a U-shape. 
 
Using time series analysis, Chukwu and Agu (2009) adopt the Granger causality approach to 
find out if there is a two-way causality flow between inequality and poverty in Nigeria. While 
many studies have examined the relationship between inequality and poverty (Aigbokhan, 
2000; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2004; Aigbokhan, 2008), the question of whether a 
causal relationship exists between, inequality and poverty, has received less attention, 
particularly for African countries, the direction of the causality and any other possible variable 
that may be found in the linkage. The study adopts the cointegration technique on national 
poverty index measured by head count index, inequality captured by Gini coefficient, adult 
literacy rate and unemployment rate for the period 1980 to 2010. They find that there is a bi-
directional causality between poverty and inequality in Nigeria at the 5 percent level of 
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significance and conclude that policy measures toward the reduction of poverty in Nigeria 
should not only concentrate on poverty but also incorporate policies of equitable distribution to 
reduce inequality through progressive taxes and subsidies on basic necessities.  
 
Similarly, Berisha et al. (2015) employ the Johansen and Engle–Granger methodology to 
determine if there is a cointegrating relationship between household debt and income inequality 
in the United States over the time period 1919 to 2009. The results suggest that household debt 
and income inequality have a cointegrating relationship. Thus, there is evidence to the idea of 
a ‘debt channel’ of income inequality, in addition to the well-documented channels in the 
existing literature. These results support the recent academic work by Rajan (2010) 
demonstrating a significant increase in income inequality in the United States due to the 
increase in household debt. In line with this, household debt exacerbates inequality as the poor 
have a higher marginal propensity to consume (MPC) relative to the rich and often have to 
resort to borrowing (ironically from the rich who mobilise funds for lending) to smoothen-out 
consumption (Berisha et al., 2015; Sheng, 2015b, 2015a). 
 
Likewise, Nwachukwu and Besong (2015) provide an assessment of how differences in income 
inequality may influence the relationship between finance and changes in the overall United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) weighted index of human welfare on 29 SSA 
countries. More specifically, the study aims to complement the large literature on the finance-
growth nexus by examining whether an interaction between changes in the financial sector and 
income distribution produces any discernible impact on human welfare. It adopts a dynamic 
panel data framework using the conventional Johansen’s maximum likelihood co-integration 
approach with the associated vector error correction model (VECM). They argue that countries 
where inequality in income distribution is relatively high, economic agents in all income strata 
are incentivised to divert a larger percentage of savings to long-term risky projects. The 
anticipated higher returns to capital results in a divergence in human welfare, with residents of 
those states where the average Gini index is greater than 45 percent forging ahead of their peers 
in the more equal countries. They report that the size of deposit intermediaries fuels greater rate 
of improvement in wellbeing in the high inequality countries rather than financial deepening.  
 
In a budding strand of empirical literature, Agnello et al. (2015) investigate causes of financial 
reforms via fiscal consolidation. They used the probit and logit models on annual data for a 
panel of 17 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2005 to find that financial reforms is 
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promoted by large austerity plans, mainly implemented through spending cuts rather than tax 
hikes. Also, when fiscal adjustments are put in place there is the tendency that reforms in the 
banking sector are more likely to occur. Similarly, while banking sector reforms are mainly 
prompted during periods of tax drive consolidations, spending cuts driven consolidation 
packages seem to propel the implementation of domestic finance reforms. Lastly rising 
inflation, lower degree of trade openness, worsening financial conditions and, to some extent, 
a fall in the degree of competitiveness raises the likelihood of financial reforms. That is, in such 
situation, fiscal adjustments can pave the way for important reforms of the banking sector. 
 
von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) analyse the regional implications of financial market 
development, industry location and income inequality by developing a heterogeneous-firms 
model with trade in goods, labour mobility and credit constraints due to moral hazard. The study 
builds a hypothetical framework of two regions and two sectors. They show that better access 
to external funds reduces the incentives for mobile workers to cluster in one region such that 
economic activity is dispersed and income is more equally distributed. This result stands in 
contrast to previous research in the finance and inequality literature where globalisation of 
financial markets is shown to cause more inequality (Atif, Srivastav, Sauytbekova, & 
Arachchige, 2012; United Nations, 2013).  
 
On the other hand, Hermes (2014) uses a sample of 70 developing countries to address the 
question of whether participation of the poor in microfinance contributes to reducing a 
country’s level of income inequality. The Gini index is the inequality variable while 
microfinance intensity as measured by the number of active borrowers relative to total 
population ranges from 2.9 percent in Asia, to 1.9 percent in Latin America, 1.6 percent in 
Europe and only 0.8 percent in Africa. Relatively, Africa has the lowest proportion of 
population with access to micro-credit. 41 percent of countries in the study are from Africa. 
Employing the OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimation techniques, the study shows 
that higher levels of microfinance participation are indeed associated with a reduction of the 
income gap between the rich and poor. The analysis supports the suggestion that microfinance 
is an appropriate tool to reducing the income gap between the rich and poor in developing 
countries. This in effect have the potential to directly help the poor since it enables them to 
engage in self-employment and play an active role in the economy giving them the opportunity 
to smoothen consumption, increase their relative incomes, expand their asset base and break-
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out of poverty. The study acknowledges that data do not cover all microfinance institutions in 
the countries in the sample. 
 
In the same vein, Kasali, Ahmad, and Ean (2015) use a sample of 1,134 microfinance loan 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from three states in South-West Nigeria to analyse the 
relationship between microfinance loan and the income of the rural poor. Primary data collected 
include the demographic characteristics of the respondents, business and owner’s profile, 
consumption expenditure, loan procurement procedure, assets and business management 
among others. In addition, operators of microfinance institutions in the study area were also 
interviewed on their mode of operations, problems faced on the clientele and the assistance 
required from the government. Using descriptive statistics and multiple regression models, the 
results reveal that microfinance has negligible income effects on the rural poor. This negligible 
impact is due to the poor enabling environments of microfinance institutions from functioning 
effectively and efficiently.  
 
Adeleye, Osabuohien, Bowale, Matthew, and Oduntan (2017) conduct a more recent study on 
the relationship between financial reforms and credit growth in Nigeria from 1980 to 2016. 
Using secondary data from World Bank (2016) and the autoregressive distributed lag model, 
error correction model, and bounds testing approaches, the study finds evidence supporting the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis which states that at higher real interest rates financial 
intermediation evidenced by credit growth increases. Other findings show that in the long-run, 
financial system deposits, inflation rate and per capita GDP have strong asymmetric impacts on 
credit growth and real interest rates (the financial reform indicator). Results also indicate that a 
long-run cointegration relationship exists between domestic credit and other covariates and 
likewise between the real interest rate and its regressors.  
 
Lastly, using a combination of time series analyses and macro-panel regressions, the UNDP 
(2017) Report highlights the different dimensions of income inequality and clarifies its 
equalising and dis-equalising factors. Among the factors that equalises the income distribution 
are subsidies and transfers, in SSA. The study finds, among others that secondary education, 
direct taxation and efficiency of tax administration, well-targeted social expenditure and 
enhanced agricultural productivity which has helped reduce rural poverty gaps and inequality. 
The inequality-aggravating factors include rising foreign direct investments (FDI) in extractive 
industries and a surge of terms of trade in resource-rich countries, which polarise income 
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disparities, a suboptimal structural transition of the economy from a low-inequality crop 
agriculture to high-inequality sectors such as livestock production, commerce, transport, and 
formal and informal services in both urban and rural areas, which drives inequality in a number 
of countries and an unequal distribution of socioeconomic and physical facilities between rural 
and urban areas and across regions, which drives income disparities, among others. Table 2.2 
presents a summary of schedule in the empirical and methodological review of literature. 
 
2.4 Summary of Gaps Identified in Literature 
Based on the reviewed literature, the gaps identified are itemised as follows: (1) there is sparse 
(but growing) literature on the exclusive study of income inequality in SSA. Only few countries 
are often included among a broader sample of developed, emerging or transition economies; 
(2) there is not much examination about the stability of the financial sector after a financial 
reform; (3) the inability of studies to separately analyse the impact of financial reform on credit 
growth and the inability to separate the effect of credit growth from other financial reform 
indicators on income inequality; and (4) in analysing the relationship between finance and 
income inequality, domestic credit to the private sector/GDP (proxy for credit growth and a 
measure of financial depth) is often included among the explanatory variables; thus, masking 
its impact on income inequality in addition to causing endogeneity bias among the explanatory 
variables. Thus, one might conclude that the relevance of credit growth on income inequality is 
contingent on financial reforms. In essence, the extant literature for the most part, has not 
explored the complex link, which this study intends to address. 
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Table 2.2:   Summary of Studies on Financial Reforms and Income Inequality 
S/No. Author(s)/Paper Year Methodology/Data Outcome 
1 Adeleye et al. 
 
Financial Reforms 
and Credit Growth In 
Nigeria: Empirical 
Insights from ARDL 
and ECM Techniques 
2017 Methodology: Autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model, 
error correction model (ECM) and 
Bounds testing 
 
Data: Nigeria (1980 - 2015) 
1) Financial reforms (proxied by the 
real interest rate), inflation rate and 
financial system deposits are positive 
predictors of credit growth in the long-
run while investment positively 
predicts same in the short-run. 
2) GDP per capita growth has a 
negative impact on credit growth in the 
long-run. 
3) Findings provide evidence to the 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
hypotheses. 
2 UNDP 2017 Methodology: Time series and 
panel regressions 
 
Data: 29 African countries (1991 
- 2011) 
1) Factors mitigating income 
inequality: subsidies and transfers, 
secondary education, direct taxation 
and efficiency of tax administration, 
social expenditure and enhanced 
agricultural productivity. 
2) Factors aggravating inequality: 
rising foreign direct investments (FDI) 
in extractive industries, a suboptimal 
structural transition of the economy 
from a low-inequality crop agriculture 
to high-inequality sectors 
3 Anyanwu et al. 
 
Empirical Analysis of 
the Key Drivers of 
Income Inequality in 
West Africa 
2016 Methodology: Dynamic System 
GMM 
 
Data: 17 African countries (1970-
2011) 
1) Population density, natural resource 
dependence, unemployment, domestic 
investment rate, government 
consumption expenditure, trade 
openness, inward foreign direct 
investment, international remittances, 
and civil conflicts increase inequality 
while human capital, democracy 
reduces it. 
2) Evidence of the Kuznets curve. 
4 Kus and Fan 
 
Income Inequality, 
Credit and Public 
Support for 
Redistribution 
2015 Methodology: Multilevel 
Regression Technique 
 
Data: 17 OECD countries (1970-
2011) 
Finds a negative association between 
credit use and citizen support for 
redistribution. 
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S/No. Author(s)/Paper Year Methodology/Data Outcome 
5 Dabla-Norris et al. 
 
Causes and 
Consequences of 
Income Inequality: A 
Global Perspective 
2015 Methodology: Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed effects 
models 
 
Data: 162 countries (1980-2012) 
1) In advanced economies, increase in 
the skill premium exacerbate market 
income inequality. 
2) Easing of labour market regulations 
is associated with higher market 
inequality and increase the income 
share of the top 10%. 
3) Increase in government 
redistributive spending relative to total 
spending is associated with a decrease 
in income inequality. 
4) Better access to education, 
improved health outcomes, and 
redistributive social polices help raise 
the income share of the poor and the 
middle class irrespective of the level of 
economic development of a country. 
5) Financial deepening raises the 
income shares of the poor and the 
middle class in advanced economies. 
6 Kotarski 
 
Financial Deepening 
and Income Inequality: 
Is There any Financial 
Kuznets Curve in 
China? The Political 
Economy Analysis 
2015 Methodology: Historical 
institutionalism approach, Hukou 
System 
 
Data: China (1980 - 2011) 
1) Income inequality is predominantly 
high in China and takes a U-shape. 
2) No evidence of the Kuznets 
hypothesis. 
7 Berisha et al. 
 
Income Inequality and 
Household Debt: A 
Cointegration Test 
2015 Methodology: Johansen and 
Engle–Granger Cointegration 
 
Data: United States (1919-2009) 
1) Household debt and income 
inequality have a cointegrating 
relationship. 
2) Household debt exacerbates 
inequality. 
8 Nwachukwu and 
Besong 
 
Financial 
Intermediation, 
Income Inequality and 
Welfare in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
2015 Methodology: VECM 
 
Data: 29 African countries (1990-
2010) 
Evidence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the aggregate 
human welfare and the chosen 
indicators of financial development 
and income inequality, after 
controlling for other ancillary 
variables. 
9 Agnello et al. 
 
Fiscal Consolidation 
and Financial Reforms 
2015 Methodology: Logit and Probit 
 
Data: 17 OECD countries (1980-
2005) 
1) Large austerity plans, mainly 
implemented through spending cuts 
rather than tax hikes, promote 
financial reforms. 
2) Banking sector reforms and 
domestic finance reforms are more 
likely to occur when fiscal adjustments 
are put in place. 
10 von Ehrlich and 
Seidel 
 
Regional Implications 
of Financial Market 
Development: Industry 
Location and Income 
Inequality 
2015 Methodology: Heterogenous-firm 
Model 
Better access to external funds 
reduces the incentives for mobile 
workers to cluster in one region such 
that economic activity and thus 
income is more equally distributed. 
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S/No. Author(s)/Paper Year Methodology/Data Outcome 
11 Kasali et al. 
 
What Impact does 
Microfinance Loan 
Have on Incomes of 
the Rural Poor in 
Nigeria? 
2015 Methodology: Descriptive Statistics 
and Multiple Regression Model 
 
Data: South-West Nigeria 
Due to the poor enabling 
environment, microfinance has 
negligible income effects on the 
rural poor. 
12 Delis et al. 
 
Bank Regulations and 
Income Inequality: 
Empirical Evidence 
2014 Methodology: dynamic unbalanced 
panel data, system-GMM and 2SLS-
IV 
 
Data: 87 countries (1973-2005) 
1) Reduce inequality: banking 
deregulation, overall liberalisation, 
abolishing credit and interest rate 
controls, abolishing entry barriers, 
bank liquidity, enhancing 
privatization laws and liberalisation 
of international capital flows, GDP 
per capita, education. 
2) Increase inequality: liberalisation 
of equity market, inflation, trade 
openness. 
13 Lee 
 
Globalization, Income 
Inequality and 
Poverty: Theory and 
Empirics 
2014 Methodology: Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) 
 
Data: No of countries not stated 
(1976-2004) 
1) Financial integration increases 
inequality while trade, education, 
natural resources and socialism 
reduces inequality. 
2) Evidence of Kuznets' hypothesis. 
14 Hermes 
 
Does Microfinance 
Affect Income 
Inequality? 
2014 Methodology: Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and Instrumental 
variables (IV) 
 
Data: 70 developing countries 
Higher levels of microfinance 
participation are associated with a 
reduction of the income gap 
between the rich and poor. 
15 Asongu 
 
How Do Financial 
Reforms Affect 
Inequality Through 
Financial Sector 
Competition? 
Evidence From 
Africa. 
2013 Methodology: Two stage least 
squares instrumental variables 
(2SLS-IV) 
 
Data: 28 African countries (1996-
2010) 
Improvement of the formal 
financial sector, semi-formal 
financial sector, informal financial 
sector, non-formal financial sector 
reduce income inequality. 
16 Malinen 
 
Does Income 
Inequality Contribute 
to Credit Cycles? 
2013 Methodology: Panel Cointegration 
Framework 
 
Data: 8 countries (1959-2008) 
1) Both the top 1% income share 
and the share of bank loans are 
driven by stochastic trends. 
2) Income inequality has 
contributed to the increase of bank 
credit in developed economies.  
17 Johansson and 
Wang 
 
Financial Sector 
Policies and Income 
Inequality 
2013 Methodology: Instrumental 
variables (IV), Modeling Average 
Method and generalised method of 
moments (GMM) 
 
Data: 90 countries (1981-2005) 
Financial repression tends to 
increase income inequality 
18 Agnello and Sousa 
 
How do Banking 
Crises Impact on 
Income Inequality? 
2012 Methodology: dynamic panel data 
using IV-GMM 
 
Data: 62 OECD/non-OECD 
countries (1980-2006) 
1) Access to banking sector helps to 
reduce inequality. 
2) No evidence of Kuznets 
hypothesis. 
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S/No. Author(s)/Paper Year Methodology/Data Outcome 
19 Agnello et al. 
 
Financial Reforms and 
Income Inequality 
2012 Methodology: 
unbalance panel data; 
fixed effects model 
 
Data: 62 countries 
(1973-2005) 
Reduce inequality: removal of policies toward 
directed credit, removal of excessive high 
reserve req., improvements in the securities 
market; easiness of expansion of bank 
branches; wider banking services; lower 
regulation in more democratic societies. 
20  Bordo and Meissner 
 
Does Inequality Lead to 
a Financial Crisis? 
2012 Methodology: Linear 
probability model, 
logit, OLS 
 
Data: 14 advanced 
countries (1988-2008) 
1) Economic growth drives credit boom and 
not inequality; 
2) Fall in short-term interest rates lead to a 
credit boom; 
3) Income inequality is not a significant 
determinant of credit boom; 
4) Positive relationship between credit boom 
and banking crisis. 
21 Kumhof and Rancière 
 
Inequality, Leverage 
and Crises 
2011 Methodology: 
Dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model 
Households in the lower deciles borrow to 
maintain consumption growth due to rising 
income inequality and stagnant incomes and 
the increase in debt eventually lead to 
financial crisis. 
22 Batuo et al. 
 
Financial Development 
and Income Inequality: 
Evidence from African 
Countries 
2010 Methodology: System-
GMM 
 
Data: 22 African 
countries (1973 - 1996) 
1) Inequality reduces with index of financial 
reform, M2, liquid liabilities and domestic 
credit to the private sector and increases with 
primary education. 
2) No evidence of Kuznets hypothesis. 
23 Kaboub et al. 
 
Inequality-Led 
Financial Instability 
2010 Methodology: 
Minsky's Financial 
Instability Hypothesis 
(FIH) 
 
Data: United States 
(2007-2009) 
Real wage income stagnation led to financial 
crises through the sub-prime mortgage sector. 
24 Rajan 
 
Fault Lines: How 
Hidden Fractures Still 
Threaten the World 
Economy 
2010 Methodology: 
Analytical Review of 
US Financial Crisis 
 
Data: United States 
(2007-2009) 
Rising income inequality in the past 30years 
and stagnant real wage income of the lower 
and middle class led to the 2007 US financial 
crisis. 
25 Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine 
 
Finance and Inequality: 
Theory and Evidence 
2009 Methodology: Human 
capital approach 
The intergenerational persistence of relative 
incomes, the distribution of income, 
improvements in financial markets, contracts, 
and intermediaries reduce income inequality. 
26 Chukwu and Agu 
 
Multivariate Causality 
Between Financial 
Depth and Economic 
Growth in Nigeria 
2009 Methodology: 
Granger-Causality 
Approach 
 
Data: Nigeria (1980-
2010) 
Bi-directional causality between poverty and 
inequality exists. 
27 Abiad and Moody 
 
Financial Reform: What 
shakes it? What shapes 
it? 
2005 Methodology: Ordered 
Logit 
 
Data: 35 countries 
(1973 - 1996) 
1)International interest rates, balance of 
payment crises, trade openness trigger reforms; 
2) Banking crises set reforms back; 
3) Highly repressed economies remained that 
way but once reforms occurred it gained 
momentum overtime. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STYLISED FACTS 
This chapter discusses factual evidence on the extent and behaviour of income inequality 
(represented by the Gini index) from four standpoints: the global trend, the trend in SSA, trends 
across the four sub-regions in SSA and lastly the trends specific to Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa, the countries of focus. Although, these four countries may not adequately 
represent the continent given its diverse socio-economic heterogeneity, as earlier substantiated, 
their choice is intuitive for three reasons: each represents a sub-region; they are dominant 
players in the continent particularly in their respective regional economic blocs; and their trends 
of inequality differ which makes comparative analysis relevant. 
 
3.1   Global Income Inequality 
In reference to income distribution, and using traditional Gini measures, Africa is the second 
most unequal region in the world after Latin America (Milanovic, 2014; Klasen, 2016). This 
finding is not new probably because it is also the result of the congenital inequality Africa 
obtained from colonialism upon attaining independence (Leibbrandt, Finn, & Woolard, 2012; 
Piraino, 2015). However, what is less clear is the extent to which the level of income inequality 
has changed since independence and in this respect there is certainly variation across countries. 
After a decade of high growth, a new plot of hopefulness has taken hold of SSA and its 
economic prospects. Given encouraging growth rates, there has been some poverty reduction 
and some positive advancement in sectors such as health and education (United Nations, 2010; 
Klasen, 2016).  
 
There is growing general acknowledgement that inequality is the issue of our time as there is 
little definitive analysis of income inequality trends on the continent. Income inequality 
impedes progress in different ways. This is demonstrated, particularly, by research in developed 
countries, where it has been found that more equal societies do better on a whole host of health 
and social indicators (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). From the Afro-pessimism regularly 
expressed during the 1980s and 1990s, the continent has become the subject of increasing 
optimism in some quarters, based on the booming economy (AfDB, 2012; Africa Tax and 
Inequality Report, 2014). This is commonly noted by mainstream economic commentators, 
who see that many of the world’s fastest growing economies are in SSA. Many are therefore 
asking how the proceeds of growth are being shared. Is growth accompanied by decreasing 
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inequality, with a greater share of income going to the poor? Or is income inequality increasing 
across the region? It is intuitive analysing SSA’s inequality behaviour within the context of a 
global perspective. Thus, using the Gini index data from Lahoti et al. (2016) which covers 161 
countries (of which 43 are in SSA), statistics reveal that SSA is the most unequal region with 
an average Gini index of 60.23, while ECA has the lowest average index of 33.39. Figure 3.1 
shows the global average Gini index across the seven regions7. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Gini Index, Global (1980 – 2015) 
Note: Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), North America (NA), South Asia (SA) 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
However, using a two-period analysis and despite having the highest average inequality index, 
the trend analysis shows that the SSA region has the highest percentage decline (-4.06) in 
income inequality followed by SA (-2.35) and LAC (-1.85). As shown in Table 3.1, and in line 
with UNDP (2013) findings, statistics reveal increasing inequality in the developed economies 
of Europe and North America with 15.84 percent and 5.89 percent respectively while globally 
and on average, inequality increased slightly by 0.85 percent. The global trend further shows 
that household income inequality has been falling in SSA and SA since the late 2000s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7In line with the United Nations demographic structures, countries are grouped across seven (7) regions: Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East 
and Northern Africa (MENA), North America (NA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
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Table 3.1: Change in Gini Index, Global (1980 – 2015) 
Region Countries 
1980 - 
2015 
1980 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2015 
%  
Change 
Europe and Asia Pacific 21 46.48 46.14 46.91 1.67 
East and Central Asia 49 33.39 31.18 36.12 15.84 
Latin America and The 
Caribbean 27 49.93 50.34 49.41 -1.85 
Middle East and North America 11 52.85 53.1 52.54 -1.05 
North America 2 36.01 35.09 37.16 5.89 
South Asia 8 43.72 44.17 43.13 -2.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa 43 60.23 61.32 58.83 -4.06 
SSA 161 46.08 45.91 46.3 0.85 
Note: Percentage change is computed as: [
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2000 𝑡𝑜 2015) − (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999)
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999) 
 × 100]  
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
3.2   Income Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The African Development Bank report on income inequality in Africa, AfDB (2012) finds that: 
“In the 2000s, six of the world’s ten fastest-growth countries were in Africa, but this has not 
significantly helped to equal incomes or to redistribute wealth” (pp. 2). Could the type of growth 
being experienced in the region itself be driving inequalities? Very little information and 
analysis are available to answer these questions. By 2010, six of the ten countries in the world 
with the most unequal income distribution were in the region (AfDB, 2012), and the countries 
with the most unequal income distribution include Namibia, Comoros, South Africa, Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, with the sub-region of Southern Africa showing a striking 
concentration of countries which suffer from remarkably high income inequality levels. 
Graphically, the trend of the Gini index for SSA as shown in Figure 3.2 reveals that the Gini 
index began a downward slide from 61.04 in 1980 to 58.89 in 2006 from where it rose slightly 
to 59.00 in 2007 and thereafter dropped to 57.74 in 2015.  
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Figure 3.2: Gini Index, SSA (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
On the global scale, SSA has the highest average Gini index and the highest declining rate of 
income inequality. Given these mix of statistics, it is evident that the region is witnessing a 
blend of countries experiencing rising and falling inequality. Comparatively, Figure 3.3 shows 
the sub-regional breakdown of the average Gini index. The average index in East Africa (58.49) 
and Central Africa (59.34) are slightly below the regional average of 60.108 while that of West 
Africa (60.93) and Southern Africa (64.39) are above same. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Gini Index, SSA Sub-regional Averages (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
                                                 
8Slight differences in SSA average is due to approximations 
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Table 3.2 shows the within-region variation of the Gini index and that all the sub-regions 
witnessed declining index with West Africa having the highest (-8.37) followed by Southern 
Africa (-2.38). 
 
Table 3.2:      Change in Gini Index, SSA (1980 – 2015) 
Region Countries 
1980 - 
2015 
1980 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2015 
%  
Change 
Central Africa 8 59.33 59.7 58.86 -1.41 
East Africa 14 58.49 58.74 58.18 -0.95 
Southern Africa 5 64.39 65.06 63.51 -2.38 
West Africa 16 60.93 63.23 57.94 -8.37 
SSA 43 60.19 61.32 58.79 -4.13 
Note: Percentage change is computed as: [
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2000 𝑡𝑜 2015) − (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999)
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999) 
 × 100]  
Slight disparity is average Gini index for SSA is due to rounding up. 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
Having established that the SSA region has the highest inequality index at 60.10 amidst a 
negative change in inequality by 4 percent indicating that inequality is declining in the region, 
the study of inequality merits attention in a bid to proffer remedial solutions. In view of this, 
the next section will be to examine the trends of income inequality in the selected economies 
which are a mix of varying inequality levels all of which are classified as having very high 
income inequality.  
 
3.2.1 Income Inequality in Cameroon 
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015) report, the 
possibility of Cameroon achieving the goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger 
including reaching a poverty level of less than 25.1 percent is uncertain given its current level 
of economic growth. Despite being one of the richest countries in SSA, poverty remains a 
serious problem in Cameroon (Lynch, 1991; Fambon et al., 2014; Fambon, 2017). Different 
colonial experiences between the western and eastern regions of the country have left different 
legacies of education, infrastructure, and economic opportunity. The country exhibits ample 
regional disparities in income and living standards. The noticeable differences in income 
between urban and rural households, and the disproportionate number of subsistence oriented 
farmers who are poor, begin to provide a basis of orienting policy and targeting programs to 
alleviate poverty (Baye Menjo & Fambon, 2002; Fambon, 2017). 
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The need to bridge the widening inequality gap has motivated the suggestion of various options 
that may be available to policymakers such as structural reforms in the forestry sector (OECD, 
2002; Makoudjou, Levang, & Tieguhong, 2017), including the importance of efficient financial 
intermediation (Fambon, 2017). Despite some improvements, inequalities between men and 
women persist while in general, inequalities are more pronounced in rural areas (Lynch, 1991; 
Fambon et al., 2014). From Figure 3.4, the average income inequality index is 58.08 and the 
country is classified to be experiencing very-high income inequality. The trend of the country’s 
inequality index reveals that the index was stable from 1980 to 1998 from where it begins a 
steady ascent from 58.13 in 1999 to 58.80 in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 3.4:   Gini Index, Cameroon (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
 
3.2.2 Income Inequality in Kenya 
According to Africa Tax and Inequality Report (2014), despite Kenya’s steady growth in recent 
years, the remains one of the most unequal societies in the world and hosts one of the world’s 
biggest slums. An estimated 38% of total income remains in the hands of the top 10% of the 
population, while the bottom 10% controls only 2% of income. In Nairobi, about 60% of the 
population lives in slums on about 5% of the land area, which has negative implications for 
both human security and economic development. Inequality has been rising in Kenya since 
1994, but as newly published data shows, has begun to reduce somewhat since 2005. World 
Bank data, discussed earlier, showed clearly that as income inequality was rising the rich were 
getting richer and the poor were getting poorer. The richest 10% of society increased their 
income share by 16% between 1994 and 2005, while the poorest 40% saw their share of income 
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fall by 14%. The richest decile was reported in 2005 to hold 38% of national income, compared 
to only 2% for the poorest decile, a huge disparity. It is also widely recognised that the high 
income inequality level is holding back progress in poverty reduction, with particularly negative 
impacts on the high rural poverty rates. This poor performance is all the more disappointing 
given that Kenya is economically stable, has enjoyed good growth rates and benefits from a 
relatively efficient tax collection system and moderate levels of tax revenue. The average 
income inequality index is 60.35 and the country is also classified as experiencing very-high 
income inequality. The trend of its inequality index shown in Figure 3.5 indicated that the 
country’s index began a steady rise from 57.30 in 1980 to 63.59 in 1992, and then witnessed a 
steady decline to 59.9 in 1999. It rose slightly to 60.03 in 2000 and maintained a steady pace to 
60.50 in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 3.5:   Gini Index, Kenya (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
3.2.3   Income Inequality in Nigeria 
Income inequality is rising strongly in Nigeria. Between 1986 and 2010, there has been a 75% 
increase in the concentration of income in the country. It is also clear that this trend is not just 
a result of the rich getting richer. There is clear evidence that this is at the expense of the poor 
who are also getting poorer, and are therefore actively impoverished in this process. rising 
inequality is leading to less stable and more violent and conflictive societies with protests 
centred around issues such as corruption, rising utility prices, growing inequality and the 
visibly-increasing concentration of economic power in multinationals (Africa Tax and 
Inequality Report, 2014). Relative to the studies on poverty levels, there have been sparse 
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studies on the subject of income inequality in Nigeria (Aigbokhan, 2000, 2008; Osahon & 
Osarobo, 2011; Nuruddeen & Ibrahim, 2014; Kolawole, Omobitan, & Yaqub, 2015; Ogbeide 
& Agu, 2015). Considered as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (AfDB, 2012; 
Africa Tax and Inequality Report, 2014; World Bank, 2015) and given the abundant human and 
natural resources, the country is witnessing an increasing rate of socio-economic inadequacies. 
These include: a high rate of poverty both at the regions and at the national level, high 
unemployment rate, high income inequality, low quality human capital, high percentage of 
population on welfare and high emigration in the face of harsh economic realities (Odedokun 
& Round, 2001; Ogbeide & Agu, 2015). Figure 3.6 reveals the pattern of income inequality in 
Nigeria. In 1980, the Gini index was 50.61 and rose to 60.07 in 1992, dipped slightly to 58.77 
in 1996, climbed again to 58.87 in 2009 before a downward trend to 48.83 in 2015. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6:   Gini Index, Nigeria (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
3.2.4   Income Inequality in South Africa 
As mentioned earlier, the Southern African countries constitute the larger percentage of unequal 
countries in the world. In particular, income inequality is extremely high in South Africa – one 
of the highest rates in the world – and, according to the country’s household surveys, 
consistently increasing. Income inequality also has a clearly racial dimension. Poverty and 
unemployment continue to determine the limits of transformation, and macro-economic policy 
choices have not had any significant positive impact on poor people since 1994 (Africa Tax and 
Inequality Report, 2014). There are several studies on inequality in South Africa which 
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emphasises the country’s colonial history and the practice of apartheid, as a result, income 
inequality has a strong ethnic dimension (Leibbrandt et al., 2012; Harris & Vermaak, 2014; 
Piraino, 2015; Wittenberg, 2015; Akanbi, 2016). Several attempts have been made to redressing 
this scenario since the end of apartheid, with various economic development strategies 
including black economic empowerment initiatives and land reforms but these are seen as 
piecemeal and relatively ineffective. From Figure 3.7, the Gini index was 62.94 in 1980 and 
rose to 70.69 in 1994 which represents a significant 12.31 percent increase in the inequality 
index. It dipped slightly to 64.52 in 1995 and maintained a wobbly pattern to 63.98 in 2001 
from where it maintained a steady rise to 66.24 in 2015. 
    
 
Figure 3.7:  Gini Index, South Africa (1980 – 2015) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
3.3 Countries’ Comparison and Representation 
Table 3.3 shows the within variations of the Gini index across the four countries. While that of 
Nigeria declined in inequality in the 2000s by over 5 percent that of Kenya, Cameroon and 
South Africa worsened by about 0.2, 2 and 6.5 percent respectively within the same period. 
This statistics is important because it shows each country’s contribution to the region’s 
inequality index and confirms that indeed some countries witnessed rising and falling inequality 
indexes. For instance, the regions’ negative decline of 4.13 percent can be attributed largely to 
the 5.57 percent decrease from Nigeria and the increase of 6.5 percent from South Africa, 
among others. 
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Table 3.3:      Change in Gini Index, Countries (1980 – 2015) 
Country 
1980 - 
2015 
1980 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2015 
%  
Change 
Cameroon 58.07 57.56 58.72 2.02 
Kenya 60.35 60.29 60.41 0.20 
Nigeria 56.56 58.00 54.77 -5.57 
South Africa 66.82 64.95 69.15 6.47 
SSA 60.19 61.32 58.79 -4.13 
 Note: Percentage change is computed as: [
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2000 𝑡𝑜 2015) − (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999)
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1980 𝑡𝑜 1999) 
 × 100]  
Slight disparity is average Gini index for SSA is due to rounding up. 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
 
This section concludes with a justification on why the four selected countries represent their 
sub-regions. The selection is primarily based on their average Gini index since the crux of this 
thesis is to investigate measures that will tackle the high inequality index. Figure 3.8 shows that 
relative to SSA average, Nigeria has the lowest inequality index of 56.57, followed by 
Cameroon at 58.08, Kenya at 60.35 and South Africa with 66.82. In comparison to their 
respective sub-regional averages, the averages from these representing countries hovers around 
that of their sub-region which are 59.33 for Central Africa, 58.49 for East Africa, 64.39 for 
Southern Africa and 60.19 for West Africa. The relevance of this analogy is that policies that 
will cause a reduction in the representing countries’ inequality index may have impact in the 
reduction of the inequality index relating to their respective sub-regions. 
 
 
Figure 3.8:   Comparative Statics (1980 – 2015) 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation from Lahoti et al. (2016) 
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3.4 Summary of the Stylised Facts 
Using the Gini index as the measure of income inequality, and a two-period analysis, statistics 
reveal that global income inequality is on the rise at the rate of 0.85 percent. With the 
classification of Gini indexes as low inequality (20 to 29.9), medium inequality (30 to 39.9), 
high inequality (40 to 49.9) and very high inequality (above 50), none of the regions is 
experiencing low inequality, two (ECA and NA) are within the medium inequality bracket, 
three (EAP, LAC and SA) are classified high inequality bracket and two (MENA and SSA) are 
categorised very high inequality. Among them, SSA has the highest inequality (60.23) index 
but ironically contributes the highest decline (-4.06 percent) to global inequality. Similitude to 
a paradox, the region with the highest index contributes the highest decline to global inequality 
while that with the lowest inequality index (ECA at 33.33) contributes the highest increase 
(ECA at 15.54 percent) to global inequality.  
 
With particular reference to SSA region, all the four sub-regions have Gini indexes above 50 
and are classified as witnessing very high income inequality. Among them, Southern Africa 
region has the highest at 64.39 while the lowest is East Africa (58.49). Using a two-period 
analysis, data analytics further reveal that West Africa contributes the highest decline to the 
region’s inequality index (-8.37 percent) followed by Southern Africa (-2.38 percent) while the 
lowest contributor is East Africa (-0.95 percent). These facts reveal that across the sub-regions 
and the representing countries, the average Gini index is categorised as very high which implies 
that even though the region’s inequality index is falling, individual countries are burdened by 
wide disparities in income distribution.  
 
Lastly, all the representative countries have inequality indexes above 50 and therefore 
categorised as experiencing very high inequality. Among which Nigeria has the lowest (56.56) 
and South Africa the highest (66.82). The total decline of -4.06 percent contributed to global 
inequality by SSA emanates from the combination of SSA countries experiencing rising and 
falling inequality indexes within the study scope. For instance, among the representing 
countries, Nigeria contributes the highest decline (-5.57 percent) and South Africa the highest 
increase (6.47) to regional inequality. A cursory look at the sub-regions and the countries’ 
representation reveals a somewhat interesting pattern. That is, the average inequality indexes 
prevalent in these sub-regions are quite close to those evident in the four countries. For instance, 
the average index in Central Africa is 59.34 while that of Cameroon is 58.07, East Africa is 
58.49 while Kenya has 60.35, West Africa is 60.93 while Nigeria has 56.56 and Southern Africa 
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is 64.39 while South Africa has 66.82. Thus, statistics support the argument that the four 
countries are quite representative of their sub-regions since the average index in each country 
and its sub-region are very close such that policies that will correct income inequality in these 
countries will do likewise in the respective sub-regions and vice-versa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the theoretical framework 
of financial reforms and income inequality by showing the distributive effects of how imperfect 
financial markets engender income inequality. The second section shows the analytical model 
which illustrates how imperfect financial markets exacerbate cross-generational income 
inequality. The third section is the model specification from where the study’s empirical model 
(which is a modification of existing models) is derived. The fourth section details the estimation 
techniques on panel data and country-level analyses. These estimators are within the 
frameworks of ordinary least squares, fixed effects, heterogeneous panel and the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) (𝑝, 𝑞) models. Variables, scope, measurements and sources are 
discussed in the fifth section while issues relating to data sourcing are discussed in the sixth 
section. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
Finance plays a critical role in most theories of persistent inequality as it shapes the gap between 
the rich and the poor. It affects the extent to which that gap widens or contracts across 
generations. Thus, the finance-inequality theory illuminates a variety of direct and indirect 
mechanisms through which changes in the operation of the financial sector can exacerbate or 
reduce the inequality of pecuniary opportunity. For instance, credit shocks to some economic 
agents can affect investments in human capital, distribution of physical capital accumulation; 
distort the rate of economic growth and the demand for production inputs (particularly labour) 
with adverse consequences on poverty and income distribution (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Levine, 2007; Levine, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009).  
 
The theoretical framework is bound within the financial markets imperfections theory (Loury, 
1981; Galor & Zeira, 1993) and the extensive margin theory (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; 
Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). Both theories give the propositions that (1) imperfect financial 
systems exert highly skewed cross-generational income inequality which disproportionately 
favours the rich due to ancestral wealth regardless of innate abilities or entrepreneurial abilities 
of households; and (2) by extending credit, to those economic agents that had hitherto been 
denied, will increase the probability of these groups engaging in economic opportunities leading 
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to a reduction in the income inequality gap (Bourguignon, 1981; Banerjee & Newman, 1993; 
Galor & Moav, 2004).  
 
The financial system shapes the extent to which economic opportunities are moulded by natural 
endowments (abilities) rather than by parental wealth. Finance influences cross-generational 
income inequality through human capital investment and entrepreneurial opportunities and the 
theoretical model shows that income inequality is exacerbated when financial markets are 
imperfect (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Levine, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009). From these 
assertions, it is suggested that with perfect financial markets, individuals will have access to 
credit (which is a function of interest rate) to fund education, acquire skills or start a new 
business venture based only on individual talent and initiative, and not on parental or hereditary 
wealth. From these theories, perfect financial markets equate opportunities of poor and rich 
households by reducing the relevance of residual assets of the wealthy class on the assumption 
that the credit market is accessible. From this perspective, financial development might exert a 
favourable positive influence on the poor. 
 
This study expounds these theories, by hypothetically assuming that a generation 𝑖’s total 
income in period 𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is a function of wages (𝑤) earned from human capital (𝐻) which might 
be dynasty-specific and rentals (𝑟) from inheritance (i.e. physical capital accumulation, 𝑀) that 
may vary by dynasty. Such that: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝑓(𝐻𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡)      [4.1] 
 
This modest framework shows that if the legacy motive that transfers savings from the present 
(𝑡) to future generation (𝑡 + 1) is a convex function of parental wealth, so that the legacy rate 
rises with wealth (i.e. M′ > 0 and M″ > 0), then (1) dynastic wealth will not converge in 
equilibrium, (2) wealth differential will persist in the long run, and (3) the long-run distribution 
of wealth will depend on the initial distribution of wealth (Levine, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 2009). In furtherance, the theories concerning the behaviour of each component of 
equation[4.1] are discussed herein detailing how each of the behaviours affects the distribution 
of income and how imperfect financial markets widen income inequality across generations.  
 
On the first component, parental decision to invest in the human capital of their children 
determines the persistence of inter-generational relative income. Furthermore, we assume that 
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human capital is a positive function of an individual’s dynastic-endowment of innate abilities 
or natural skills (𝑏)and the opportunity of accessing quality education (𝑠) (i.e. schooling), that 
is: 
𝐻𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑏𝑖𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑡)      [4.2] 
 
Such that  𝑏’, 𝑠’ > 0 because an individual with more innate ability or more education is likely 
to get more productive engagements. Also, ability and schooling are complementary human 
capital production inputs, 𝜕2𝐻 𝜕𝑏𝜕𝑠 > 0⁄  since individuals with more abilities are likely to get 
more education and such will have access to more productive opportunities – this is a socially 
efficient outcome. Also, because relative differences of abilities tend to wane from generations 
to generations, brains are not strongly persistent across lineages within a dynasty, that is, ability 
is mean-reverting (Loury, 1981; Bardhan, Bowles, & Gintis, 2000), it is therefore necessary 
that individuals get adequate schooling to earn economic opportunities that will increase their 
household incomes. So, from equation [4.2] with perfect credit systems, it is socially efficient 
that children with innate abilities have access to credit (𝐶𝑅)  in order to acquire education 
irrespective of ancestral wealth; so that human capital is a function of brains and access to 
credit. Thus, an individual’s economic opportunities are determined by: 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑏𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡)      [4.3] 
 
and credit is a function of the prevailing interest rate (𝑖𝑛𝑡),  
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡)      [4.4] 
 
Due to financial reform, the borrowing interest rate drops and since ability regresses to the 
mean, with perfect capital markets, individuals can access credit to finance for schooling 
(𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝐶𝑅 > 0⁄ ) or engage an economic opportunity such as setting up a business and as such, 
initial dynastic wealth differences does not tend to persist. However, with imperfect financial 
markets, human capital is now jointly determined by brains and ancestral wealth (𝑀) such that 
only the rich who has the wealth to collateralise their loans can access credit to fund the 
education of their children. That is: 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑏𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1)      [4.5] 
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And as such access to credit is dependent on both the prevailing interest rate and the ancestral 
wealth of the borrower, that is: 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1)     [4.6] 
 
From [4.6], there will be a slower reduction in cross-dynasty human capital differences if access 
to schooling is constrained by parental wealth because dumb kids from wealthy backgrounds 
can have access to schooling compared to kids with high-abilities but from poor backgrounds. 
Extending this model shows that in the event of credit shocks, poor families will have to pull-
out their kids from schools and engage them into menial jobs thus, thwarting the ability of poor 
families to develop the educational needs of their children. The effect of this is that: (1) cross-
generational income inequality will persist; (2) the socially efficient allocation of resources will 
be altered with adverse effects on the economy and (3) the economic prospects of individuals 
born into poor dynasties will continually reduce (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Galor & Tsiddon, 1997). 
On the second component of equation[4.1], finance can also affect cross-generational returns 
on entrepreneurial engagement or investment opportunities. Individuals are endowed with 
different levels of investing abilities or skills (𝑉) and the returns (𝑟) to opening a business 
depends positively on it: 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑉𝑖𝑡)       [4.7] 
 
When markets are perfect, entrepreneurs with the most investment ability gets access to credits 
at the borrowing rate such that entrepreneurial activity (𝑍) is a function of investing skills, and 
not dynastic wealth. Such that enterprise is influenced by skills through the rate of return. That 
is: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑡)       [4.8] 
 
In essence, society’s pooled savings are funnelled to those with the most investment abilities 
and not those with ancestral wealth (Levine, 2004, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009; 
Rewilak, 2013). On the other hand, with imperfect financial markets, credit will not simply 
flow to those with business skills as lenders will demand collateral, that is: 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1)     [4.6] 
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and large injections of funds by the ‘borrower’ before the business proposal is funded. Thus, 
the ancestral wealth will influence lending decisions and the ability of that dynasty to attract 
external funding and to run a new business venture. That is: 
 
𝑍𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡)      [4.9] 
 
Such that 𝜕𝑍 𝜕𝐶𝑅 > 0⁄ ;  𝑀’ > 0 and equation [4.6] can be interpreted to mean: (1) society’s 
pooled resources are not only channelled to those with business skills but also with the most 
assets; (2) a poor individual might not get access to credit while a wealthy individual with a 
run-of-the-mill idea might have easier access to credit due to his parental wealth and (3) with 
imperfect credit markets, the initial distribution of wealth sways which dynasty can obtain 
external finance and which ones are essentially cut-off from business endeavours. Interestingly, 
the model rolls into financial liberalisation definition as given by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), which implies the highest rate of interest that equates the demand for (credits), and 
supply of (deposits) loanable funds (Balassa, 1989). Such that credit is a function of interest 
rate (the financial reform indicator): 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡)      [4.10] 
 
The protagonists of the financial markets imperfections theory and the extensive margin theory 
(Becker, 1957; Stiglitz, 1969; Becker & Tomes, 1979; Bourguignon, 1981; Becker & Tomes, 
1986; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Galor & Zeira, 1993) posit that by increasing the 
availability and use of financial services to households and firms who had not been engaging 
those services because of price, impediments or discriminatory factors, expand the economic 
opportunities of these groups and reduce the cross-dynasty persistence of income inequality. 
The theories also point to the fact that allocation of credit can affect inequality via indirect 
mechanisms. That is, credit shocks can influence both output production and employment of 
labour which may alter the demand for low- and high-skilled labour with associated impacts on 
income distribution. For instance, credit allocation improvement will boost the demand for low-
skilled labour thus equalising economic opportunities and tightening the inequality gap 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2009). 
 
Finance plays a critical role in most theories of tenacious income inequality, yet, there is a 
dearth of theoretical and empirical research on the potentially enormous impact of formal 
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financial sector policies, such as banking regulations (i.e. reserve requirements, loans portfolio, 
interest rate ceilings and so on) on persistent inequality (Levine & Rubinstein, 2009; Delis et 
al., 2014). In this section, an  attempt is made to model the indirect relationship between finance 
and the Gini index (the measure of income inequality) contrary to the direct relationship 
postulated in empirical literature (Asongu, 2013; Li & Yu, 2014; Batuo & Asongu, 2015; 
Kotarski, 2015). From the finance-inequality literature, the theoretical model is given as: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡)      [4.11] 
 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the measure of income inequality and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of variables characterising 
financial sector regulations occasioned by financial reforms or liberalisation – of which 
domestic credit to the private sector is often grouped with. From equation [4.11], the probable 
influence of financial reforms on income inequality seems less challenging to predict. That is, 
the reforms given by regulatory policies enhance financial liquidity and increase the volume of 
lending (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) which in line with the theoretical literature would allow individuals at the 
lower end of the income distribution to have easier access to capital, and to fund their business 
investment ideas more efficiently and at a reduced cost. Therefore,  equation [4.11] is modified 
to reflect that channel of influence through which financial reforms impact on the Gini index 
which is through credit growth (a measure of financial depth and stability) because increase in 
credit access accompanies financial liberalisation (Gine & Townsend, 2004). Thus, equation 
[4.11] modifies into a two-equation model: 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡)       [4.12] 
and 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡)       [4.13] 
 
Empirical evidence reveals that regulatory policies (such as interest rate liberalisation, reserve 
requirements, removal of entry barriers and so on) reduce credit market constraints and enhance 
the rate of both human and physical capital accumulation of poor households (Galor & Zeira, 
1993; Galor & Tsiddon, 1997; Beck et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2004, 2007; Beck et al., 2010).  
 
In the light of the theoretical framework, an analytical approach for considering the joint and 
endogenous evolution of finance, credit and income inequality is constructed where the 
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transmission mechanism through which financial reforms impact income inequality is shown. 
Following Li and Yu (2014) which is a modification of Loury (1981) and Galor and Zeira 
(1993), we adopt a Cobb-Douglas function to show the indirect impact of financial reforms on 
income inequality through credit. An attempt is made to show that as individuals have access 
to credit in a bid to invest in human capital (that is, gain expertise) so as to earn higher income 
or become an entrepreneur (operate a business successfully), the income inequality gap reduces.  
 
4.2 The Analytical Model 
The analytical approach is based on the assumptions of two individuals in a given economy, 
where one is an experienced worker and the other an amateur. Each person is the same with the 
exception of the amount of ancestral inheritance (assets) they possess. Both live for two periods 
and can choose to invest in education in the first period in order to work as a skilful worker in 
the second period, or he/she can choose to be an unskilful worker in both two periods. 
Individuals can borrow unlimited amounts to finance schooling in the first period in order to 
gain the expertise required for higher income levels in the second period. Both derive utilities 
from consumption and bequest motive that can only happen in the second period.  
 
For the amateurish worker, the income function is given as: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑎  =  𝑤𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑎        [4.14] 
 
while that of the experienced individual: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑒  = 𝐴(𝐿𝑡
𝑒)∝(𝐾𝑡)
1−∝       [4.15] 
 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝑎and 𝑌𝑡
𝑒 represent the total incomes of the amateurish and experienced individual 
respectively in period 𝑡;  𝑤𝑎is the wage rate earned per unit labour for the amateur (i.e. the 
marginal productivity); 𝐴 represents expertise which is an outcome of education; 𝐿𝑡
𝑎 and 𝐿𝑡
𝑒 
denote labour hours for both individuals, respectively; and 𝐾𝑡 is physical capital stock 
(assuming no depreciation) employed at period 𝑡. Given that 𝐴 is a function of human capital 
investment stock in the economy, (𝐻𝜑) such that 𝜑 ≥ 1, the wage of the experienced worker 
in period 𝑡 equals its marginal product, that is: 
𝑤𝑡
𝑒  = 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑡
𝑒 , 𝐾𝑡) = 𝐻
𝜑 ∝ (
𝐾
𝐿
)
1−∝
     [4.16] 
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An individual’s utility is derived from his consumption (𝑝) and bequest motive (𝑞) to his 
children which are functions of the total wealth (𝑇) in his entire life: 
𝑈𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑞 
        = 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛿𝑇 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝛿)𝑇    [4.17] 
 
So, if the amateur decides not to invest in schooling (will continue to earn low wages) and 
augments livelihood with his inheritance, his utility would be: 
𝑈𝑎(𝑀)𝑙𝑜𝑔 =  [𝑤𝑎 + (𝑀 + 𝑤𝑎)(1 + 𝑟)] + 𝜇   [4.18] 
Where 𝜇 is the error term 
 
The amateur then bequest his offspring an amount of: 
𝑏𝑎(𝑀) ≡  (1 − 𝛿)𝑇 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝑤𝑎 + (𝑀 + 𝑤𝑎)(1 + 𝑟)]   [4.19] 
 
The cost of acquiring schooling is 𝑠, and if the amateur with an inheritance 𝑀 > 𝑠 chooses 
additional education in order to gain more expertise and earn higher income in the second 
period, his utility is: 
𝑈𝑒(𝑀) =  𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑤𝑒 + (𝑀 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝑟)] + 𝜇    [4.20] 
 
and he bequeaths 
𝑏𝑡
𝑒(𝑀) ≡  (1 − 𝛿)𝑇 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝑤𝑡
𝑒 + (𝑀 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝑟)]   [4.21] 
 
Lastly, if an individual with 𝑀 < 𝑠 chooses to invest in education, such will have to borrow 
funds from the financial market; and his utility becomes: 
𝑈𝑡
𝑒(𝑀) =  𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑤𝑡
𝑒 + (𝑀 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝑖)] + 𝜇   [4.22] 
 
Where 𝑖 denotes the borrowing rate and leaves a bequest of: 
𝑏𝑡
𝑒(𝑀) ≡  (1 − 𝛿)𝑇 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝑤𝑡
𝑒 + (𝑀 − 𝑠)(1 + 𝑖)]    [4.23] 
 
From above, it can be seen that an individual with 𝑀 > 𝑠 will be incentivised to get more 
schooling if [4.20] ≥ [4.18]. That is, 
𝑤𝑡
𝑒 ≥  𝑠(1 + 𝑟) + (2 + 𝑟)𝑤𝑎     [4.24] 
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Also, individuals who will recourse to borrowing to finance schooling will only make the 
investment if [4.22] ≥ [4.18]. That is,  
𝑤𝑡
𝑒 ≥  (𝑠 − 𝑀)(1 + 𝑖) + 𝑀(1 + 𝑟) + (2 + 𝑟)𝑤𝑎    [4.25] 
 
Clearly, if [4.25] holds then [4.24] holds automatically, since 𝑠 > 𝑀 for borrowers. That is: 
 
 (𝑠 − 𝑀)(1 + 𝑖) + 𝑀(1 + 𝑟) + (2 + 𝑟)𝑤𝑎>𝑠(1 + 𝑟) + (2 + 𝑟)𝑤𝑎 
 
From [4.25], we know that for any individual 𝑗 who accesses the credit market for funds, such 
will choose to work as an experienced person in the second period if: 
𝑤𝑡
𝑒 ≥  (𝑠 − 𝑀𝑗)(1 + 𝑖) + 𝑀𝑗(1 + 𝑟) + (2 + 𝑟)𝑤
𝑎    [4.26] 
 
As a result of financial reform, the borrowing rate (𝑖) falls and more individuals are able to 
access credit to fund schooling which increases human capital stock in the economy. Thus, 
supply curve for borrowers’ slopes upwards since higher wages (𝑤𝑒) is the precursor that 
attracts more borrowings. 
 
This study concludes the framework by depicting income inequality (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄) as: 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 =  
𝑤𝑡
𝑒
𝑤𝑎
≡  
𝐻𝜑∝(
𝐾
𝐿
)
1−∝
𝑤𝑎
     [4.27] 
 
which is the initial income position with respect to human capital stock. However, as individuals 
have access to credit to fund more schooling to gain expertise, and borrowing rate falls, the 
stock of human capital increases (to 𝐿’) and [4.27] becomes: 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 =  
𝑤𝑡
𝑒
𝑤𝑎
≡  
𝐻𝜑∝(
𝐾
𝐿′
)
1−∝
𝑤𝑎
     [4.28] 
 
The decline in income inequality (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷) is given by: 
     𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷 =  
𝑤𝑡
𝑒
𝑤𝑎
≡  
𝐻𝜑∝(
𝐾
𝐿
)
1−∝
𝑤𝑎
−   
𝐻𝜑∝(
𝐾
𝐿′
)
1−∝
𝑤𝑎
    
   
          =
𝐻𝜑∝𝐾1−𝑎𝐿𝑎−1
𝑤𝑎
−   
𝐻𝜑∝𝐾1−𝑎𝐿′
𝑎−1
𝑤𝑎
    [4.29] 
                      =
𝐻𝜑∝𝐾1−𝑎
𝑤𝑎
[𝐿𝑎−1 − 𝐿′𝑎−1]     [4.30] 
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Equation [4.30] shows that 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷 > 0 implying that income inequality can be reduced by 
financial reform (signified by low borrowing rate) as individuals are able to access credit used 
to fund education which invariably increase more earning capacities in subsequent periods in 
addition to increasing the stock of human capital investment. 
 
Also, from equation [4.30], taking the derivative of 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷 with respect to 𝐻, gives: 
𝜕𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝐻
=
𝜑𝐻𝜑−1∝𝐾1−𝑎
𝑤𝑎
[𝐿𝑎−1 − 𝐿′𝑎−1]     [4.31] 
 
Therefore, 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐷 is a decreasing function of 𝐻 since 𝜑 ≥ 1. This implies that at higher levels 
of credit access (due to fall in borrowing rate) income levels converge in steady-state. That is, 
the human capital stock increases as financial reform shapes credit access and income inequality 
reduces, ceteris paribus. Conceptually, the direction of the finance-credit-inequality nexus is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there are grounds for a pro-equity impact of financial 
development. More specifically, financial development can improve the access of the poor to 
financial services enabling them to become more productive, for example by opening-up new 
businesses (Saibu et al., 2009; Bowale & Akinlo, 2012). On the other hand, financial 
development may increase inequality if it takes the form of more and better financial services 
for the better-off and delivers higher returns to their capital without significant improvement in 
access for the poor thus, widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Therefore, the impact 
of financial development on income inequality is ultimately an empirical issue (Park & Shin, 
2015). As conjectured from the extensive margin theory, the increase in credit while controlling 
for GDP per capita, government expenditures, trade openness, age-dependency ratio, secondary 
education enrolment rate, corruption and the rule of law index is expected to lead to a reduction 
in income inequality, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.3 Model Specification 
Thus, following both theoretical and empirical literature and aligning with this study’s 
analytical approach, the empirical  model modifies the existing model as used by Agnello et al. 
(2012), Asongu (2013), Batuo and Asongu (2015) and other related works such as the more 
recent one by Adeleye et al. (2017). In order to address the research hypotheses and allow 
comparativeness across the four sub-regions, a three-equation model is designed having dummy 
variables. For the panel data analysis, these equations are stated as: 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝜑0𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴 + 𝐸𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴 + 𝞮𝑖𝑡    [4.32] 
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𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  0𝑖𝑡 + 1𝒓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛳′𝑖𝒁𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴 + 𝐸𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴 + 𝞮𝑖𝑡    [4.33] 
 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆0𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁1𝐶?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛹′𝑖𝑲𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴 + 𝐸𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴 + 𝞮𝑖𝑡    [4.34] 
 
where: 𝐹𝑆𝐼 is the financial stability index; 𝑟 is the interest rate9 (financial reform indicator); 𝐶𝑅 
is credit growth; 𝐶?̂? is the predicted value of credit growth; 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 is the Gini index (measure of 
income inequality); 𝜑,, λare constant terms;  𝛿, , 𝜁are parameters; i, countries, 1, 2……..N;  t, 
time, 1, 2…..T, 𝛽′𝑖𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝛳′𝑖𝒁𝑖𝑡, 𝛹′𝑖𝑲𝑖𝑡 are vectors of observed time-variant control variables 
and their regression coefficients. 𝐶𝐴, 𝐸𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝐴 are sub-regional dummies10 having 1 for countries 
in that sub-region and 0, otherwise. 𝑊𝐴 is the base dummy. 
 
Equation [4.32] explains the impact of financial reforms on the financial sector. It seeks to 
address the issue of financial system stability after a financial reform. Using the real interest 
rate as the reform variable and a composite index for financial system stability, this study shows 
that the financial sector stabilises after a reform has taken place even though some distortions 
may be felt within the early periods of reforms. Equation [4.33] addresses the issue of whether 
credit growth is stimulated by financial reforms. With domestic credit as the proxy for credit 
growth, this study seeks to show that financial reforms positively stimulate credit growth. 
Lastly, equation [4.34] addresses the crux of this thesis which is to show if credit growth has 
an equalising effect on income inequality. To achieve this, the predicted value of domestic 
credit (rather than the level of domestic credit) which is generated from equation [4.33] is used 
as the proxy for credit growth (the explanatory variable) for the panel data analysis (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009, 2010) while the level of domestic credit is used for the time 
series analyses. The intuition for using this approach is to connect the second and third 
hypotheses together in establishing the nexus. Lastly, the inclusion of control variables11 is to 
determine whether the effect of the main explanatory variables on the dependent variables still 
holds true after considering the effects of these covariates on inequality. 
                                                 
9Since financial reform in itself is not readily observable, but captured using proxies and indicators such as the 
interest rate, capital account liberalisation etc. The choice of using the interest rate as the financial reform variable 
is in line with the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) hypothesis which states that creation of higher interest rates equate the 
demand and supply for savings leading to increased savers and increased financial intermediation. 
10The dummy variables are only included in the pooled OLS estimations. 
11See Table 4.1 for full variables list. 
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For the time series analysis, an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model is specified in 
order to control for the inherent endogeneity in the data and the non-integration of variables of 
the same order. Thus, following Kripfganz and Schneider (2016), the generalised ARDL 
(𝑝, 𝑞, … , 𝑞) three-equation model is stated as: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡 =  𝜑0𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽′𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡   [4.35] 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑡 =  0𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛳′𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑍𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡    [4.36] 
 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 =  𝜆0𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝐶?̂?𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛹′𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝐾𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡  [4.37] 
 
 
Where the dependent and explanatory variables are allowed to be purely I(0) or I(1) or co-
integrated;𝑝, 𝑞 are optimal lag orders;𝜀𝑡 is a vector of the error terms - unobservable zero mean 
white noise vector process (serially uncorrelated or independent). The other particulars in the 
equations are as defined in equations [4.32] to [4.34]. It is important to state that the model for 
each country is augmented by using specific control indicators and not ‘generalised’ indicators. 
This is to reduce the bias that might be created from the use of ‘generalised’ control variables. 
It is also important to note that a distinctive feature between equation 4.34 and equation 4.37 is 
that the latter accounts for hysteresis or persistence in income inequality, which is consistent 
with the discussed theoretical and empirical literature.  
 
4.4  Estimation Techniques 
For the panel data analysis, the estimation techniques are pooled OLS, fixed effects estimator 
(outcome of the Hausman test ), dynamic fixed effects estimator (from the heterogeneous 
dynamic panel model) and system generalised method of moments (for estimator robustness 
check) while the error correction representation of the autoregressive distributed lag model is 
adopted for the time series analysis of 4 countries. 
 
4.4.1 Pooled OLS Estimator 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis captures not just the variations in time or space, but 
the variation in both of these dimensions at the same time. The pooled OLS model, rather than 
testing a cross-sectional model for all countries at one point in time or testing a time series 
model for one country using time series data, pools and tests all countries through time 
(Pennings, Keman, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). With the easiness to analyse all units (firms, 
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countries, individuals etc.) at the same time, the pooled OLS gained an advantage which has 
become central in quantitative studies of comparative economics. An accumulating body of 
research has utilised pooled models to provide answers to classical questions of the discipline 
(Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange, 1991; Hicks & Swank, 1992). Furthermore, given the structure of 
the empirical model, White (1980) robust and homoscedasticity-consistent standard errors is 
used to correct for the possible existence of heteroscedasticity and to remove the effect of 
outliers. Moreover, the log-transformation of the dependent variable can serve to mitigate 
problems of heteroscedasticity of the error term and reduce the impact of outliers in the data. 
The generalised baseline pooled OLS linear model is given as: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜕𝑡 + (𝜂𝑖 + Ԑ𝑖𝑡),       [4.38] 
 
where, Ԑ𝑖𝑡 , denotes the unobserved random error term, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes natural logarithm of the 
dependent variable (which could either be financial stability index or natural logarithm of credit 
growth or the natural logarithm of Gini index),𝛼, the constant term; i,, countries, 1, 2……..N; 
t, time, 1, 2…..T, 𝛽𝑋′𝑖𝑡, vector of observed time-variant factors and their regression coefficients 
and 𝜂𝑖  denotes unobserved country-specific effects. 
 
4.4.2 Fixed Effects Estimator 
In the case where 𝜂𝑖  is expected to correlate with one or more of the explanatory variables in 
the above model, when 𝐸(𝜂𝑖│𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, the fixed effects model is needed. In this case 𝜂𝑖 has to 
be removed prior to estimation or it will result in biased estimates and since 𝜂𝑖is country-
specific and assumed to be fixed over time, the effect can be “differenced” away. This 
transformation removes the country-specific effects 𝜂𝑖 and equation [4.38] becomes: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?) = (𝛼 − 𝛼) + 𝛽(𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡
−  ?̅?) + (𝜂𝑖 − 𝜂𝑖) + (Ԑ𝑖𝑡 −  Ԑ̅)   [4.39] 
 
and this reduces to: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  𝑌)̅̅ ̅ = 𝛽(𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡
−  ?̅?) +  𝜕𝑡  +  (Ԑ𝑖𝑡 −  Ԑ̅)     [4.40] 
where: 𝜕𝑡, denotes a time dummy to control for temporal variation in the dependent variable; 
thus, the application of OLS to [4.35] provides unbiased and consistent estimates for the 
covariates of interest.  
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However, in determining the appropriateness between the random and fixed effects model, a 
statistical test is implemented. The Hausman (1978) test compares the random effects estimator 
to the ‘within’ estimator. If the null is rejected, this favours the ‘within’ estimator’s treatment 
of the omitted effects (i.e., it favours the fixed effects but only relative to the random effects). 
The use of the test in this case is to discriminate between a model where the omitted 
heterogeneity is treated as fixed and correlated with the explanatory variables, and a model 
where the omitted heterogeneity is treated as random and independent of the explanatory 
variables. If the omitted effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the random 
effects estimator is consistent and efficient. However, the fixed effects estimator is consistent 
but not efficient given the estimation of a large number of additional parameters (i.e., the fixed 
effects). If the effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, the fixed effects estimator 
is consistent but the random effects estimator is inconsistent. The Hausman test provides the 
basis for discriminating between these two models (Greene, 2003; Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 
2010). The matrix version of the Hausman test is expressed as:  
 
[𝛽𝑅𝐸 − 𝛽𝐹𝐸][𝑉(𝛽𝑅𝐸) − 𝑉(𝛽𝐹𝐸)]
−1[𝛽𝑅𝐸 − 𝛽𝐹𝐸]
′ ~ χ𝑘
2    [4.41] 
 
where k is the number of covariates (excluding the constant) in the specification, and 
𝛽𝑅𝐸 , 𝛽𝐹𝐸  are the regression beta coefficients. If the random effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, then there will be a statistically significant difference between the 
random effects and the fixed effects estimates. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
expressed as:  
 
H0: Random effects are independent of explanatory variables  
H1: H0 is not true.  
 
The null hypothesis is the random effects model and if the test statistic exceeds the relevant 
critical value, the random effects model is rejected in favour of the fixed effects model. In finite 
samples the inversion of the matrix incorporating the difference in the variance-covariance 
matrices may be negative-definite (or negative semi-definite) thus yielding non-interpretable 
values for the chi-squared (Greene, 2003; Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010).  
 
 
 
83 
 
4.4.3 Heterogeneous Dynamic Panel Model Estimators 
The empirical approach adopted for this study differs a bit from the approach adopted by similar 
studies on finance-inequality relationship. It adopts the heterogeneous dynamic model which is 
suitable given that there are twenty (20) countries (N) covering 1980 to 2015 (T)  which is 36 
years, hence N < T. Roodman (2006, 2014) states where N > T, the suitable estimators are the 
difference-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the sys-GMM estimator 
propounded by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman (2006) 
further argues that where N < T, the application of the GMM estimators will result in spurious 
outcomes for two reasons. Firstly, the small size of N might produce some unreliable 
autocorrelation test and secondly, the number of instruments will increase as the time span of 
the data increases affecting the validity of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions which 
may cause the rejection of the null hypothesis. This will cast doubt on the reliability and 
consistency of results obtained using GMM when N < T. Therefore, applying the GMM 
estimators to a model where N < T will likely yield inconsistent and misleading long-run 
coefficients unless the slope coefficients are indeed identical (Pesaran & Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 
Shin, & Smith, 1997; Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 1999). Based on Pesaran et al. (1999), the 
dynamic heterogeneous panel regression is incorporated into the error correction model using 
the autoregressive distributed lag ARDL (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑞, … , 𝑞) technique stated as follows: 
 
∆𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖[𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′
𝑖𝑗
𝐱𝑖𝑡] + ∑ 𝛾
∗
𝑖𝑗∆𝒚𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛿
∗′
𝑖𝑗∆𝐱𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=0 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 [4.42] 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, 2, … 𝑇; 𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 ); 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 ; 𝛾
∗
𝑖𝑗 = − ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑗+1 , (𝑗 =
1, 2, … , 𝑝 − 1) and 𝛿∗𝑖𝑗 = − ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑗+1 , (𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑞 − 1). 
 
The ARDL (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑞, … , 𝑞) model assumes that firstly, the errors 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are independently 
distributed across 𝑖 and 𝑡, with means 0, and variances 𝜎𝑖
2 > 0. Secondly, is the stability in its 
roots lie outside the unit circle given by: ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑧
𝑗𝑝
𝑗=1 = 1, (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁) and this assumption 
ensures that 
𝑖
< 0 to establish the long-run relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝐱𝑖𝑡 which is defined 
by: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = − (
𝛽′𝑖
𝑖
) 𝐱𝑖𝑡 + φ𝑖𝑡 for each 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 where φ𝑖𝑡is a stationary process. Lastly, the 
model assumes long-run homogeneity across groups. That is the long-run coefficients on  𝐱𝑖 
defined by 𝜭𝑖 = − (
𝛽′𝑖
𝑖
) are the same across groups such that 𝜭𝑖 = 𝜭, (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁) 
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The long-run growth regression is the term in the square brackets. Equation [4.41] can be 
estimated by three different estimators: the mean group (MG) model of Pesaran and Smith 
(1995), the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999), and the dynamic fixed 
effects estimator (DFE). These estimators allow for the long-run equilibrium and the 
heterogeneity contained in the dynamic adjustment process (Demetriades & Law, 2006) which 
are computed by maximum likelihood. Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran 
and Shin (1999) present the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in an error correction 
form as a relatively new cointegration test bearing in mind that the emphasis is importance of 
having consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters in a long-run relationship.  
 
According to Johansen (1995), only variables with the same order of integration can be said to 
exhibit some forms of cointegration and hence have a long-run relationship. However, Pesaran 
and Shin (1999) argue that the panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model can be used 
even with variables with different orders of integration irrespective of whether the series are 
I(0) or I(1). In other words, both the short-run and long-run effects can be estimated at the same 
time from a data set with large N and T. Finally, due to the inclusion of lags of both the 
dependent and the explanatory variables, the ARDL model, especially PMG and MG 
estimators, provide consistent coefficients despite the possible presence of endogeneity 
(Pesaran et al, 1999). To understand the key features of the three different estimators in the 
dynamic panel framework, their assumptions are explained briefly below. 
 
Mean Group (MG) Estimator 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) introduced the mean group (MG) estimator which allows for the 
estimation of separate regressions for each country and calculating the coefficients as un-
weighted means of the estimated coefficients for the individual countries. No restrictions are 
imposed by this estimator and it allows that all coefficients vary and be heterogeneous in the 
long-run and short-run. However, for the estimator to be consistent and its results valid, the 
necessary condition is to have a sufficiently large T (that is, large time dimension in the data).  
 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Estimator 
The PMG on the other hand, allows for short-run coefficients, including the intercepts, the 
speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium values, and error variances to differ across 
countries, while the long-run slope coefficients are restricted to be the same for all countries. 
This assumption is particularly useful when there are reasons to expect that in the long-run, the 
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countries may exhibit the same features or are likely to respond in the same manner. However, 
due to the widely different impact of the responsiveness to financial and external shocks, 
stabilisation policies, monetary policy etc. the short-run adjustment is allowed vary by country. 
Nevertheless, for this approach to be consistent and its results valid, there are certain 
requirements. Firstly, it is required that the coefficient of the error–correction term be negative 
to establish the existence of a long-run relationship among the variables of interest. Secondly, 
the resulting residual of the error-correction model must not be serially correlated and the 
explanatory variables can be treated as exogenous. These conditions can be fulfilled with the 
inclusion of (𝑝, 𝑞) lags for the dependent (𝑝) and independent variables (𝑞) in error correction 
form in the ARDL model. Lastly, the relative size of T and N is crucial. If both are large, this 
allows the use of the dynamic panel technique and helps prevent some bias in the use of the 
estimators and addresses the problem of heterogeneity. Hence, the PMG will produce 
inconsistent estimates if these conditions are not met. 
 
Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) Estimator 
The operation of the dynamic fixed effects estimator (DFE) is quite similar to that of PMG 
estimator. The slope coefficients and error variances are homogenous for all countries in the 
long-run in addition to the speed of adjustment coefficient and the short-run coefficient which 
are restricted to be the same too. However, the model allows for different country-specific 
intercepts. Nevertheless, Baltagi, Griffin, and Xiong (2000) point out that this model is subject 
to a simultaneous equation bias due to the endogeneity between the error term and the lagged 
dependent variable in case of small sample size but this does not negate the usefulness of this 
technique in empirical studies. Therefore, given the distinct features of these estimators, this 
study uses that of the DFE because it aligns with generalising the reform-credit-inequality nexus 
in SSA. The “general” approach corresponds with some basic features of the DFE estimator 
amongst which are that in the long-run, the slope coefficients, error variances are the same 
across all countries in the sample. If these differ across countries, as it is in the case of the PMG, 
obtaining long-run coefficients that may represent an overview of SSA countries will become 
impossible, thus, defeating the essence of this study. 
 
4.4.4 Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Estimator 
A substantial time-series literature examines the finance-growth relationship using a variety of 
time-series techniques. These studies frequently use Granger-type causality tests and vector 
autoregressive (VAR) procedures to examine the relationships between macroeconomic 
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variables and economic growth (Alege & Osabuohien, 2013; Alege & Ogundipe, 2014; Alege 
& Okodua, 2014), or specifically the nature of the finance-growth relationship (Edo, 2012, 
2014). VAR models in economics were made popular by Sims (1980) while the definitive 
technical reference for VAR models with updated surveys of VAR techniques is given in 
Lütkepohl (2005), applications of VAR models to financial data given in Alege (2010), Edo 
(2011), Ogundipe and Alege (2014) and Davtyan (2016) to mention a few. However, research 
has progressed by using better measures of financial development, employing more powerful 
econometric techniques, and by examining individual countries in much greater depth (Shan, 
2003; Shan & Jianhong, 2006; Soultanaeva, 2010).  
 
Thus, extending the works of Edo (2012) in relation to financial development and Davtyan 
(2016) who used the vector autoregression (VAR) approach, this study examines the 
interactions of these variables within the framework of the ARDL model specified in equations 
[4.35] to [4.37] in four SSA countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) while 
controlling for the effects of other macroeconomic factors. The dynamics of the reforms-credit-
inequality relationship is analysed whilst avoiding the pitfalls of endogeneity and integration of 
the variables. Inevitably, a time series analysis has its own limitations. The foregoing arguments 
of this study (framed in three hypotheses) are that firstly, the stability of the financial system is 
important in measuring the extent of credit growth and then income inequality. Secondly, it 
analyses the impact of financial reform on credit growth and thirdly investigates the reforms-
credit-inequality nexus. Each model is estimated using the error-correction parameterisation of 
the ARDL framework wherein both the long- and short-run relationships are established.  
 
4.4.5 System Generalised Method of Moments (Sys-GMM) Estimator 
For robustness of estimators and to control for the possible presence of endogeneity amongst 
others, the system generalised methods of moments estimator is used. The Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimators 
are designed for situations with (1) “large N” “small T”, panels, meaning many groups and few 
years coverage; (2) a linear functional relationship; (3) one left-hand-side variable that is 
dynamic, depending on its own past realisations; (4) independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous, meaning they are correlated with past and possibly current realisations of the error 
term; (5) fixed individual effects; and (6) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals but not across them (Roodman, 2006, 2014). Arellano–Bond (1991) estimation 
begins with the transformation of all regressors by usually by differencing, and uses the 
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generalised method of moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982; Holtz-Eakin, Newey, & Rosen, 1988) 
which is known as difference GMM.  
 
Subsequently, the Arellano–Bover and Blundell–Bond estimator augments Arellano–Bond by 
making an additional assumption that first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated 
with the fixed effects allowing for the introduction of more instruments and which can 
dramatically improve efficiency. This approach builds a system of two equations - the original 
equation and the transformed one - and is known as system GMM. One of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) contributions is a test for autocorrelation appropriate for linear GMM regressions on 
panels, which is especially important when lags are used as instruments. In addition, the 
consistency of the sys-GMM estimator is assessed by two specification tests. The Hansen test 
of over identifying restrictions tests for the overall validity of the instruments and the second 
test examines the null hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated. Failure to reject 
both null hypotheses gives support to the model (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Sghaier & Abida, 2013; Alege & Ogundipe, 2014). However, a 
weakness of difference and system GMM is that they are complicated and so can easily generate 
invalid estimates. 
 
Given the structure of the empirical model, 20 countries12 are analysed across 4 different time 
dimensions, that is, 1980 to 1989 (10 years), 1999 to 2000 (10 years), 2000 to 2009 (10 years) 
and 2010 to 2015 (6 years). This justifies the use the sys-GMM which is strictly designed for 
panels with short time dimension, T (Roodman, 2006, 2014). In addition to controlling for 
dynamic panel bias, (or the persistent nature of inequality), the estimation strategy addresses 
the problems of endogeneity, country-specific heterogeneity, measurement error and omitted 
variables and captures the short and long-run impacts of the regressors on the dependent 
variable which may not be adequately captured in a static model. In addition, the system GMM 
approach is used when the dependent variable is persistent. For example, this might be the case 
where habit persistence is known to be strong in the model. In this thesis, income inequality is 
a persistent variable and therefore, equation [4.38] is modified as: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ɸ𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖  +  𝜕𝑡 +  Ԑ𝑖𝑡.     [4.43] 
                                                 
12Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Gabon, Gambia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland and 
Tanzania 
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where, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the lag of natural logarithm of the Gini index.  
 
4.5 Variables, Measurements and Sources 
This section outlines the variables, their definitions, measurements, and the rationale for their 
inclusion as well as related data sources. Unless otherwise stated, the variables’ scope are from 
1980 to 2015 and they are downloaded from Lahoti et al. (2016) Global Consumption Income 
Project Dataset, World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2016) and Global Financial 
Development Datasets of the World Bank (2015). As a result of the structure of the empirical 
model and due to the considerations given to each of the representing country’s distinct 
heterogeneities13, a total of 22 variables are used. Table 4.1 shows the variables, measurements 
and their sources. The three outcome variables are financial stability index (computed via 
principal component analysis using the macroeconomic measures of financial stability), credit 
growth (proxied by domestic credit) and the Gini index (measure of income inequality). All the 
variables are as shown in Table 4.1, their relevance in the model and their a priori expectations 
are discussed in brief. Since there are three distinct models (financial stability, credit growth 
and income inequality), explanations adduced to each variable is model-specific. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13For instance, a total of 20 variables are used across the four countries. Cameroon has 14 variables, Kenya has 
14, Nigeria has 11 and South Africa has 13 with 6 variables common to all of them. 
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Table 4.1:      Variables, Definitions and Sources 
S/No. 
Variables and 
Measurements 
Short Description Source 
1 
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of 
dependents (people younger than 15 or older 
than 64) to the working-age population 
(those ages 15-64) 
WDI (2016) 
2 
Bank liquid reserves to bank 
assets ratio (%) 
This is the proxy for loan-to-deposit ratio WDI (2016) 
3 Broad money (% of GDP) 
Broad money (M2) is the sum of currency 
outside banks; demand deposits other than 
those of the central government; the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central 
government; bank and traveler’s checks; and 
other securities. 
WDI (2016) 
4 
Broad money growth (%, 
annual) 
The growth rate of broad money. WDI (2016) 
5 Deposit interest rate (%) 
The rate paid by commercial or similar 
banks for demand, time, or savings deposits.  
WDI (2016) 
6 
Domestic credit provided by 
financial sector (% of GDP) 
Credit to the private sector by financial 
institutions. This serves as the proxy for 
credit growth. It excludes credit to the public 
sector. 
WDI (2016) 
7 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
Credit to the private sector. This serves as 
the proxy for credit growth. It excludes 
credit to the public sector. 
WDI (2016) 
8 Dummy variables 
For each of the four sub-regions. 1 (if in that 
sub-region) and 0 (if otherwise). 
Constructed by 
Researcher 
9 Financial stability index This is a measure of financial stability 
Researher's 
Computation 
10 
Financial system deposits (% 
of GDP) 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions 
as a share of GDP. It is a measure of 
financial depth. 
WBGFDD (2016) 
11 GDP (current US$) 
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. 
WDI (2016) 
12 GDP growth (%, annual) The growth rate of the GDP. WDI (2016) 
13 GDP per capita (current US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. 
WDI (2016) 
14 
GDP per capita growth (%, 
annual) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per 
capita based on constant local currency. 
WDI (2016) 
15 Gini index 
The measure of income inequality. Ranges 
between 0 (perfect equality) and 100 
(perfect inequality) 
Lahoti et al, (2016) 
16 
Govt. expenditures (% of 
GDP) 
General government final consumption 
expenditures include all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services.  
WDI (2016) 
17 
Gross fixed capital formation 
(% of GDP) 
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly 
gross domestic fixed investment). 
WDI (2016) 
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S/No. Variables and Measurements Short Description Source 
18 
Gross fixed capital formation 
gr. (%, annual) 
Average annual growth of gross fixed 
capital formation based on constant local 
currency. 
WDI (2016) 
19 
Inflation (consumer prices) (%, 
annual) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer 
price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer 
of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly. 
WDI (2016) 
20 Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) 
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad 
money, or M3. It is a measure of financial 
depth. 
WBGFDD (2016) 
21 
Total natural resources rents 
(% of GDP) 
This is the proxy for natural resources. 
Mineral rents are the difference between 
the value of production for a stock of 
minerals at world prices and their total 
costs of production. 
WDI (2016) 
22 Primary enrolment (% total) 
Percentage of primary enrolment to total 
enrolment. 
WDI (2016) 
23 Real interest rate (%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation as measured by the 
GDP deflator. 
WDI (2016) 
24 Trade (% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
WDI (2016) 
Note: WBGFDD: World Bank Global Financial Development Database, WDI: World Development Indicators 
Source: Researcher's Compilation 
 
1. Financial Stability Index 
This is a dependent variable. The principal component analysis (PCA) method involves a 
mathematical procedure that transforms a number of correlated variables into a small number 
of uncorrelated variables called principal components (Tchamyou, 2016). The first component 
captures most of the common variance and the following orthogonal components contain less 
and less information than the preceding components (Creel, Hubert, & Labondance, 2014). 
Given that there are many indicators of financial system stability with each indicator having a 
commensurable influence on financial system activities and to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, it becomes imperative to derive an index measuring financial system stability. 
Thus, the main reason for building a composite index is to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity that occurs when introducing several financial stability variables at the same 
time that are highly correlated amongst themselves (Batuo, Mlambo, & Asongu, 2017). 
Howbeit, there is no consensus as to what variables make up the financial stability index, 
researchers in related field have used different indicators classified into microeconomic and 
macroeconomic dimensions into computing this index.  
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In addition, there is no consensus as to whether the indicator is called “financial stability index” 
or “financial instability index”. For instance, Creel et al. (2014) computed financial stability 
index using both microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions which are: ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans which is relevant as a warning signal for systemic banking 
insolvency, the banking Z-score, stock market volatility, bank capital to total assets, net interest 
margin, bank non-performing, loans to gross loans, stock market capitalization growth rate, 
return on assets, return on equity, and liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, total of 
credit to the private sector by deposit banks and other financial institutions and stock market 
turnover ratio. Batuo et al. (2017) on the other hand, computed financial instability index using 
the macroeconomic dimension which are composites of indicators gleaned from the balance 
sheet of the banking system such as: domestic credit provided by banks, credit provided to the 
private sector, liabilities liquidity, money and quasi money (M2) as a percentage of GDP, the 
real interest rate, and interest rate spread. Thus, depending on the researcher’s line of thought 
or argument, either connotation is applicable. 
 
2. The Gini Index 
This is a dependent variable. Income inequality is the major value-added of this study and the 
Gini index is a useful summary indicator of income inequality. It is the most used measure of 
income equality and ranges from 0 (perfect income equality) to 100 (perfect income inequality). 
It takes its cue from the Lorenz (1905) curve as shown in Figure 4.1 and it is a graphical 
distribution of nations’ wealth. On the graph, a straight diagonal line (45°) represents perfect 
equality while the Lorenz curve lies beneath showing the reality of wealth distribution. Thus, 
the coefficient is the difference between the straight and curved line measuring the amount of 
inequality in wealth distribution. Countries with Gini indices closer to 0 (European countries) 
are more equal than those closer to 100 i.e. Latin American and African countries (UNDP, 
2011, 2013). 
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Figure 4.1: The Lorenz Curve from Lorenz (1905) 
Source: Todaro and Smith (2012)  
 
 
According to The Conference Board of Canada (2011), countries with Gini indices within 20 – 
29.99 are said to be experiencing low inequality; those within 30 – 39.99 are having medium 
inequality; those within 40 – 49.99 are experiencing high inequality while those above 50 are 
said to have very-high inequality. Most developing economies are in the region of ‘high’ and 
‘very high’ income inequality and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) falls into this category. The Gini 
index is widely used perhaps due to the fact that it is easily computable and the data is readily 
available relative to other income measures. The index can be measured using gross income or 
net income, income or expenditure, data per capita or data per household (Milanovic, 2014; 
Solt, 2016). However, variations in defining the measure of the Gini index itself can undermine 
international and intertemporal comparability of any data (Deininger & Squire, 1996; 
Milanovic, 2014; Solt, 2014; Lahoti et al., 2016). The undermining may be as a result of 
different income definitions (gross income or net income) used across or even within countries 
and different reference units. The Gini index based on net income is used in this study.  
 
3. Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
This is a dependent variable and the proxy for credit growth; it is also the key explanatory 
variable in the inequality model. It captures the financial resources provided to the private sector 
by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. It is measured as a 
percentage of GDP and excludes credit to the public sector (World Bank, 2016) and represents 
the volume of funds available for lending. It is also the key explanatory variable in the 
inequality equation. Empirical findings support the argument that the removal of bureaucratic 
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controls towards directed credit and excessively high reserve requirements in addition to 
improvements in the securities market greatly reduce inequality. This further corroborates the 
findings of other political economy scholarship, which emphasises that access to credit amidst 
banking sector reforms reduces income inequality (Agnello et al., 2012; Kotarski, 2015; Park 
& Shin, 2015). Thus, a negative coefficient is expected. 
 
4. Interest rates 
Both the real and deposit interest rates are used to measure financial reforms. The deposit rate 
is the rate paid to depositors while the real interest rate is the lending rate adjusted for inflation 
and both rates enhance competition and efficiency in the financial sector. Such that, when the 
economy is booming, it pushes up demand for loanable funds (deposits) and therefore banks 
have incentive to increase deposit rates to savers. However, with respect to operating cost and 
credit risk, an increase in the cost of financial intermediation (which includes the increased 
deposit interest rate) leads to higher lending rates as banks attempt to recoup the costs. These 
include costs incurred in assessing the risk profile of borrowers, monitoring of the various 
projects for which loans have been advanced and expansion of branch network. On the other 
hand, an increase in the volatility of the money market interest rate drives up both deposit and 
lending rates (Were & Wambua, 2014). Therefore, Balassa (1990) considers financial 
liberalisation to be the backbone of economic reforms in lagging economies and explains it to 
mean the creation of higher interest rates that equate the demand and supply for savings and 
opinionated that increased rates of interest will lead to increased saving, increased financial 
activities as well as improving the efficiency of using savings (Adeleye et al., 2017). Given 
these, positive coefficients are expected in both the financial stability and credit growth models. 
 
5. Control Variables 
To ascertain whether the significance of key explanatory holds, they are controlled for using 
these variables. The GDP and its growth rate represent economic size. They are used only in 
the inequality model and it is expected that as they increase, income inequality falls. Therefore, 
a negative coefficient is expected. Likewise, the per capita GDP and its growth rate are 
expected to enhance financial stability, stimulate financial intermediation and hence reduce 
income inequality. However, some studies reveal that an increase in GDP deteriorates income 
distribution (van der Hoeven, 2010; Huhta, 2012). Hence, the underlying expected signs are 
contingent on the equal distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity across the population 
in the country. Broad money, its growth rate, financial system deposits and liquid liabilities 
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represent the pool of loanable funds which enhances financial system stability, stimulate credit 
and expected to reduce income inequality (as applicable to the model in which  they appear). 
That is, an increase drives the need to avail credit (Akinboade & Makina, 2010; Jegede, 2014; 
Ajibike & Aremu, 2015; Bassey & Moses, 2015; Adeleye et al., 2017). The inflation rate is 
expected to have a positive relationship with credit growth and a negative relationship with 
financial stability as rising inflation causes the real rate of return to fall which weakens the 
efficiency of the financial sector. 
 
Similarly, trade openness is included to test for potential effects of globalisation, which through 
Stolper-Samuelson effects can be hypothesised to potentially impact on economic development. 
At the same time, if openness to trade is a stimulus of economic development, then it could go 
hand-in-hand with development of financial institutions and hence stimulate financial 
intermediation. Hence, a positive coefficient is expected. Government consumption expenditure 
represents an important mechanism through which income can be redistributed across societal 
strata. It is both an engine of growth and a determinant of the distributions of wealth, income, 
and welfare. Government public investment increases wealth inequality over time, regardless 
of its financing. The time path of income inequality is, however, highly sensitive to financing 
policies, and is often characterized by sharp inter-temporal trade-offs, with income inequality 
declining in the short run but increasing in the long run (Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2012). The 
expected sign on income inequality is indeterminate but positive coefficients are expected for 
the financial stability and credit growth models. Gross fixed capital formation (proxy for 
investment) and its growth rate also enhance financial stability and stimulate lending. Hence a 
positive coefficient is expected but the impact of expenditures on income inequality is 
indeterminable. Equally, the loan-to-deposit ratio is expected to reduce income inequality as 
the proportion of loans increase.  
 
Likewise, the education variable primary enrolment tests the impact of education on income 
inequality. This is the school enrolment ratio, and it is expected to feature with a negative 
coefficient although empirical literature have mixed views as to the impact on income 
distribution. Furthermore, as noted by Witt, Clarke, and Fielding (1999); Lochner (2004) 
schooling generates benefits beyond the private return received by individuals. Some other 
studies find that primary and secondary education are equalising variables (De Gregorio & Lee, 
2002; Perugini & Martino, 2008) while higher education further widens the inequality gap 
(Lochner, 2004; Lochner & Moretti, 2004; Lo Prete, 2013). Also, the age-dependency ratio 
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captures the ratio of non-income earners to the working-age population, and as the proportion 
rises, income inequality is expected to rise. A high ratio indicates that a large proportion of 
youths are employed while a lower ratio can still be seen as a positive sign, especially for young 
people, if it is caused by an increase in their education. 
 
Furthermore, natural resources capture economic wealth. This variable will be used only in the 
inequality model as it is included to test if the abundance of natural resources influences income 
inequality. While natural resources have the potential to generate huge income for a country, 
the key issues whether the generated wealth trickles down to the lower members of society, or 
if it is kept exclusively by a small elite. It is expected that inequality should reduce in countries 
naturally-endowed but since natural resources are relative to regions and countries, the expected 
sign is indeterminable (Adeleye, 2014). Lastly, four dummy variables are constructed to capture 
variations across the four sub-regions. 1 indicate the respective sub-region and 0 if otherwise. 
The summary of the a priori expectations are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2:      Variables’ a priori Expectations  
S/No. Variables 
Models 
Sample: 
FSI CR Gini 
1 Age dependency ratio     positive SSA 
2 Broad money   positive negative K, S 
3 Broad money growth positive positive negative SSA, C, K, N, S 
4 Deposit interest rate positive positive   C, K, N, S 
5 Domestic credit     negative SSA, C, K, N, S 
6 Financial system deposits   positive   N 
7 GDP (US$)     negative K 
8 GDP growth (%, annual)     negative SSA 
9 GDP per capita positive positive   SSA, C, K, N, S 
10 
GDP per capita growth 
(%, annual) 
positive positive 
negative SSA, C, N, S 
11 Govt. expenditures positive positive undetermined SSA, C, K, S 
12 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
positive positive 
  SSA, C, K, N, S 
13 
Gross fixed capital 
formation gr. 
positive positive 
  C, S 
14 
Inflation (consumer 
prices) 
negative positive   C, K, N, S 
15 Liquid liabilities     negative C, K 
16 Loan-to-deposit ratio     negative S 
17 Natural resources     negative SSA, C 
18 Primary enrolment     negative K, N, S 
19 Real interest rate positive positive   SSA, C 
20 Trade positive positive   SSA 
Note: FSI: Financial stability index, CR: Credit growth, Gini: Gini index, SSA: Sub-Sahara Africa, C: 
Cameroon, K: Kenya, N: Nigeria, S: South Africa,  
Source: Researcher's Compilation 
 
 
4.6 Handling Data Issues 
To obtain the desired dataset, it has been necessary to choose from already existing datasets and 
databases. Even though data has become increasingly available for most indicators, it is still 
important to be very critical towards the quality of the data being collated. Much of the data 
coming out of most regions, aside Europe, suffer from inconsistencies in the numbers and 
methodology, both across countries, within countries and cross time (Meschi & Vivarelli, 2009; 
Lo Prete, 2013; Milanovic, 2014; Ravallion, 2014).  
 
Acknowledging the above challenges, only data from accredited sources, of which most have 
been previously used in the literature, are included. Ideally, the dataset will be a representative 
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longitudinal sample across all regions of Sub-Saharan Africa containing prominent indicators 
believed to have influence on credit growth and income inequality. The data collection and 
selection process involved combining similar datasets, while taking into consideration the units 
of measurements, thus yielding a meaningful time series data (Dollar & Kraay, 2004). 
 
Due to the issue of missing values, particularly on the Gini index, the study coverage is scaled 
down to 20 countries. Priority is given to the availability of substantial data points on the Gini 
index, real interest rate, deposit rate and domestic credit. Thus, countries without these are 
dropped to minimise ‘holes’ in the data and also to balance the ‘trade-off’ between sample size, 
richness and power of the explanatory variables (Barro, 2000). Finally, on a different note, it is 
hoped that the compiled dataset will serve as a secondary outcome of this research. Even though 
the dataset is mainly compiled for the purpose of this specific study, it may be useful in other 
respects as well.  
 
On the challenges encountered in obtaining the Gini index (the main argument of this study), a 
choice was made between the two renowned sources often referenced among researchers, they 
are: Lahoti et al. (2016), Solt (2014) Standardised World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
and World Bank (2013) Gini Datasets14. Lahoti et al. (2016) covers 1960 to 2015 and available 
for 161 countries of which 44 are in SSA. The index is calculated from actual household surveys 
with a total 2218 'standardised' number of Gini coefficients. The database is a representation 
and adaptation of Gini indices retrieved from nine (9) sources in order to create a single 
'standardised' Gini variable. The sources are: LIS, SEDLAC, SILC, ECA, WYD, POVCAL, 
WIIDI, CEPAL and INDI15. Solt (2014) on the other hand, provides the SWIID which gives 
comparable estimates of the Gini index of net- and market-income inequality for 174 countries 
of which 45 are African countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to 2011 (or 2012 
and 2013, for very few countries), as well as measures of absolute and relative redistribution. 
                                                 
14The World Bank (2013) data source in its entirety is not useable for this study. The reason is because the data on Gini indices 
for Sub-Saharan Africa is very sparse with only a trickle of data points available.  
15LIS: Luxembourg Income Study dataset covers 1967-2010' includes 40, mostly developed, countries; 232 Gini observations. 
SEDLAC: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean covers 1974-2012; includes 23 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries; 301 Gini observations.   
SILC: Survey of Income and Living Condition includes years 2005-2008 with 29 countries; 103 Gini observations. 
ECA: World Bank’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia database covers 1990-2011, includes 30 countries; 257 Gini observations. 
WYD: World Income Distribution dataset covers 1980-2012; includes 152 countries; 631 Gini observations.   
POVCAL, World Bank-based dataset covers the period 1978-2011; includes 124 countries; 798 Gini observations. 
WIID1: World Institute for Development Research (WIDER) dataset covers 1950-2012; includes 159 countries; 1490 Gini 
observations. 
CEPAL. Historical data on Latin American countries obtained from published documents by CEPAL; covers 1950-1987; 
include 6 countries; 29 Gini observations.   
INDIE: Individual data sets taken from individual studies. 
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The SWIID was introduced in 2008 to provide researchers with income inequality data that 
maximise comparability for the broadest possible sample of countries and years (Solt, 2009). 
The SWIID made use of five sources16 and has more than 10,000 Gini indices calculated on the 
basis of eleven different combinations of welfare definitions and income scale. Therefore, given 
the longer period coverage, this study makes use of the Gini dataset from Lahoti et al. (2016).  
 
Another major issue that may arise from multivariate models is multicollinearity which explains 
the degree of dependence between regressors. If there is perfect or near-perfect 
multicollinearity, it indicates that variation in one regressor can be completely explained by 
another regressor because both variables cannot be distinguished from one another, thus 
resulting in biased estimates even though OLS estimators are still best linear and unbiased 
estimators (BLUE). One of the ways17 to test for multicollinearity is via the tolerance level and 
variance-inflating factor (VIF)18. The tolerance level is percentage of unaccounted variance in 
an explanatory variable by other explanatory variables. It is mathematically stated as 1 – R2 
(where R2 is that obtained from regressing an explanatory variable on other regressors). The 
unaccounted variance is the tolerance level. The tolerance level of 0.10 is often accommodated, 
such that any percentage below that evidences the presence of multicollinearity.  
 
The VIF is the inverse of the tolerance level and it is the speed at which variances and co-
variances increase and shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence of 
multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). As the coefficient of correlation, r between the 
regressors’ approaches 1, the VIF approaches infinity. The implication of this is that, as the 
extent of collinearity increases, the variance of an estimator increases, and in the limit it can 
become infinite. Thus, if there is no collinearity between regressors, the VIF will be 1 (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009). In the three specified models, multicollinearity is prevented by avoiding the 
inclusion of highly collinear variables in the same model. Further testing is done to ascertain 
that multicollinearity does not exist using the VIF. These are shown in the diagnostic checks in 
Tables 5.22, 5.24, 5.26 and 5.28. 
 
 
                                                 
16LIS, Milanovic (2013), SEDLAC, WIDER (2008, 2013) and Deininger and Squire (1996). 
17Multicollinearity can also be tested with the coefficient of correlation, r. If r = 1, then multicollinearity or 
collinearity exists between explanatory variables.  
18VIF = 
1
(1−𝑟𝑛𝑘
2 )
, where 𝑟𝑛𝑘
2  is the coefficient of correlation between regressor n and k, 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To address the stated hypotheses and achieve the objectives of the study, the empirical strategy 
and results are presented and discussed in two parts. The first which is the general approach 
comprises a panel dataset of 20 countries while the second part which is the specific approach 
involves time series analyses of 4 countries – Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, with 
each representing a sub-region. The distinct heterogeneity of each of the four countries 
representing a sub-region is taken into consideration. The time span for both analyses is from 
1980 to 2015 and variables used are as discussed in section 4.5 (shown in Table 4.1). For the 
panel data, the empirical techniques of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), 
dynamic fixed effects (DFE) and system GMM (for estimation robustness) are used while the 
error-correction model of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) framework is used for the 
time-series data. All estimations are carried out using Stata13 analytical software. 
 
5.1 The General Approach – Panel Data Analysis 
The reason for adopting a general approach is because a broader perspective on the issues 
bordering on the menace of income inequality is required to enable proffering a corrective 
course of action as it relates to Sub-Sahara Africa. To achieve this, 20 countries are selected 
from the region based on data availability. They are: Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland and 
Tanzania. From this pool of countries, 6 are from Central Africa, 7 from East Africa, 4 from 
Southern Africa and 3 from West Africa. Given the time dimension of 36 years, analyses is 
done by dividing the sample into a 10-year non-overlapping window in order to understand 
variations in the data vis-à-vis the 4 sub-regions. The empirical techniques employed are the 
pooled OLS, FE, DFE and sys-GMM estimators. 
 
5.1.1 Computing Financial Stability Index 
Financial system stability has no established aggregate indicator that can be used as a measure 
of financial instability but most studies either use proxies or compute an index of financial 
stability (Geršl & Heřmánek, 2006; Creel et al., 2014; Batuo et al., 2017). Since the objective 
of financial stability indicators is to provide users with a rough idea of the soundness of the 
financial sector as a whole, this study aligns with the general school of thought by computing a 
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financial stability index using the principal component analysis (PCA) method. The 
justification for the PCA is that there are many indicators of financial stability which often leads 
to not knowing which of these indicators best capture financial stability or which is most 
appropriate for an empirical analysis, coupled with the fact that there often exists a high 
correlation among them. The computation of a financial stability index can be done by either 
using macroeconomic or microeconomic financial indicators (Creel et al., 2014).  
 
Thus, due to paucity of data on the microeconomic measures of financial stability for all SSA 
countries, particularly from 1980 to 1995, this study adopts the macroeconomic measures in 
computing the financial stability index for the panel of countries. The variables used are 
domestic credit to the private sector, domestic credit to the private sector by banks, domestic 
credit provided by financial institutions, financial system deposits, liquid liabilities and broad 
money all of which are in percentage of GDP. Interestingly, these measures capture both the 
assets (domestic credit to the private sector, domestic credit to the private sector by banks and 
domestic credit provided by financial institutions) and liabilities (financial system deposits, 
liquid liabilities and broad money) components of the financial system in the balance sheet of 
financial intermediaries thus substantiating their relevance in the composition of the index in 
addition to the fact that they remain strongly correlated.  
 
Therefore, following Batuo et al. (2017), the “change” rather than the “level” of each variable 
is used in the computation of the index, which is a linear combination of the six preceding 
variables maximising the common variance explained between them. Consequently, to justify 
the use of PCA, it is observed from the data that the correlation between change in domestic 
credit provided by banks and change domestic credit to the private sector is 0.9003, and that 
between change in liquid liabilities and financial system deposits is 0.9413. The correlation 
between FSI and other measures of financial stability is shown in Table 5.1. The financial 
stability index (FSI) is strongly and positively correlated with all variables of financial stability, 
an indication that the FSI best explains these variables simultaneously. Likewise, the strong 
correlation among the indicators is evidenced. It further shows that when the FSI increases, 
financial system stability improves. 
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Table 5.1:       Correlation Matrix (FSI and Financial Stability Variables), SSA 
Variables FSI ∆DCF ∆DC ∆DCB ∆FSD ∆LL ∆BM 
Financial stability index (FSI) 1.000       
Change in domestic credit by fin. inst. 0.632 1.000      
Change in domestic credit 0.750 0.521 1.000     
Change in domestic credit by banks 0.785 0.479 0.900 1.000    
Change in financial system deposits 0.780 0.289 0.290 0.350 1.000   
Change in liquid liabilities 0.798 0.302 0.308 0.363 0.941 1.000  
Change in broad money 0.773 0.382 0.396 0.464 0.595 0.632 1.000 
Note: FSI: financial stability index; ∆DCF.: change in domestic credit by financial institutions; 
∆DC.: change in domestic credit; ∆DCB.: change in domestic credit by banks; ∆FSD.: change in 
financial system deposits; ∆LL.: change in liquid liabilities and ∆BM.: change in broad money 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
In computing the financial stability index, the first component has an eigenvalue (the variance 
of the component) of 3.4193 (a value greater than one means that the component captures more 
variance than its nominal share of the total variance of the variables) and explains 56.99% of 
the common variance of the series while the second component has an eigenvalue of 1.3703 
and explains 22.84% of the variation. Only the first component is used in this case and the scree 
plot is shown in Appendix Figure A5.1. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index is the measure 
of sampling adequacy and it compares the partial correlations and correlations between 
variables. A value above 0.50 justifies the use of PCA (Creel, Hubert, & Labondance, 2014). 
Therefore, with a KMO of 0.6976, the use of PCA is validated. Table 5.2 shows some salient 
features from the computation of financial stability index. 
 
Table 5.2:  PCA and Eigenvectors, SSA 
Variables SSA 
PCA eigenvectors (highest) 3.4193 
Proportion explained 0.5699 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.6976 
Source: Researcher's Computation 
 
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix, SSA 
The descriptive analysis is conducted on a sub-regional basis in comparison with the full 
sample. From Table 5.3, the average Gini index for the 20 selected countries is 60.68 while 
among the sub-regions, Southern Africa has the highest average income inequality index of 
64.63. Generally, all the sub-regions in SSA exhibit high inequality index. Ironically, the 
Southern Africa region has the highest volume of domestic credit (47.122) the bulk of which 
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comes from South Africa. In the same vein, Southern Africa has the lowest real interest rate 
(4.438) relative to the full sample (7.09) and across other sub-regions. Likewise on per capita 
GDP, Southern Africa recorded the highest average of 3,146.64 followed by East Africa relative 
to the full sample (1,897.58) and other sub-regions just to mention a few.  
 
Table 5.3:  Data Properties and Descriptive Statistics, SSA (1980-2015) 
 
 
Next is the standard deviation which tells how the calculations for a group are spread out from 
the average (mean), or expected value. A low standard deviation implies that most of the 
numbers are very close to the mean value while a high standard deviation means that the 
numbers are spread out. For instance, the standard deviation of 4.425 for the Gini index for the 
full sample indicates that most of the countries in the sample exhibit high inequality indexes. 
That is, very close to the sample average. Also, the standard deviation of 1,780.42 for per capita 
GDP for Southern Africa indicates that most countries in that sub-region are greatly dispersed 
from the average group mean implying huge disparities in the per capita incomes of countries 
located in Southern Africa. In the same vein, the standard deviation of 18.04 for the real interest 
rate for West Africa indicates that most countries in the sub-region are greatly dispersed from 
the average rate of 4.69.  
 
On the correlation among the variables, it is important that the variables used in each equation 
do not exhibit perfect collinearity (that is, when the variation in one explanatory variable can 
be completely explained by movements in another explanatory variable) as this will give rise 
to biased estimates. Although still best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE), the obtained OLS 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Financial Stability Index 0.000 1.849 -0.158 1.284 0.136 1.811 0.134 1.975 -0.164 2.528
Gini index 60.680 4.425 60.019 2.416 58.544 2.636 64.625 4.612 61.742 6.452
Domestic credit 21.127 26.075 11.535 6.661 20.002 18.841 47.122 43.635 10.565 6.913
Real interest rate 7.090 11.313 10.290 12.046 7.510 7.864 4.438 5.643 4.687 18.041
GDP growth 3.644 5.916 3.046 6.389 3.891 5.839 4.467 4.169 3.188 6.913
per capita GDP 1,897.579 2,547.971 1,593.815 2,161.410 2,022.679 3,320.318 3,146.637 1,780.419 557.067 586.234
per capita GDP growth 1.124 5.706 0.282 6.096 1.575 5.739 2.165 3.896 0.405 6.528
Broad money growth 16.087 15.361 9.884 15.715 17.341 12.243 16.219 12.861 25.317 18.582
Investment 19.575 8.533 20.035 10.134 20.160 7.258 22.075 6.246 13.928 8.006
Trade 73.551 37.395 70.162 31.670 68.128 41.975 98.527 34.762 59.128 23.052
Primary enrollment 96.398 24.305 97.469 28.110 96.911 25.819 103.935 10.568 81.046 19.407
Govt. expenditures 16.335 7.035 14.004 5.682 17.786 7.375 20.904 3.724 11.547 7.416
Age-dependency ratio 86.029 15.747 90.715 8.496 83.891 20.984 79.308 15.772 90.608 4.335
Natural resources 12.810 15.997 22.604 20.681 6.826 7.156 4.023 5.024 17.790 16.393
[Southern Africa] [West Africa]
Note: Std. Dev: Standard Deviation
Source: Researcher's Computations
Variables
[Full Sample] [Central Africa] [East Africa]
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estimates will have large variances and co-variances making precise estimation difficult 
(Wooldridge, 1995; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009, 2010). The correlation analysis 
shown in Table 5.4 reveals the relationships existing between and among the variables. 
Although there is no consensus on the exact level of dependence for one to become wary of the 
presence of multicollinearity, but it is generally agreed that any figure from 0.8 and above 
should be cautiously looked at. 
 
Table 5.4:     Correlation Matrix for SSA 
 
 
From Table 5.4, only two relationships exhibit strong correlation (that is, strong linear 
dependence). They are per capita GDP growth/GDP growth (0.978) and age-dependency ratio/ 
per capita GDP (-0.786). However, since these collinear regressors are not included together in 
the same models, the problem of multicollinearity is averted. 
 
5.2 Estimation and Results – Panel Data 
The approach taken is to address each research hypothesis and display the results from the 
various empirical techniques used. The pooled OLS estimation is simply the OLS method run 
on a panel dataset which ignores individual fixed effects. Although the pooled OLS does not 
differentiate between time and cross-sections, its essence in this study is to capture the sub-
regional variations in the data. Hence, the dataset is divided into 4 sub-regions – Central Africa 
(CA), East Africa (EA), Southern Africa (SA) and West Africa (WA) with WA as the base sub-
region. On the other hand, the fixed effects model chosen on the basis of the Hausman test result 
(see Table 5.5) eliminates all unobserved heterogeneity (individual fixed effects) in the data.  
Variables FSI Gini DC RR GDPGr. PC PCGr. BMGr. GFCF Trade Pry. Exp. Age Nat
Financial stability index 1.000
Gini index -0.051 1.000
Domestic credit 0.174 0.233 1.000
Real interest rate 0.388 -0.099 -0.011 1.000
GDP growth -0.139 -0.065 -0.045 0.050 1.000
GDP per capita 0.138 -0.003 0.489 -0.003 -0.003 1.000
GDP per capita growth -0.110 -0.079 0.041 0.040 0.978 0.114 1.000
Broad money growth 0.207 0.091 -0.086 -0.389 0.133 -0.133 0.123 1.000
Gross fixed capital formation 0.116 -0.107 0.080 0.030 0.129 0.411 0.149 -0.066 1.000
Trade 0.032 0.112 0.072 -0.038 0.149 0.530 0.214 0.006 0.495 1.000
Primary enrollment 0.082 -0.125 0.169 0.024 0.087 0.324 0.129 0.006 0.407 0.291 1.000
Government consumption exp. 0.115 0.253 0.157 -0.004 -0.071 0.408 -0.045 -0.108 0.355 0.391 0.285 1.000
Age dependency ratio -0.208 0.048 -0.587 0.020 0.005 -0.786 -0.140 0.065 -0.281 -0.414 -0.295 -0.270 1.000
Natural resources -0.107 -0.219 -0.207 -0.141 -0.013 -0.168 -0.050 0.112 0.046 -0.046 0.144 -0.257 0.213 ####
Note: FSI:  financial stability index; DC:  Domestic credit; RR:  Real interest rate; PC: per capita GDP; PCGr:  per capita GDP growth; 
BMGr: Broad money growth; GFCF: Gross fixed capitaI formation; Pry: Primary enrollment; Exp: Government expenditures; Age:  Age 
dependency ratio; Nat: Natural resources
Source: Researcher's Computation
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Table 5.5:    Hausman Test Result   
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
      
                  chi2(39) = (b-B)'[(V(b)-V(B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                           =       77.84   
                 Prob>chi2 =      0.0003  
                 (V(b)-V(B) is not positive definite) 
Source: Researcher's Computations   
 
Likewise the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) model is used only in addition to other techniques to 
address the third research question due to the dynamic nature of income inequality. This 
dynamic character is articulated by the introduction of a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable. In addition, a 10-year non-overlapping window is used to further capture 
variations across the different time periods (pre-reform, reform and post-reform periods). This 
study is unable to clearly separate the pre- and reform periods since most countries embarked 
on financial reforms between mid-1980s to the late 1990s. Therefore for simplicity and to 
prevent unnecessary ambiguity, periods before year 2000 are classified as reform periods. In 
addition, the inclusion of year dummies is to capture the influence of aggregate (time‐series) 
trends. Including dummies for each year allows the model to attribute some of the variation in 
the data to unobserved events that took place during each year, or otherwise characteristic 
features of that year besides specific events. Lastly, to check the robustness of estimators and 
control for endogeneity, the system GMM estimator is used. 
 
5.2.1 Pooled OLS Results 
The pooled OLS for all the hypotheses are displayed and discussed in this section. Firstly, in 
addressing whether the financial system is stable after a reform (Equation 4.32), results 
displayed in Table 5.6 show that across all specifications, the real interest rate is a positive and 
significant predictor of financial sector stability at the 1% level. Similarly, the coefficients of 
per capita GDP and broad money growth are positive and statistically significant across all 
specifications at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 5.6:   Pooled OLS: Financial Reforms and Financial Stability 
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Constant -2.913b (-2.60) -3.424a (-3.54) -0.899 (-0.62) -7.384a (-2.87) 
Real interest rate 0.105a (8.36) 0.079a (7.51) 0.099a (6.89) 0.215a (4.79) 
per capita GDP (log) 0.487a (2.94) 0.471a (4.21) 0.500a (2.71) 0.552b (2.11) 
per capita GDP gr. -0.078a (-3.38) -0.092a (-3.88) -0.078a (-2.82) -0.095 (-1.42) 
Broad money growth 0.054a (6.83) 0.049a (5.84) 0.059a (4.82) 0.076b (2.33) 
Investment (log) -0.077 (-0.21) 0.269 (1.34) -0.290 (-1.11) 0.777 (1.23) 
Trade (log) -0.404c (-1.83) -0.393c (-1.71) -0.661c (-1.69) -0.748 (-1.01) 
East Africa 0.203 (0.64) 0.467 (1.17) 0.171 (0.52) 1.292b (2.43) 
Central Africa -0.167 (-0.48) -0.648 (-1.46) -0.061 (-0.20) 2.937a (4.29) 
Southern Africa -0.131 (-0.31) 0.218 (0.48) 0.589 (1.10) 1.573c (1.88) 
No. of observations 132 172 184 71 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.539 0.512 0.377 0.668 
F-Statistic 6.971 8.344 4.366 . 
Note: Dependent variable: Financial Stability Index; Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
Also observed from Table 5.6 is the negative and significant effect of per capita GDP growth 
at the 1% and 5% levels with the exception of year 2000 to 2015. Likewise trade openness has 
a significant but negative impact in periods 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999, and 2000 to 2009 at 
the 10% level. On the sub-regions, the results show that it is only in time period 2010 to 2015 
that the financial sectors in Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa are significantly 
more stable than those in West Africa (base sub-region). On some particulars of the four 
specifications, the R-squared reflects the percentage of variation in the dependent variable 
explained by the regressors while the F-statistic gives the joint significance of the regressors 
and there is no evidence of multicollinearity (the variance inflation function is 1.43). 
 
Secondly, in addressing the financial reforms and credit growth relationship (Equation 4.33), 
results shown in Table 5.7 reveals that the positive and statistical significance of the real interest 
rate on credit growth is evident only in periods 1980 to 1989 at the 5% level contrary to the 
positive significance of per capita GDP across the 5 specifications at the 1% level. This result 
is in line with a priori expectations that financial reforms stimulate credit growth (Khalaf, 2011; 
Adeleye et al., 2017). Also, the per capita GDP growth rate on the other hand is negative across 
all specifications but it is statistically significant in periods 1980 to 1989, and 1990 to 1999 at 
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the 1% and 5% levels. Likewise, broad money growth rate has a negative and statistically 
significant impact in period 2010 to 2015 at the 10% level and trade openness has a negative 
and statistically significant impact in periods 2000 to 2009, and 2010 to 2015 at the 1% and 5% 
levels. 
 
Table 5.7:   Pooled OLS: Financial Reforms and Credit Growth          
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Constant 0.249 (0.52) 0.634 (1.05) 1.978a (4.45) 1.329c (1.70) 
Real interest rate 0.009b (2.15) 0.005 (1.25) 0.010 (1.65) 0.011 (1.62) 
per capita GDP (log) 0.363a (4.68) 0.268a (4.09) 0.623a (10.26) 0.457a (5.51) 
per capita GDP gr. -0.019b (-2.49) -0.029a (-2.95) 0.001 (0.11) -0.019 (-1.24) 
Broad money gr. -0.004 (-1.29) 0.003 (0.80) -0.002 (-0.71) -0.014c (-1.72) 
Investment (log) -0.072 (-0.74) 0.148 (1.22) -0.156 (-1.19) 0.047 (0.31) 
Trade (log) 0.064 (0.54) -0.199 (-1.13) -0.797a (-5.47) -0.555b (-2.54) 
Central Africa -0.052 (-0.38) -0.079 (-0.50) -0.428a (-2.63) 0.927a (5.29) 
East Africa 0.076 (0.62) 0.603a (3.48) 0.600a (3.47) 0.813a (5.49) 
Southern Africa 0.269 (1.50) 1.087a (5.66) 0.789a (4.22) 0.967a (4.39) 
No. of observations 152 176 188 88 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.440 0.527 0.678 0.660 
F-Statistic 6.550 9.612 20.382 9.493 
Note: Dependent variable: Credit Growth (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
For the sub-regions, with the exception of period 1980 to 1989, both East Africa and Southern 
Africa have increase in credit growth while Central Africa experienced a significant decrease 
in credit growth in period 2000 to 2009, and a significant increase in period 2010 to 2015 
relative to West Africa. The F-statistic further reveals that the regressors are jointly significant 
in explaining credit growth, the variation in credit growth that are explained by the regressors 
range from 44% to 68% while the year dummies control for time variation in the data. The 
model shows no evidence of multicollinearity (the variance inflating function is 1.41). 
 
Thirdly, on the credit-inequality relationship (Equation 4.34), Table 5.8 reveals that credit 
growth has a significant equalising effect on income inequality at the 5% level for periods 1980 
to 1989 and 1990 to 1999 while it aggravates inequality at the 10% in period 2010 to 2015. 
These outcomes for the first two periods are in line with the theoretical literature (Greenwood 
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& Jovanovic, 1990; Galor & Moav, 2004) and earlier studies (Ang, 2010; Agnello et al., 2012; 
Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) on the equalising impact of income inequality. Similarly, natural 
resources has an equalising effect on income inequality in periods 1980 through to 2009. On 
the other hand, the variables that aggravate inequality include primary enrolment rate in periods 
1990 through to 2015 at the 1% and 5%; government expenditures at periods 1980 through to 
2009 at the 1% and 10% significant levels and age-dependency ratio at periods 1990 through 
to 2009 at the 1% and 5% significance level respectively. 
 
Table 5.8:    Pooled OLS: Credit Growth and Income Inequality                      
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Constant 4.16a (33.00) 3.788a (27.60) 3.846a (41.58) 3.41a  (6.96) 
Credit growth -0.041b (-2.01) -0.051b (-2.51) 0.014 (1.21) 0.127c (1.82) 
GDP growth -0.001 (-0.85) 0.001 (-0.51) -0.0003 (-0.52) -0.003 (-1.13) 
Primary education -0.0004 (-1.59) 0.001b (2.18) 0.001a (3.01) 0.002b (2.66) 
Natural resources -0.001b (-2.04) -0.002a (-3.59) -0.0004a (-1.81) 0.002 (0.42) 
Govt. exp. (log) 0.073a (6.50) 0.063a (5.50) 0.018c (1.77) -0.052 (-0.98) 
Age-dependency (log) -0.005 (-0.19) 0.074a (2.92) 0.029b (2.02) 0.079 (1.28) 
Central Africa -0.053a (-2.86) -0.103a (-4.94) 0.006 (0.66) -0.032 (-0.43) 
East Africa -0.096a (-5.35) -0.107a (-3.78) -0.049a (-5.29) -0.111 (-1.28) 
Southern Africa -0.017 (-0.67) -0.002 (-0.04) 0.054a (3.08) -0.096 (-0.92) 
No. of Obs. 142 147 165 54 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.499 0.593 0.602 0.335 
F-Statistic 13.85 13.14 14.58 8.66 
Note: Dependent variable: Gini Index (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
For the sub-regional analysis, results show that in Central and East Africa, credit growth has a 
more equalising effect on income inequality than West Africa in periods 1980 through 2009 at 
the 1% significant level. For Southern Africa, income inequality is higher in period 2000 to 
2009 relative to West Africa at the 1% significant level. The sub-regional results are consistent 
with the stylised facts of Table 3.2 which indicates that on average the Gini index is lower in 
both Central and East Africa while higher in Southern Africa relative to West Africa. Also, the 
models have a good fit as the variation in the Gini index explained by the regressors range from 
33% to 60% while the F-statistic is significant across all specifications evidencing the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables. The model shows no evidence of multicollinearity 
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(the variance inflating function is 1.56). Overall, from the pooled OLS results, the study 
concludes that the reform-credit-inequality nexus exists for SSA. 
 
5.2.2 Fixed Effects Results 
Using the fixed effects (FE) estimator relating to Equation 4.32, results displayed in Table 5.9 
reveal the effects of financial reforms on the financial system. It shows that the real interest rate 
is positive and significant at the 1% level across all specifications evidencing the stability of 
the financial system after the reforms. Likewise broad money growth is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level across all specifications. Close observation on the impact of per 
capita GDP shows that it is a positive predictor of financial sector stability in periods 1980 to 
1989, and 2000 to 2009 at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Likewise broad money growth 
has a significant and positive effect across all the four time periods at the 1% level. Similarly, 
GDP per capita is a significant and negative predictor of financial sector stability for the periods 
1980 through to 2009 at the 1% significant level. The specifications also evidence good fits 
with the R-Squared ranging from 42% to 75% and the F-statistics indicate that all the regressors 
are jointly significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table 5.9:     Fixed Effects: Financial Reforms and Financial Stability                       
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015]  
Constant -10.753b (-2.56) -9.408 (-1.48) -18.986b (-2.32) -1.598 (-0.08)  
Real interest rate 0.111a (8.79) 0.081a (8.24) 0.125a (8.06) 0.256a (9.58)  
per capita GDP (log) 1.389b (2.49) 0.872 (1.30) 2.857a (3.32) 0.396 (0.22)  
per capita GDP gr. -0.098a (-4.93) -0.087a (-3.52) -0.136a (-4.47) -0.120 (-1.51)  
Broad money growth 0.057a (6.98) 0.046a (5.97) 0.061a (5.92) 0.114a (3.36)  
Investment (log) 0.083 (0.15) 0.441 (1.39) 0.122 (0.28) 0.956 (0.86)  
Trade (log) -0.044 (-0.07) 0.313 (0.40) -0.728 (-0.74) -1.693 (-0.95)  
No. of observations 132 172 184 71  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.596 0.457 0.424 0.749  
F Statistic 10.652 7.681 7.306 12.453  
Note: Dependent variable: Financial Stability Index; Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
 
On the financial reform and credit growth relationship (Equation 4.33), results shown in Table 
5.10 reveal that financial reform stimulates credit growth with the positive significance of the 
real interest rate for periods 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 at the 1% level. This 
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result supports those from similar studies (Odhiambo, 2010; Okoye & Eze, 2013; Chipote et 
al., 2014). 
 
Table 5.10:     Fixed Effects: Financial Reforms and Credit Growth                        
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Constant 2.282a (2.71) -0.875 (-0.67) 6.820a (6.74) 1.636 (1.53) 
Real interest rate 0.009a (4.10) 0.004b (2.13) 0.007a (3.52) -0.003 (-1.67) 
per capita GDP (log) -0.061 (-0.55) 0.339b (2.46) -0.332a (-3.11) 0.094 (0.88) 
per capita GDP gr. -0.010a (-2.78) -0.014a (-2.83) -0.0003 (-0.08) 0.002 (0.69) 
Broad money growth 0.0007 (0.48) 0.001 (0.64) 0.002c (1.70) 0.0006 (0.34) 
Investment (log) 0.028 (0.30) 0.029 (0.44) 0.048 (0.87) 0.424a (6.50) 
Trade (log) 0.168 (1.34) 0.232 (1.45) -0.416a (-3.37) -0.092 (-0.98) 
No. of observations 152 176 188 88 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.324 0.223 0.403 0.495 
F Statistic 4.145 2.695 6.894 5.523 
Note: Dependent variable: Credit Growth (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
Contrary to the OLS results, per capita GDP has positive and statistically significant impact in 
period1990 to 1999 but has negative effect in period 2000 to 2009. In the same vein, broad 
money growth is a positive predictor of credit growth only in period 2000 to 2009 at the 10% 
significance level. Likewise, investment, is positive and statistically significant only in period 
2010 to 2015 at the 1% level. On the other hand, per capita GDP growth and trade have negative 
and statistically impacts on credit growth in periods1980 through to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 
respectively at the 1% level. On the good-fit of the model, the value of the R-squared indicates 
that 22% to 50% of the variation in credit growth is explained by the regressors while the F-
statistic indicate their joint significance. Given these results, it can be concluded that financial 
reforms stimulate credit growth in SSA thus rejecting the null hypothesis that credit growth is 
not stimulated by financial reforms. 
 
5.2.3 Dynamic Fixed Effects Results 
The credit-inequality relationship is examined within the framework of a dynamic 
heterogeneous panel. Given that N (number of countries is 20) is less than T (number of years 
is 36) it is applicable to estimate this heterogeneous panel using the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) 
estimator. It is required that T must be long enough so that each member of the group (panel) 
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can be estimated separately. Having divided the region into four sub-regions to highlight the 
heterogeneity across them, the estimations are done on the full sample and the sub-regional 
samples. Table 5.11 shows the results from the heterogeneous panel regression from the DFE 
estimator (Equation 4.34) from where it is seen that in the long-run, credit growth has an 
equalising impact on the Gini index in relation to the full sample and Southern Africa at the 
10% level while inequality is aggravated in East Africa at the 5% level. The coefficients for 
Central and West Africa are negative but statistically not significant. This however supports the 
equalising effect of credit although not significant in this case. Other long-run results indicate 
that GDP growth rate and government expenditure significantly exacerbate inequality for SSA 
and East Africa at the 1% and 5% levels respectively while primary enrolment has an equalising 
impact on income inequality in East Africa at the 1% level. 
 
In the short-run, credit growth intensifies inequality relative to the full sample and West Africa 
while it equalises inequality in East Africa both at the 5% level and 10% levels. The GDP 
growth rate significantly reduces inequality in East Africa while primary enrolment aggravates 
it. The age dependency ratio exacerbates inequality relative to the full sample and East Africa 
while it equalises inequality in Central Africa. The adjustment term is negative for SSA, East 
and Southern Africa samples indicating that adjustment to long-run equilibrium is at a speed 
rate of 12% to 26.2%. Overall, the null hypothesis that the finance-credit-inequality does not 
exist is rejected for the full sample, East and Southern Africa. 
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Table 5.11:     DFE: Credit Growth and Income Inequality                        
Variables [SSA] 
[Central 
Africa] 
[East Africa] 
[Southern 
Africa] 
[West Africa] 
Long-run:      
Constant -0.154b (-2.22) -0.070c (-1.84) -0.133a (-5.66) 0.062 (0.18) -1.549 (-1.31) 
Credit growth -0.062c (-1.71) -0.603 (-0.48) 0.036b (2.07) -0.207c (-1.81) -0.059 (-0.18) 
GDP growth -0.001 (-0.42) -0.002 (-0.25) 0.006a (3.17) -0.002 (-0.32) -0.009 (-0.41) 
Primary enrolment -0.001 (-1.35) 0.0089 (0.49) -0.001a (-5.53) -0.002 (-0.45) 0.002 (0.22) 
Govt. expend. (log) 0.073b (2.50) 0.294 (0.52) 0.098a (5.14) 0.184 (1.21) 0.143 (0.67) 
Age-dependency (log) 0.096 (1.13) -1.982 (-0.49) 0.067 (1.60) -0.103 (-0.45) 4.341 (0.61) 
Short-run:      
Adjustment -0.174a (-6.15) 0.008 (0.50) -0.120a (-5.79) -0.262a (-3.57) -0.076 (-0.68) 
∆Credit growth 0.029b (2.05) -0.002 (-0.72) -0.011b (-2.13) 0.069 (1.19) 0.084c (1.89) 
∆GDP growth 0.0002 (0.78) 0.000 (0.46) -0.001a (-3.80) 0.0001 (0.06) 0.001 (0.73) 
∆Primary enrolment 0.000 (0.02) 0.0001 (1.55) 0.0002b (2.26) -0.001 (-0.35) 0.0003 (0.30) 
∆Govt. expend. (log) -0.005 (-0.62) 0.001 (0.45) -0.006c (-1.89) -0.011 (-0.19) 0.0003 (0.02) 
∆Age-dependency (log) 0.249c (1.85) -0.165a (-3.01) 0.096a (2.85) 1.059 (1.31) 0.940 (1.19) 
No. of observations 457 115 171 105 66 
R-Squared 0.105 0.143 0.368 0.183 0.180 
F Statistic 4.521 1.491 8.099 1.831 1.034 
Note: Dependent variable: Gini Index (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks – System GMM Results 
The Arellano-Bond (1991) method allows to explicitly take into cognizance the fact that the 
determinants of the dependent variable are either pre-determined or endogenous or both and 
that the dependent variable itself could depend on its past realisations. The problem of 
endogeneity that is often associated with the use of panel data will be resolved by the use of the 
system GMM estimator to estimate the relationship between the dependent variable and its 
regressors. The estimator eliminates biases arising from ignoring dynamic endogeneity and also 
provides theoretically based and powerful instruments that accounts for simultaneity while 
eliminating any unobservable heterogeneity (Alege & Ogundipe, 2014). Therefore, to check for 
the robustness of the previous estimators and also control for possible endogeneity in the 
models, all specifications are estimated using the two-step system GMM estimator.  
 
Firstly, for the financial reform and financial stability relationship (Equation 4.32), results 
shown in Table 5.12 validate previous results obtained from the pooled OLS (Table 5.6) and 
fixed effects (Table 5.9) estimators. With the positive and statistical significance of the real 
interest rate which ranges from 1% to 10%, financial reform enhances the stability of the 
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financial system. The specification diagnostics reveal no evidence of second-order auto-
correlation with the non-significance of the AR(2) coefficients and given the outcome of the 
Hansen statistic, the instruments sets are not over-identified. 
 
Table  5.12:  System GMM: Financial Reforms and Financial Stability 
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Fin. stab. index_1 0.138 (0.95) 0.036 (0.27) 0.156 (1.58) 0.095
c (1.85) 
Real interest rate 0.131a (3.49) 0.066a (3.10) 0.130a (4.91) 0.1671c (2.04) 
per capita GDP (log) 0.644 (1.08) 1.005b (2.35) 0.937c (1.94)  
GDP growth    -0.121b (-2.41) 
Broad money gr. 0.066a (3.81) 0.056b (2.53) 0.064a (4.37)  
Investment (log) -0.512 (-0.52) -0.665 (-0.52) -0.886 (-0.50)  
Trade (log) -0.693b (-2.26) 0.101 (0.04) -1.561 (-0.95)   
No. of observations 116 148 164 57 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments 20 23 23 14 
AR (2) 0.402 0.355 0.631 0.225 
Hansen Statistic 0.229 0.133 0.638 0.148 
F Statistic 5.743 60.1 27.85 9.367 
Note: Dependent variable: Financial Stability Index; Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. AR(2): Autocorrelation integrated of order 2. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
Secondly, for the financial reform and credit growth relationship (Equation 4.33), results 
displayed in Table 5.13 are similar to those from the pooled OLS (Table 5.7) and FE (Table 
5.10) estimators regarding the effect of the real interest rate on credit growth. With the 
exception of period 2010 to 2015, financial reform stimulates credit growth with a statistical 
significance ranging from 10% to 1%. Also, the past realisation of credit growth significantly 
stimulates its current form at the 1% significance level. The diagnostics also show that the 
specifications do not suffer from second-order serial correlation and the instruments are not 
over-identified. 
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Table 5.13:  System GMM: Financial Reforms and Credit Growth 
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Credit growth (log)_1 1.050
a (13.75) 1.047a (52.79) 1.038a (28.23) 1.194a (12.20) 
Real interest rate 0.015c (1.93) 0.008a (3.60) 0.009a (4.17) 0.004 (1.28) 
per capita GDP gr. -0.004 (-0.34) -0.002 (-0.16) -0.016 (-1.31) -0.031 (-1.35) 
Broad money growth 0.008 (1.20) 0.008a (4.41) 0.003b (2.21) 0.009c (2.08) 
Trade (log) -0.063 (-0.72) 0.027 (0.97) -0.069 (-0.58) -0.099 (-0.80) 
No. of observations 128 158 170 72 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments 21 24 24 14 
AR (2) 0.155 0.336 0.314 0.106 
Hansen Statistic 0.423 0.991 0.482 0.464 
F Statistic 220.284 193738.909 14092.10 2860.13 
Note: Dependent variable: Credit Growth (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. AR(2): Autocorrelation integrated of order 2. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
Lastly, on the credit-inequality relationship (Equation 4.34), results in Table 5.14 are similar to 
those obtained in Tables 5.8 for pooled OLS. The coefficient of credit growth is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level only in period 1980 to 1989 while for the remaining 
periods it is negative but not statistically significant. The negative coefficient of the credit 
growth variable is crucial in this context because it provides evidence that the variable has an 
equalising effect on income inequality if there is efficient financial intermediation. Also, on the 
diagnostics, the specifications give no evidence of second-order auto-correlation and there are 
no over-identifying restrictions. 
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Table 5.14:  System GMM: Credit Growth and Income Inequality                      
Variables [1980 - 1989] [1990 - 1999] [2000 - 2009] [2010 - 2015] 
Gini (log)_1 0.000 (.) 1.171
b (2.48) 1.038a (7.33) 0.745a (4.51) 
Credit growth (log) -0.073a (-7.28) -0.001 (-0.03) -0.005 (-0.25) -0.005 (-0.25) 
GDP growth 0.026 (11.49) -0.006 (-0.55) 0.001 (0.68) -0.001 (-0.40) 
Primary education -0.001a (-5.83) -0.0002 (-0.40) -0.0002 (-0.13)  
Age-dependency (log) 0.029b (2.26) -0.056 (-0.41) -0.029 (-0.58) 0.012 (0.37) 
Govt. expenditure gr. -0.008a (-13.01) -0.000 (-0.23) 0.000 (0.05)   
No. of observations 104 118 129 39 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of instruments 23 23 24 14 
AR (2) 0.318 0.801 0.453 0.931 
Hansen Statistic 1.000 0.928 0.697 0.078 
F Statistic 15678.811 124.777 42.558 5619.183 
Note: Dependent variable: Gini Index (log); Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
AR(2): Autocorrelation integrated of order 2. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.4 Research Objectives and Hypotheses Validation 
Having undergone several empirical analyses of the SSA sample of 20 countries, this section 
summarises the results (in tabular form) verifying whether the outlined research objectives 
(section 1.4) and research hypotheses (section 1.5) are realised. Shown in Table 5.16 are the 
four research objectives and hypotheses with their corresponding outcomes. Conclusively, the 
objectives set out by this study are realised and the null hypotheses invalidated. 
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Table 5.15:     Summary of Research Objectives and Hypotheses Validation 
S/No. Null Hypotheses Research Objectives 
1 
Null hypothesis 1: The financial sector is not 
significantly stable after the reforms. 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected: 
a) From the pooled OLS results in Table 5.6, the financial 
system is significantly stable after financial reforms given 
the positive and statistically significant coefficients of the 
real interest rate across the four periods. 
 
b) The fixed effects results shown in Table 5.9 reveal that 
the financial system is significantly stable after financial 
reforms given the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of the real interest rate across the four periods. 
 
c) The system GMM results in Table 5.13 validate that the 
financial system is significantly stable after financial 
reforms given the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of the real interest rate across the four periods. 
Objective 1: Observe the stability of the 
financial sector after the reforms. 
 
Objective realisation: It is observed that across 
the four different time periods, the financial 
system of the selected SSA countries are 
significantly stable after the reforms. 
2 
Null hypothesis 2: Credit growth is not stimulated by 
financial reforms in selected SSA countries. 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected: 
a) From the pooled OLS results in Table 5.7, period 1980 
to 1989 provide evidence that financial reforms 
significantly stimulate credit growth given the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of the real interest 
rate. 
 
b) The fixed effects results shown in Table 5.10 reveal that 
credit growth is significantly stimulated by financial 
reforms given the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of the real interest rate in periods 1980 to 
1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009. 
 
c) The system GMM results in Table 5.14 validate that 
credit growth is significantly stimulated by financial 
reforms given the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of the real interest rate in periods 1980 to 
1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009. 
Objective 2: Evaluate how credit growth is 
stimulated by financial reforms. 
 
Objective realisation: Credit growth is 
significantly stimulated by financial reforms in 
the selected SSA countries and this trend is 
consistent across the four periods. 
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3 
Null hypothesis 3: Credit growth has no equalising effect 
on income inequality in SSA. 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected: 
a) From the pooled OLS results in Table 5.8, periods 1980 
to 1989 and 1990 to 1999 provide evidence that credit 
growth has a significant equalising effect on income 
inequality given the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of credit growth. 
 
b) The fixed effects results shown in Table 5.11 reveal that 
credit growth has a significant equalising effect on income 
inequality given the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of credit growth in period 1980 to 1989. 
 
c) Results from the dynamic fixed effects in Table 5.12 on 
the SSA sample reveal that credit growth has a significant 
equalising effect on income inequality given the negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of credit growth. 
 
d) The system GMM results in Table 5.15 validate that 
credit growth has a significant equalising effect on income 
inequality given the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of credit growth in period 1980 to 1989. 
Objective 3: Examine how credit growth 
impacted on income inequality in SSA. 
 
Objective realisation: The outcome of the 
empirical analyses reveal that the impact of 
credit growth on income inequality varies across 
the different periods depending on the estimation 
method adopted. However, credit growth has an 
equalising impact on income inequality, overall. 
4 
Null hypothesis 4: The financial reforms and credit 
growth nexus on income inequality do not differ across 
SSA sub-regions. 
 
Using four sub-regional dummy variables and West 
Africa as the base dummy variable, the null hypothesis 
is rejected: 
a) The pooled OLS results in Table 5.7, reveal that 
financial reforms significantly stimulate credit growth in 
Central Africa for period 2010 to 2015; East Africa for 
periods 1990 to 1999, 2000 to 2009 and 2010 to 2015; and 
Southern Africa for periods 1990 to 1999, 2000 to 2009 
and 2010 to 2015 relative to West Africa. 
 
b) The pooled OLS results in Table 5.8, reveal that relative 
to West Africa credit growth has a significant equalising 
effect on income inequality in Central Africa for periods 
1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 1999; East Africa for periods 
1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009; while for 
Southern Africa the equalising effect is not evidenced. 
 
c) Results from the dynamic fixed effects in Table 5.12 on 
the sub-regional samples reveal that credit growth has a 
significant equalising effect on income inequality in 
Southern Africa, it significantly aggravates inequality in 
East Africa while the effects are equalising but not 
statistically significant in Central and West Africa. 
Objective 4: Appraise how the financial reforms 
and credit growth nexus on income inequality 
differ across SSA sub-regions. 
 
Objective realisation: The outcome of the 
empirical analyses reveal that, given the 
empirical technique adopted, the financial 
reforms and credit growth nexus on income 
inequality differ across SSA sub-regions. Such 
that: 
a) financial reforms significantly stimulate credit 
growth in Central Africa, East Africa and 
Southern Africa relative to West Africa at 
different periods; 
 
b) credit growth has a significant equalising 
effect on income inequality in Central Africa and 
East Africa relative to West Africa at different 
periods; while the equalising effect is not 
evidenced for Southern Africa; 
 
c) credit growth significantly reduces income 
inequality in Southern Africa, it significantly 
exacerbates income inequality in East Africa 
while its impact in Central and West Africa, 
though negative, is not significant. 
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5.5 Specific Approach – Time Series Analysis 
The specific approach is undertaken to examine if the results obtained on the analysis of SSA 
and the four sub-regions hold when individual countries - Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa - are considered. These countries represent each sub-region in SSA and they are the 
economic power-houses of their respective regional blocs. Each country is analysed bearing in 
mind the heterogeneities across them and the peculiarities of their financial sectors. The 
respective country’s varying characteristics make comparative study relevant and innate in 
channelling a sub-regional course of action in addressing the problem of income inequality. A 
few of these distinct observations and differences are mentioned herein.  
 
In Cameroon, the real interest rate and not the deposit rate is the predictor of financial sector 
stability contrary to what obtains for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Also, for Kenya and 
Nigeria, domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP) and domestic credit to the private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) are not significantly different from one another. The correlation 
between both indicators is 0.9999 and 0.9998, respectively. Furthermore, the model is “well-
behaved” for Kenya when domestic credit provided by financial institutions is used as a proxy 
for credit growth as against other variants of domestic credit. Similarly, broad money drives 
credit growth in Kenya and South Africa while it is driven by financial system deposits in 
Nigeria. Lastly, for Cameroon and Kenya, broad money growth is the predictor of financial 
stability as the exclusion of this variable in the model specifications renders the other 
coefficients in the equation to be statistically not significant. Therefore, in order to obtain 
impartial results (with minimal bias) and to enhance comparativeness, the specification for each 
country is augmented to give each a fair model representation. In this section, the analytical and 
empirical approaches are detailed in addition to the results. Thus, the estimations are carried 
bearing in mind that certain indicators behave poorly in some countries while responding well 
in some others.  
 
5.5.1 Computing Financial Stability Index, 4 Countries 
The study analyses begin with the computation of an index that captures financial system 
stability. The reasons for using the PCA are as stated in section 5.1.1. Using the “change” rather 
than the “level” of each variable, Table 5.17 shows some salient features of each country’s 
computation of financial stability index. 
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Table 5.16:       PCA and Eigenvectors, 4 Countries 
Variables Cameroon Kenya Nigeria S/Africa 
PCA eigenvalue (highest) 3.4341 3.6498 5.3142 2.9647 
Proportion explained 0.5724 0.6083 0.8857 0.4941 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.6900 0.6687 0.7887 0.5018 
Source: Researcher's Computation    
 
For Cameroon, the first component has an eigenvalue (the variance of the component) of 3.4341 
(a value higher than one implies that the component captures more variance than its nominal 
share of the total variance of the variables) and explains 57.24% of the common variance of the 
series. Same explanation can be deduced for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa with eigenvalues 
of 3.6498, 5.3142 and 2.9647 respectively. The scree plots for the four countries are shown in 
Appendices Figure A5.1 to A5.4. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index above 0.50 and 
validates the use of PCA. Furthermore, the correlation between the respective PCA for each 
country and the variables used in the composition is shown in Table 5.18. The index of financial 
system stability (FSI) is strongly and positively correlated with variables of financial stability, 
an indication that the FSI best explains these variables simultaneously. It further shows that 
when the FSI increases, financial system stability improves. 
 
Table 5.17:  Correlation Matrix of Measures of Financial Stability and    
                     Financial Stability Index, 4 Countries 
Variables Cameroon Kenya Nigeria S/Africa 
Change in domestic credit by fin. inst. 0.7068 0.8025 0.8499 0.6347 
Change in domestic credit 0.7806 0.8461 0.9489 0.7383 
Change in domestic credit by banks 0.7804 0.8475 0.9487 0.9165 
Change in financial system deposits 0.7484 0.6562 0.9738 0.6347 
Change in liquid liabilities 0.7595 0.6411 0.9561 0.6565 
Change in broad money 0.7608 0.8545 0.9638 0.5857 
Source: Researcher's Computations     
 
5.5.2 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix, 4 Countries 
As a result of each country’s heterogeneity, a total of 20 variables are used across the 4 
countries. Cameroon has 14 variables, Kenya with 14, Nigeria has 11 and South Africa has 13 
with 6 variables common to all of them. Table 5.18 shows the summary statistics (mean and 
standard deviations) for each variable. 
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Table 5.18:       Summary Statistics, 4 Countries 
Variables 
Cameroon Kenya Nigeria S/Africa 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Broad money    35.226 4.768     59.419 10.659 
Broad money growth 8.318 11.794 15.517 8.520 24.403 17.275   
Deposit rate 5.610 1.788 9.310 4.107 11.486 4.090 10.973 4.224 
Dom. credit to private sect. 16.033 8.295     14.999 6.100 111.429 33.633 
Dom. credit by fin. inst.    36.603 4.017       
Financial stability index 
6.18e-08 1.85 -2.94e-09 1.91 -2.94e-08 2.30 
-2.19e-
10 
1.72 
Financial system deposits        17.372 5.485   
GDP    1.949e+10 1.719e+10       
GDP per capita  948.430 233.555 564.208 323.671 874.872 907.833 4175.609 1664.692 
GDP per capita growth 0.161 4.733     1.038 7.370 0.534 2.484 
Gini index 58.076 0.603 60.349 1.252 56.565 4.000 66.816 5.418 
Govt. consumption exp. 10.508 1.291 16.318 1.760     18.389 1.786 
Gross fixed cap. formation 18.207 3.127 18.625 1.930 12.718 6.415 20.090 3.954 
Gross fixed cap. growth 3.603 11.829 12.443 8.753     3.175 7.927 
Inflation (consumer prices) 5.176 6.853 12.443 8.753 19.444 17.752 9.374 4.500 
Liquid liabilities 18.331 3.076 35.429 5.486       
Loan-to-deposit ratio            114.528 13.231 
Natural Resources 11.673 3.630           
Primary enrolment    104.775 8.915 94.350 9.278 99.436 11.151 
Real interest rate 11.624 7.222             
Note: SD: Standard deviation 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
       
 
From Table 5.18 (limiting comparative analysis to the variables common to all), Nigeria has 
the lowest average Gini index of 56.57 while South Africa has the highest at 66.816 which in 
retrospect, is higher than the region’s average index of 60.23. On average, Nigeria has the 
highest deposit rate (11.49) followed by South Africa (10.97) with Cameroon having the lowest 
(5.61). The country with the lowest average inflation rate (consumer prices) is Cameroon 
(5.176) and Nigeria has the highest (19.44). South Africa has the highest average per capita 
income (4175.61), followed by Cameroon (948.43), Nigeria (874.87) and Kenya (564.21) in 
that order. Average investment and government expenditures is highest in South Africa (20.09, 
18.39) relative to others.  
 
Likewise, correlation analysis among the variables is done on a country-level basis (see 
Appendix Tables A5.1 to A5.4 for full correlation matrix). From Table A5.1 on Cameroon, 
statistics reveal that there is no linear dependence among the variables except for a strong 
correlation between the deposit rate and the Gini index (-0.840) and between liquid liabilities 
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and domestic credit (0.848). Thus, the Cameroon model does not exhibit multicollinearity 
because these identified relationships are not included together in the same model. Similar 
analogy is drawn on Kenya in Table A5.2 which shows strong correlations between liquid 
liabilities and broad money (0.815) and between the GDP and per capita GDP (0.993). Also for 
Kenya, multicollinearity is mitigated as these identified relationships are not put together in the 
same model. For Nigeria in Table A5.3, financial systems deposits and domestic credit exhibit 
high correlation at 0.827. Again, multicollinearity is forestalled as both variables are not in the 
same model. Lastly for South Africa in Table A5.4, domestic credit and inflation exhibit strong 
negative correlation at -0.853 while broad money and per capita GDP are strongly correlated 
(0.879). Multicollinearity is also prevented as these identified relationships are not put together 
in the same model.  
 
5.6 Optimal Lags Selection Results 
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model is susceptible to the arbitrary use of lags but 
provides consistent coefficients despite the possible presence of endogeneity because it includes 
lags of dependent and independent variables (Pesaran et al., 1999) to correct for any form of 
bias. Therefore, for each country, the order of the ARDL process must be augmented to ensure 
that the residual of the error-correction model be exogenous and serially uncorrelated. However, 
with limited time series, the ARDL order should not be overextended as this imposes excessive 
parameter requirements on the data. Since the primary interest is on the long-run parameters, 
hence optimal lags selection from the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used. Appendix 
Table A5.5 shows the optimal lags for each variable on country-by-country basis. 
 
5.7 Unit Root Tests Results 
Given that the order of integration is irrelevant under the ARDL model, but with the increase 
in time period of analysis, it is important to test the variables for unit root to be certain that none 
is integrated of order two, I(2), by applying the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-
GLS) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results displayed in Appendix Table A5.6 
to A5.9 indicate none of the series is integrated of order two. However, a noticeable similarity 
across the four countries is that the index of financial stability is stationary at levels. 
 
5.8 Bounds Test Results for Cointegration 
Having established that the variables are integrated of different orders and that none is of order 
two, we proceed to analyse if there exists any cointegration among the variables using the 
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ARDL bounds test approach (based on the error correction representation) as developed by 
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001). The bounds test is mainly based on the joint F-statistic whose 
asymptotic distribution is non-standard under the null hypothesis of no cointegration (i.e.𝛽1 =
𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 0, for instance, with a model with 5 restrictions) against the alternative 
hypothesis of a cointegrating relationship (i.e.𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 𝛽3 ≠ 𝛽4 ≠ 𝛽5 ≠ 0). Under the bounds 
test, it is assumed that the model comprises both I(0) and I(1) variables and two levels of critical 
values are obtained. The first level is calculated on the assumption that all variables included 
in the ARDL model are integrated of order zero, while the second one is calculated on the 
assumption that the variables are integrated of order one. The procedure is to estimate the 
equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) and test for joint significance of the lagged levels of 
the variables. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the F-statistic is higher than 
the critical value of both the I(0) and I(1) regressors, and not rejected if otherwise (Belloumi, 
2014). In a situation where cointegration exists, an error correction model is specified and if 
otherwise, the ARDL model is specified. The cointegration results are shown in Table 5.19. 
 
Table 5.19:    Bounds Test Results 
 Models Cameroon Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Financial reforms and financial stability 4.914a 20.194a 8.549a 10.279a 
Financial reforms and credit growth 3.627c 3.874b 3.729c 7.262a 
Credit growth and income inequality 4.976b 4.618a 7.505a 5.156a 
a, b, c represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The critical values for the F-statistics 
from Pesaran, Shin & Smith (2001). Results are Stata-generated using the “btest” command. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
The comparisons indicate that the null hypotheses of no cointegration is rejected at the 1% level 
for all models constructed for Kenya and South Africa while it is rejected at the 1% and 10% 
levels for models constructed for Cameroon and Nigeria. These results indicate that there are 
unique cointegrating relationships among the variables in the models and that the long-run 
forcing variables are the key explanatory and control variables. They also indicate that in all 
the relationships, the covariates are the forcing variables that move first when a common 
stochastic shock hits the system. The implication of the above finding is that: financial stability, 
credit growth and income inequality follow changes in these indicators. 
 
5.9 Error Correction Model and Diagnostics Results 
Estimation is done on a country-by-country basis whilst noting the key differences and 
similarities among them. For easy ordering, the error correction and diagnostic results relating 
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to each country are shown correspondingly. The error correction results are in three columns 
[1], [2] and [3] corresponding to (1) financial reform and financial stability relationship, (2) 
financial reform and credit growth relationship and (3) credit growth and income inequality 
relationship. These represent the estimations of Equations 4.35 to 4.37. 
 
5.9.1      Cameroon 
In column [1] of Table 5.20, the results show that in the long-run, given the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the real interest rate (0.131) at the 10% level, financial reform 
stimulates financial stability. It demonstrates that an increase in the real interest rate stimulates 
financial stability by 0.13 percentage point, on average, ceteris paribus.  
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Table 5.20:    Error Correction Results, Cameroon 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  ∆Financial Stability ∆Credit Growth ∆Gini Index 
Constant -4.583 (-0.24) -3.354b (-2.63) 0.043c (1.79) 
Long-run estimates:    
Real interest rate 0.131c (1.85)   
Deposit rate  0.153
b (2.79)  
Credit growth   -0.036b (-2.72) 
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.002 (-0.16)  
Liquid liabilities (log)   0.211c (1.73) 
Broad money growth 0.146b (2.85) 0.011 (1.58)  
per capita GDP (log) 1.916 (0.56) 0.987b (2.12)  
per capita GDP gr.   0.001 (0.45) 
Natural resources   -0.0001 (-0.05) 
Investment growth -0.070 (-0.95)   
Investment (log)  2.051a (4.16)  
Government exp. (log) -4.521 (-0.82) -0.725 (-0.72)  
Adjustment: -0.888a (-4.30) -0.361a (-3.11) 0.039 (1.16) 
Short-run estimates:    
∆Real interest rate -0.014 (-0.20)   
∆Deposit rate  -0.038 (-0.64)  
∆Credit growth   -0.0021 (-1.69) 
∆Liquid liabilities (log)   0.0072a (2.94) 
∆per capita GDP (log) -0.531 (-0.12) -0.361 (-1.28)  
∆per capita GDP gr.   -0.0000 (-0.34) 
∆Natural resources   -0.0001 (-1.02) 
∆Investment growth 0.023 (0.67)   
∆Investment (log)  -0.197 (-0.72)  
∆Government exp. (log) 8.391 (1.41) 0.806b (2.11)   
No. of Obs. 26 35 33 
R-Squared 0.686 0.607 0.825 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Statistical significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables lag length (1 1 0 1 1 1) for 
financial stability model, (1 1 0 0 1 1 1) for credit growth model and (2 1 1 1 1) for income inequality model are 
Stata-generated using the “varsoc” routine. ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
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This finding differs from Akinboade and Kinfack (2014) who find that the real interest rate, 
which reflects the real cost of funds to the borrower and the real yield to the lender, was almost 
negative throughout the period under review in their analysis of financial development and 
economic growth in Cameroon. Results also reveal that the broad money growth is a positive 
predictor of financial stability by 0.15 percent, on average, ceteris paribus given its statistical 
significance at the 5% level. Overall, the positive coefficient of the real interest rate gives 
evidence that the financial sector is stable after reforms in Cameroon. In addition, the value of 
the R squared indicates that 69 percent of the variation in the financial stability index is 
explained by the independent variables while the adjustment term (-0.888) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level indicating that shocks to financial stability index are corrected for 
within the year at a convergence speed of 88.8 percent. There is also no evidence of 
multicollinearity as the coefficient of the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 1.86. 
 
The results on the impact of financial reforms on credit growth shown in column [2] reveal that, 
in the long-run the deposit rate is a strong predictor of credit growth at the 5% statistical 
significance level, indicating that a one percentage increase in the deposit rate is associated with 
a 15.3 percentage increase in credit growth, on average, ceteris paribus. This finding contradicts 
Akinboade and Kinfack (2014) who conclude that the banking sector was unable to efficiently 
mobilise savings for efficient intermediation in the post-reform era. Other results reveal that, in 
the long-run both per capita GDP (0.987) and investment (2.051) have a positive impact on 
credit growth, on average, ceteris paribus, while credit growth is impacted by government 
expenditures (0.806) in the short-run. Again, these results validate that in Cameroon, financial 
reforms stimulate credit growth. Similarly, the adjustment term (-0.361) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that errors to credit growth are corrected for within the 
year at a convergence speed of 36 percent. Also, the value of the R squared indicates that 61 
percent of the variation in credit growth (proxied by domestic credit provided by banks) is 
explained by the independent variables. There is also no evidence of multicollinearity as the 
coefficient of the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 2.07. 
 
Lastly, the results in column [3] show that 83 percent variation in the Gini index are explained 
by the regressors. There is also no evidence of multicollinearity as the coefficient of the variance 
inflating factor (VIF) is 2.07. In the long-run, credit growth has a negative and statistical 
significance on income inequality at the 5% level. This implies that a percentage increase in 
credit is associated with a 0.036 reduction in income inequality, on average, ceteris paribus. 
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Results further show that in the long- and short-runs, liquid liabilities significantly exacerbate 
inequality at the 1% level. Lastly, shocks to the Gini index are not corrected, that is there is no 
long-run convergence. However, the finance-credit-inequality nexus is validated in Cameroon. 
The diagnostic results shown in Table 5.21 provide evidence that the models are stable (see 
Appendix Figure A5.6 for CUSUMSQ graph) and the specifications do not suffer from 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (except for 
model 2), multicollinearity, and omitted variables (except for models 1 and 3). 
 
Table 5.21:           Diagnostic Tests Results, Cameroon 
Specification Test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Durbin-Watson (autocorrelation) 2.027 2.425 2.00 
White (heteroscedasticity) 0.408 0.42 0.141 
ARCH LM 0.587 0.047b 0.17 
VIF (Multicollinearity) 1.86 2.07 2.18 
Ramsey RESET (omitted variables) 0.096c 0.161 0.042b 
CUSUMSQ (squared residuals) Stable Stable Stable 
Note:  Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. ARCH-LM: 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier; VIF: Variance inflation 
factor; RESET: Regression specification error test; CUSUMSQ: Cumulative sum of squares. 
The d-statistic used for Durbin-Watson. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.9.2     Kenya 
Results in Table 5.22 for column [1] show that given the value of the R2, 93 percent variation 
in the financial stability index are explained by the independent variables. The adjustment term 
is larger (-1.361) suggesting that the rate of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is faster and 
that financial stability index adjusts to its realisation with a lag, correcting 136 percent of the 
discrepancy between the long-term and short-term financial stability index within the period. 
This coefficient is slightly below -1 but falls within the dynamically stable range (Pesaran et 
al., 1999) since it is not lower than -2 (that is, within the unit circle). This indicates that 
feedbacks from financial reform is very effective in Kenya and convergence to long-run 
equilibrium after a shock to the explanatory variables is instantaneous for the financial system 
(Narayan, 2005). It also implies that the adjustment term produces dampened fluctuations 
around the equilibrium path of the financial stability index, but convergence to long-run stable 
state is very rapid (Narayan & Smyth, 2005). 
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Table 5.22:    Error Correction Results, Kenya 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  ∆Financial Stability ∆Credit Growth ∆Gini Index 
Constant 6.05 (0.79) -0.904 (-1.31) -0.443a (-3.69) 
Long-run estimates:    
Deposit rate -0.100c (-2.04) 0.009c (2.04)  
Credit growth (log)   0.257c (1.77) 
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.077 (-1.63) -0.010b (-2.40)  
Liquid liabilities (log)   -0.257b (-2.89) 
Broad money growth 0.130a (2.93)   
Broad money (log)  0.512b (2.80)  
GDP (log)   0.043b (2.49) 
per capita GDP (log) 1.329b (2.61) 0.223a (3.18)  
Primary enrolment   0.001 (0.78) 
Investment (log) -4.339c (-1.92)   
Government exp. (log)  0.756b (2.58)  
Adjustment: -1.361a (-9.29) -0.520a (-4.08) -0.277b (-2.69) 
Short-run estimates:    
∆Deposit rate 0.114 (0.84) 0.002 (0.49)  
∆Gini index_1   0.184 (0.62) 
∆Credit growth   -0.037 (-1.64) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices) 0.095c (2.00) 0.005b (2.74)  
∆Liquid liabilities   0.034 (1.03) 
∆Broad money growth -0.067 (-1.70)   
∆Broad money (log)  0.624a (3.58)  
∆GDP (log)   -0.002 (-0.12) 
∆per capita GDP (log) -14.571a (-4.66) -0.302a (-3.64)  
Primary enrolment   -0.0003 (-0.93) 
∆Investment (log) 8.025b (2.23)   
∆Government exp. (log)   -0.153 (-0.99)   
No. of Obs. 28 30 25 
R-Squared 0.929 0.889 0.815 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical 
significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables lag length (1 1 1 1 1 1) for financial 
stability model, (1 1 1 1 1 1) for credit growth model and (2 1 1 1 1) for income inequality model are Stata-generated 
using the “varsoc” routine. ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
The coefficient of the deposit rate (-0.10, financial reform variable) is statistically significant at 
the 10% level indicating that a percentage increase in the deposit rate weakens the stability of 
the financial system by 0.10 percentage point, on average, ceteris paribus. This result is 
contrary to a priori expectation. Other results are that broad money growth (0.130) and per 
capita GDP (1.329) stimulate the financial system while investment (-4.339) negatively impacts 
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financial system stability in Kenya in the long-run. In the short-run, inflation stimulates 
financial stability by 0.09 percent, on average, ceteris paribus, while per capita GDP (-14.57) 
has a significant negative impact in the short-run.  
 
From column [2], the regressors explain 89 percent variation in credit growth (proxied by 
domestic credit provided by financial institutions). The convergence to long-run equilibrium is 
at a speed of 52 percent and the adjustment term is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. The presence of a significant coefficient of the error correction term indicates a strong 
feedback effect of the deviation of credit growth from its long-run growth path. Also, in the 
long-run, the deposit rate stimulates credit growth with a statistically significant coefficient 
(0.009) at the 10% level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the deposit rate contributes 
0.009 percentage point increase to domestic credit, on average, ceteris paribus. This finding 
corroborates (Odhiambo, 2009) who finds that the coefficient of the deposit rate in the financial 
deepening model is positive and statistically significant. The implication of this result is that 
financial reforms have a positive impact on credit growth in Kenya. Also, per capita GDP 
(0.223) has a positive effect on credit growth. This finding also corroborates (Odhiambo, 2009) 
who find a similar effect between real income and financial deepening. Other results reveal that 
broad money (0.512), and government expenditures (0.756) have positive significance on credit 
growth while inflation (-0.01) has a negative impact. For the short-run analyses, inflation 
(0.005) and broad money (0.624) significantly increase credit growth at the 1% levels while per 
capita GDP (-0.302) has a significant negative impact.  
 
On the impact of credit growth on income inequality, results in column [3] show that at the 10% 
statistical significance level, a percentage increase in credit growth exacerbates income 
inequality by 0.26 percent, on average, ceteris paribus. This is contrary to the a priori 
expectation. It implies that at a higher credit level, income inequality rises. However, the 
outcome of the dis-equalising effect of credit growth on income inequality in Kenya is not 
surprising given the fact that the country’s financial market still remains sparse in the rural 
areas, as most financial institutions are located in urban and cash crop growing areas (Mutua & 
Oyugi, 2007). In addition, majority of self-employed individuals in the rural areas do not have 
formal bank accounts and instead, save in the form of animals or durable goods, in cash at their 
homes, or through Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), which are commonly 
referred to as merry-go-rounds (Dupas & Jonathan, 2009). The provision of financial services 
in the rural areas of Kenya on a sustainable basis remains a challenging goal mainly due to the 
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rural environment that is characterised by poor. Other results show that in the long-run, GDP 
(0.043) is a positive predictor of income inequality at the 5% significance level while liquid 
liabilities (-0.257) have a significant equalising impact. In the short-run, none of the coefficients 
are significant, though with the expected signs. On the adjustment term, shocks to the Gini 
index are corrected at a convergence speed of 28%. The presence of a significant coefficient of 
the error correction term indicates a strong feedback effect of the deviation of the Gini index 
from its long-run growth path. Lastly, 82 percent variation in the Gini index is explained by the 
regressors. In conclusion, the finance-credit-inequality nexus is somewhat not validated in 
Kenya. The diagnostic results for Kenya shown in Table 5.23 provide evidence that the models 
are stable and the specifications do not suffer from autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (except for model 1), multicollinearity, and 
omitted variables (except for model 1). 
 
Table 5.23:           Diagnostic Tests Results, Kenya 
Specification Test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Durbin-Watson (autocorrelation) 1.864 2.467 1.62 
White (heteroscedasticity) 0.411 0.414 0.4058 
ARCH LM 0.035b 0.221 0.4152 
VIF (Multicollinearity) 1.28 2.62 1.79 
Ramsey RESET (omitted variables) 0.091c 0.212 0.313 
CUSUMSQ (squared residuals) N/A N/A N/A 
Note:  Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. ARCH-LM: 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier; VIF: Variance inflation 
factor; RESET: Regression specification error test; CUSUMSQ: Cumulative sum of squares. NA 
implies that the CUSUMSQ test cannot be performed due to data gaps in deposit rate and primary 
enrolment series. The d-statistic used for Durbin-Watson. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.9.3 Nigeria 
Results in Table 5.24 for column [1] show that given the value of the R squared about 82 percent 
variation in the financial stability index are explained by the independent variables. The 
adjustment term is larger (-1.031) suggesting that the rate of adjustment to long-run equilibrium 
is faster and that financial stability index adjusts to its realisation with a lag, correcting 103 
percent of the discrepancy between the long-term and short-term financial stability index within 
the period. The coefficient of the deposit rate (0.313, financial reform variable) is statistically 
significant at the 10% level indicating that a percentage increase in the deposit rate stimulates 
the stability of the financial system by 0.31 percentage point, on average, ceteris paribus. This 
result is in line with a priori expectation. Other results reveal that in the short-run, the third lag 
of the deposit rate (-0.347) and per capita GDP (-6.287) have significant negative impacts on 
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financial stability. No evidence of multicollinearity as the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 
1.60. 
 
Table 5.24:    Error Correction Results, Nigeria 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  ∆Financial Stability ∆Credit Growth ∆Gini Index 
Constant -5.203 (-1.06) -0.582 (-1.03) -0.493b (-2.98) 
Long-run estimates:    
Deposit rate 0.313c (1.82) 0.039c (1.81)  
Credit growth (log)   -0.0933a (-3.20) 
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.039 (-1.01) -0.002 (-0.38)  
Financial system deposits  1.371a (7.43)  
Broad money growth   0.001 (1.67) 
per capita GDP growth 0.041 (0.73)  -0.001 (-0.88) 
per capita GDP (log) 0.359 (0.61) -0.075 (-1.09)  
Primary enrolment   0.001 (1.19) 
Investment (log)  -0.171 (-0.93)  
Adjustment: -1.031a (-6.11) -0.771a (-4.32) -1.1310a (-3.20) 
Short-run estimates:    
∆Deposit rate_1 -0.226 (-1.35) -0.048b (-2.75)  
∆Deposit rate_3 -0.347b (-2.33) -0.020 (-1.49)  
∆Credit growth (log)   0.106a (4.65) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices) 0.024 (0.79) 0.0003 (0.13)  
∆Inflation (consumer prices)_1 -0.003 (-0.10) -0.001 (-0.31)  
∆Financial system deposits  0.470 (1.45)  
∆Primary enrolment   0.0004 (0.33) 
∆Primary enrolment_1   -0.006
a (-4.07) 
∆Broad money growth   -0.001
b (-2.50) 
∆Broad money growth_1   0.0004 (1.00) 
∆per capita GDP (log) -6.287a (-3.44) 0.396 (1.72)  
∆Investment (log)   0.202 (1.43)   
No. of Obs. 31 31 22 
R-Squared 0.818 0.899 0.866 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical 
significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables lag length (1 4 2 1 0) for financial stability 
model, (1 4 2 1 1 1) for credit growth model and (1 1 0 0 2 2) for income inequality model are Stata-generated using the 
“varsoc” routine. ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
From column [2], the regressors explain about 90 percent variation in credit growth (proxied 
by domestic credit provided by banks). Convergence to long-run equilibrium is at a speed of 77 
percent with the adjustment term negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, in 
the long-run, the deposit rate stimulates credit growth with a statistically significant coefficient 
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(0.038) at the 10% level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the deposit rate contributes 
about 0.04 percentage point increase to domestic credit, on average, ceteris paribus. In addition, 
broad money (1.371) is a positive predictor of credit growth. In the short-run, the first lag of 
the deposit rate (-0.046) significantly decreases credit growth at the 5% level. No evidence of 
multicollinearity as the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 1.53. 
 
On the impact of credit growth on income inequality, results in column [3] show that at the 1% 
statistical significance level, a percentage increase in credit growth reduces income inequality 
by 0.09 percent, on average, ceteris paribus. This is an important finding, evidence of credit 
growth-inequality nexus. That is, at a higher credit level, income inequality falls in the long-
run. Other results show that in the short-run, broad money growth (-0.001) and the first lag of 
primary enrolment (-0.006) have equalising impact on income inequality at the 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively while credit growth (0.106) exacerbates inequality at the 1% 
significance level. On the adjustment term, shocks to the Gini index are corrected at a 
convergence speed of 113%. Lastly, about 87 percent variation in the Gini index is explained 
by the regressors. Conclusively, the finance-credit-inequality nexus is validated in Nigeria. The 
diagnostic results for Nigeria shown in Table 5.25 provide evidence that the models are stable 
and the specifications do not suffer from autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and omitted variables (except for models 1 and 
3). No evidence of multicollinearity as the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 1.08. 
 
Table 5.25:      Diagnostic Tests Results, Nigeria 
Specification Test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Durbin-Watson (autocorrelation) 2.139 2.096 2.911 
White (heteroscedasticity) 0.4145 0.4145 0.3995 
ARCH LM 0.5847 0.9277 0.248 
VIF (Multicollinearity) 1.60 1.53 1.08 
Ramsey RESET (omitted variables) 0.009a 0.5101 0.0004a 
CUSUMSQ (squared residuals) Stable Stable NA 
Note:  Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. ARCH-LM: 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier; VIF: Variance inflation 
factor; RESET: Regression specification error test; CUSUMSQ: Cumulative sum of squares. NA 
implies that the CUSUMSQ test cannot be performed due to data gaps in primary enrolment 
series. The d-statistic used for Durbin-Watson. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.9.4     South Africa 
Results in Table 5.26 for column [1] show that in the long-run, the coefficient of the deposit 
rate (0.278, financial reform variable) is statistically significant at the 5% level indicating that 
a percentage increase in the deposit rate stimulates the stability of the financial system by 0.28 
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percentage point, on average, ceteris paribus. This result is in line with a priori expectation and 
corroborates similar studies (Akinboade & Kinfack, 2014). Also, per capita GDP (2.6645) has 
a significant positive impact on financial system stability. In the short-run, the deposit rate (-
0.463), its first lag (-0.550) and per capita GDP (-6.644) have negative impact on financial 
stability. Given the value of the R squared 78 percent variation in the financial stability index 
are explained by the independent variables. Also, there is no evidence of multicollinearity as 
the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 3.43. 
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Table 5.26:    Error Correction Results, South Africa 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  ∆Financial Stability ∆Credit Growth ∆Gini Index 
Constant 44.784 (1.72) -0.197 (-0.42) 0.323 (0.14) 
Long-run estimates:    
Deposit rate 0.278b (2.41) 0.034a (3.42)  
Credit growth (log)   -0.478c (-2.49) 
Inflation (consumer prices)  -0.027a (-3.89)  
Broad money growth  0.448a (1.88)  
per capita GDP growth   -0.027 (-1.23) 
per capita GDP (log) 2.645c (1.79) 0.371a (3.51)  
Loan-to-deposit ratio   0.009 (2.00) 
Investment growth -1.688 (-0.73) 0.019a (3.83)  
Investment (log)   0.743c (2.91) 
Government expend. (log) -15.914b (-2.24)   
Primary enrolment   -0.016 (-1.58) 
Adjustment: -1.675a (-7.02) -0.558a (-5.43) -1.106b (-3.49) 
Short-run estimates:    
∆Deposit rate -0.463c (-1.94) -0.033a (-4.49)  
∆Deposit rate_1 -0.550b (-2.28) -0.022a (-2.91)  
∆Deposit rate_2 -0.008 (-0.04) -0.010b (-2.13)  
∆Credit growth (log)   0.491c (2.48) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices) -0.004 (-0.74)  
∆Broad money (log)  0.229 (0.77)  
∆per capita GDP growth   0.042
b (3.33) 
∆per capita GDP (log) -6.644c (-2.06) -0.201b (-2.29)  
∆per capita GDP (log)_1 1.359 (0.46) -0.369
a (-3.00)  
∆Loan-to-deposit ratio   -0.001c (-2.43) 
∆Govt. expenditures (log) -8.879 (-0.70)   
∆Investment growth  -0.006b (-2.62)  
∆Investment (log) 12.729 (1.72)  -0.112 (-0.22) 
∆Investment (log)_1   0.509 (1.95) 
∆Primary enrolment   -0.007 (-0.89) 
∆Primary enrolment_1   -0.006 (-0.71) 
∆Primary enrolment_2     -0.002 (-0.43) 
No. of Obs. 32 31 18 
R-Squared 0.782 0.899 0.957 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical 
significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables lag length (1 3 2 2 1) for financial stability 
model, (1 3 1  1 2 1) for credit growth model and (1 1 1 1 3 2) for income inequality model are Stata-generated using the 
“varsoc” routine. ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
The adjustment term is quite large (-1.675) suggesting that the rate of adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium very fast and that the index adjusts to its realisation with a lag, correcting about 
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168 percent of the discrepancy between the long-term and short-term financial stability index 
within the period. No evidence of multicollinearity as the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 3.43. 
 
From column [2], in the long-run, the deposit rate stimulates credit growth with a statistically 
significant coefficient (0.034) at the 1% level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the 
deposit rate contributes about 0.03 percentage point increase to credit growth, on average, 
ceteris paribus. This finding supports Akinboade and Kinfack (2014) that savings have been 
better mobilised and effectively allocated to the economy and the financial sector has done well 
since the liberalisation of the sector. Likewise, broad money growth (0.448), per capita GDP 
growth (0.371) and investment growth are positive predictors of credit growth while the 
inflation rate (-0.027) has a negative impact in the long-run. In the short-run, and at different 
significance levels, the deposit rate (-0.033), its first lag (-0.022), its second lag (-0.010), per 
capita GDP (-0.201) and its first lag (-0.369) and investment growth (-0.006) decrease credit 
growth. On the model fit, the regressors explain about 90 percent variation in credit growth 
(proxied by domestic credit provided by banks). Also, the adjustment term (-0.558) is 
statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that shocks to credit growth converges to the 
long-run equilibrium at a rate of 56 percent. No evidence of multicollinearity as the variance 
inflating factor (VIF) is 2.57. 
 
Lastly, on the impact of credit growth on income inequality, the results in column [3] show that 
the adjustment term (-1.106) signifies that the speed rate to long-run equilibrium is fast and that 
the index adjusts to its realisation with a lag, correcting about 110percent of the discrepancy 
between the long-term and short-term Gini index within the period. In the long-run, credit 
growth (-0.478) has a significant equalising at the 10% level while investment (0.743) has a 
significant dis-equalising impact at the 10% significant level. In the short-run, credit growth 
(0.491) and per capita GDP growth (0.042) significantly exacerbates income inequality at the 
5% level. Lastly, about 96 percent variation in the Gini index is explained by the regressors and 
from these results, the finance-credit-inequality nexus is validated in South Africa. No evidence 
of multicollinearity as the variance inflating factor (VIF) is 3.14. 
 
The diagnostic results for South Africa shown in Table 5.27 provide evidence that the models 
are stable and the specifications do not suffer from autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and omitted variables (except 
for model 1).  
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Table 5.27:     Diagnostic Tests Results, South Africa 
Specification Test Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Durbin-Watson (autocorrelation) 2.431 2.08 2.67 
White (heteroscedasticity) 0.417 0.418 0.389 
ARCH LM 0.277 0.665 0.349 
VIF (Multicollinearity) 3.43 2.57 3.14 
Ramsey RESET (omitted variables) 0.032b 0.312 NA 
CUSUMSQ (squared residuals) Stable Stable NA 
Note:  Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. ARCH-LM: 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier; VIF: Variance inflation 
factor; RESET: Regression specification error test; CUSUMSQ: Cumulative sum of squares. NA 
implies that (1) the RAMSEY test cannot be performed because powers of fitted values collinear 
with explanatory variables (typically because all explanatory variables are indicator variables) 
and (2) the CUSUMSQ test cannot be performed due to data gaps in the primary enrolment series. 
The d-statistic used for Durbin-Watson. 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
 
5.10 Sensitivity Checks - Countries 
Variable sensitivity checks are carried to confirm the stability of the estimates when another 
proxy of the financial reform variable (main explanatory variable) is used. Due to the paucity 
of data points on the real interest rate for these countries, hence the interest rate spread which 
is the difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate is used. The a priori expectation 
is that in the event that the interest rate spread is high (an implication that the lending rate is 
quite higher than the deposit rate), there will be a contraction in credit intermediation as 
borrowers will be discouraged from borrowing due to high lending rate. 
 
5.10.1 Cameroon 
The results shown in Table 5.28 is in line with a priori expectation and reveal that in the long-
run, a high spread rate has a significant negative effect on credit growth at the 10% level, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Likewise in the long-run, broad money growth and investments 
significantly stimulate credit growth at the 5% levels respectively. Also, the adjustment term (-
0.356) is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that errors to credit growth are 
corrected for within the year at a convergence speed of 36 percent. In the short-run, only interest 
rate spread has a positive and significant effect in credit growth at the 5% level. Other diagnostic 
results reveal that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship at the 5% level (Bounds test), 
no evidence of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity while the null hypothesis of no omitted variables 
cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. The R-squared indicates that 61.2 percent 
variation in credit growth is explained by the regressors. 
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Table 5.29:   Sensitivity Check, Cameroon 
Variables ∆Credit Growth 
Constant -1.697 (-1.55) 
Long-run estimates:  
Interest rate spread -0.057c (-1.84) 
Broad money growth 0.017b (2.18) 
Investment (log) 1.930b (2.38) 
Government expenditures (log) 0.977 (1.14) 
Adjustment: -0.356a (-3.06) 
Short-run estimates:  
∆Interest rate spread 0.049b (2.32) 
∆Investment (log) -0.124 (-0.47) 
∆Government expenditures (log) 0.282 (0.63) 
No. of Obs. 27 
R-Squared 0.612 
Bounds Test 4.354b 
Note: ∆ is the difference operator. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables lag length for credit growth model (1 1 0 1 1) are Stata-generated 
using the “varsoc” routine. Diagnostic results: Durbin Watson: 2.397; White (heteroscedasticity): 
0.409; Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM): 0.093c; 
Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET for omitted variables): 0.075c; Variance 
inflation factor (VIF for multicollinearity): 1.65; Cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ for 
stability): stable 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.10.2 Kenya 
The results shown in Table 5.29 indicates that the a priori expectation for the relationship 
between financial reform and credit growth is realised only in the short-run with the negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of interest rate spread at 10%. Other results indicate that 
in the long- and short-runs, inflation rate and per capita GDP have asymmetric effects on credit 
growth at the 1% significance level. Also, the adjustment term (-0.683) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that errors to credit growth are corrected for within the 
year at a convergence speed of 68 percent. Other diagnostic results reveal that there is a long-
run cointegrating relationship at the 5% level (Bounds test), no evidence of autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity while the 
R-squared indicates that 75 percent variation in credit growth is explained by the regressors. 
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Table 5.29: Sensitivity Check, Kenya 
Variables ∆Credit Growth 
Constant 0.291 (0.31) 
Long-run estimates:  
Interest rate spread 0.0027 (0.52) 
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.016a (-4.00) 
per capita GDP (log) 0.275a (4.01) 
Government expenditures (log) 0.575 (1.69) 
Adjustment: -0.683a (-5.59) 
Short-run estimates:  
∆Interest rate spread -0.016c (-1.93) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices) 0.007a (3.03) 
∆per capita GDP (log) -0.359a (-3.47) 
∆Government expenditures (log) 0.069 (0.33) 
No. of Obs. 30 
R-Squared 0.752 
Bounds Test 8.566a 
Note: ∆ is the difference operator. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables lag length for credit growth model (1 1 1 1 1) are Stata-generated 
using the “varsoc” routine. Diagnostic results: Durbin Watson: 2.122; White (heteroscedasticity): 
0.414; Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM): 0.853; Ramsey 
regression specification error test (RESET for omitted variables): 0.291; Variance inflation factor (VIF 
for multicollinearity): 2.71; Cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ for stability): not applicable due 
to gaps in the data 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.10.3 Nigeria 
The results shown in Table 5.30 is in line with a priori expectation and reveal that in the long-
run, a high spread rate has a significant negative effect on credit growth at the 1% level, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Other results indicate that in the long- and short-runs, inflation rate 
and broad money growth have asymmetric effects on credit growth at the 1% and 10% 
significance level respectively. Also, the adjustment term (-0.611) is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that errors to credit growth are corrected for within the year at a 
convergence speed of 61 percent. Other diagnostic results reveal that there is a long-run 
cointegrating relationship at the 5% level (Bounds test), no evidence of autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity while the 
null hypothesis of no omitted variables is rejected at the 1% significance level. The R-squared 
indicates that 71 percent variation in credit growth is explained by the regressors. 
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Table 5.30:   Sensitivity Check, Nigeria 
Variables ∆Credit Growth 
Constant 1.616b (2.74) 
Long-run estimates:  
Interest rate spread -0.051a (-2.38) 
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.017a (-3.89) 
Broad money growth 0.019a (3.39) 
Investment (log) 0.085 (0.52) 
Adjustment: -0.611a (-3.59) 
Short-run estimates:  
∆Interest rate spread -0.019 (-0.86) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices) 0.006c (1.79) 
∆Inflation (consumer prices)_1 0.0001 (0.05) 
∆Broad money growth -0.017a (-2.94) 
∆Broad money growth_1 -0.0023 (-0.69) 
∆Investment (log) 0.029 (0.15) 
No. of Obs. 34 
R-Squared 0.708 
Bounds Test 3.558c 
Note: ∆ is the difference operator. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a, b, c indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. The variables lag length for credit growth model (1 1 2 2 1) are Stata-
generated using the “varsoc” routine. Diagnostic results: Durbin Watson: 2.09; White 
(heteroscedasticity): 0.419; Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier 
(ARCH-LM): 0.602; Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET for omitted variables): 
0.008a; Variance inflation factor (VIF for multicollinearity): 1.19; Cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ for stability): stable 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.10.4 South Africa 
The results shown in Table 5.31 is in line with a priori expectation and reveal that in the long-
run, a high spread rate has a significant negative effect on credit growth at the 10% level, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Other results indicate that in the long--run, the GDP significantly 
stimulates credit growth at the 1% level. Also, the adjustment term (-0.294) is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that errors to credit growth are corrected for within the 
year at a convergence speed of 29 percent. Other diagnostic results reveal that there is a long-
run cointegrating relationship at the 5% level (Bounds test), no evidence of autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and omitted 
variables The R-squared indicates that 71 percent variation in credit growth is explained by the 
regressors. 
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Table 5.31:    Sensitivity Check, South Africa 
Variables ∆Credit Growth 
Constant -2.261b (-2.29) 
Long-run estimates:  
Interest rate spread -0.092c (1.90) 
GDP (log) 0.617a (4.23) 
Trade (log) -0.669 (-1.03) 
Investment (log) -0.419 (-1.21) 
Adjustment: -0.294b (-2.26) 
Short-run estimates:  
∆Interest rate spread -0.014 (-1.12) 
∆GDP (log) -0.117 (-1.10) 
∆Trade (log) -0.071 (-0.49) 
∆Investment (log) 0.045 (0.26) 
No. of Obs. 35 
R-Squared 0.490 
Bounds Test 3.762c 
Note: ∆ is the difference operator. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Statistical significance: a,b,c indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. The variables lag length for credit growth model (1 1 1 1 1) are Stata-
generated using the “varsoc” routine. Diagnostic results: Durbin Watson: 2.080; White 
(heteroscedasticity): 0.420; Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-Lagrange Multiplier 
(ARCH-LM): 0.591; Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET for omitted variables): 
0.003a; Variance inflation factor (VIF for multicollinearity): 1.80; Cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ for stability): stable 
Source: Researcher's Computations 
 
5.11 The Implication of Findings 
The implications of findings on the nexus of financial reforms and credit growth on income 
inequality vary depending on the related sample. For the SSA sample, the significance of the 
real interest rate variable which reflects the real cost of funds to the borrower and the real yield 
to the lender portends some significant consequences. Its positive significance as a stimulator 
of financial stability and credit growth gives credence to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis that 
when the rate of interest is optimal efficient financial intermediation results and hence financial 
system stability. Therefore, since the real interest rate is the financial reform variable (which is 
often influenced by inflation rate dynamics), it becomes imperative for monetary authorities’ 
prudency in keeping the inflation rate low to enhance the efficiency the real interest rate in 
stimulating credit. 
 
Likewise, the effects of per capita GDP, broad money growth and investment as possible 
stimulants for both financial system stability and credit growth imply that these variables are 
necessary for both efficient intermediation and real sector growth. Contrarily, the negative 
effect of per capita GDP growth rate on both the financial stability index and credit growth 
portends a danger to the financial stability and real sector activities in SSA. It therefore requires 
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that the regulatory framework is enhanced or augmented to allow for the accommodation of 
unexpected shocks that may arise from fluctuations in the GDP. Similarly, the negative 
coefficient of the trade openness variable is an indication that SSA region is yet to take 
advantage of its potential in the world market that mutually-beneficial trade contracts and 
agreements needed to stimulate financial intermediation as obtainable in developed economies.  
 
The implications of findings on the credit-inequality relationship are also diverse. On SSA, the 
negative significance of credit growth shows the equalising power of credit. That is, the ability 
of financial intermediaries to improve their efficiency in the dissemination of loans and 
advances to poor households without any discrimination or contractual barriers will contribute 
to reducing inequality gap in the region. Likewise, income from natural resources and education 
enrolment have income-equalising tendencies. The implications of these are that if revenue 
from natural resources are disproportionately skewed to the wealthy via the provision of public 
goods/amenities that are beyond the affordability of the poor, then inequality will be 
exaggerated. Similarly, the provision of basic education has shown to have an equalising effect 
on income inequality. Therefore, it becomes socially responsible for governments of SSA 
countries to provide essential educational services for its citizenry. Furthermore, since the 
region has a blend of CFA and non-CFA countries and knowing that financial dependence 
obtains in CFA countries (since they maintain strong economic and financial ties to France and 
ultimately to the European Union) it becomes obvious that a blanket monetary policy may not 
be plausible for the entire region.  
 
With respect to the sub-regions, results on Central Africa attest to the fact that credit growth 
can have an equalising effect on income inequality. The non-significant negative coefficient 
may not be unconnected to the under-developed state of financial system in the sub-region. Be 
that as it may, some salient implications can be deduced in guiding monetary regulators into 
formulating policies that will foster more competition and intermediation such that the impacts 
of efficient intermediation is felt on income distribution in the sub-region in the long-run. The 
age-dependency ratio has shown to have an equalising impact on income inequality; however, 
this is a short-run phenomenon. This is an implausible outcome because it implies that as the 
ratio of dependants to the working population increases, income inequality falls. On sub-
regional comparativeness, the results imply that Central Africa has a more stable financial 
system than West Africa in period 2010 to 2015. This outcome is not surprising since most, if 
not all the countries in Central Africa are CFA countries with strong monetary allegiance to 
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France and indirectly to the European Central Bank. It is noteworthy to state that the CFA franc 
is tied to the Euro and follows the monetary dictates of the European Central Bank who has 
strict monetary guidelines particularly in relation to interest rate and inflation rate regulations. 
In the same vein, relative to West Africa, the Central Africa sub-region shows to have reduced 
credit growth in period 2000 to 2009 and an increase in period 2010 to 2015. On income 
inequality, the sub-region’s index are lower in periods 1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 1999 while 
higher in period 2010 to 2015 relative to West Africa. 
 
For East Africa, the implication of the positive and significant coefficient of credit growth on 
income inequality may be that the dissemination of credit is still skewed to the wealthy class 
who can provide the requirements for accessing loans or poor households are unable to access 
credit due to high cost of loanable funds. Similarly, in the long-run, GDP growth and 
government expenditures aggravate inequality while primary enrolment reduces the inequality 
gap. The implications are that more government interventions towards making education 
affordable and accessible will reduce inequality while if the country’s wealth and government 
spending are not well distributed, income inequality will widen. The short-run results imply 
that these variables – credit growth, GDP growth and government spending will reduce 
inequality while primary enrolment rate and age-dependency ratio will worsen income 
inequality. On sub-regional comparativeness, East Africa shows to have a more stable financial 
system relative to West Africa in period 2010 to 2015 in addition to witnessing consistent credit 
growth in periods 1990 to 1999, 2000 to 2009 and 2010 to 2015 relative to West Africa region. 
Likewise inequality is lower in periods 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2015 relative 
to West Africa. 
 
With respect to West Africa, the implication of the negative and not-significant impact of credit 
growth is that the financial system is not deepened enough to have the desired equalising 
impact. Therefore, it becomes necessary for financial regulators to explore measures that will 
foster competition and efficient financial intermediation. On relative comparativeness, the 
financial system in the sub-region is weaker to those in Central, East and Southern Africa in 
period 2010 to 2015 and likewise for credit growth.  
 
Lastly, on Southern Africa, the implication of the negative significance of credit growth on 
income inequality is that more financial deepening has equalising effect. Other results are that 
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the sub-region has a stable financial system and higher credit growth than West Africa, but it is 
a more unequal sub-region than West Africa. 
 
Regarding the four selected countries, their distinct heterogeneities lead to different 
implications for each country. For Cameroon, the effects of findings are that two financial 
reform instruments are identified. One, to ensure long-run stability in its financial system, the 
real interest rate is the reform variable. Two, to propel financial deepening and stimulate credit 
growth in the long-run, the deposit rate is the reform variable. The implication of these two 
identified financial reform instruments is that using the wrong financial reform instrument may 
lead to unsatisfactory results within its financial sector with adverse effects on income 
inequality. Others are that in the long-run, broad money growth, per capita GDP and investment 
are ingredients to sustaining its financial system and also in stimulating credit growth. While 
liquid liabilities have a significant dis-equalising effect on income inequality both in the ling- 
and short-run. This result on liquid liquidities may not be unconnected to the underdeveloped 
state of Cameroon’s financial sector leading to the inefficient transforming of liabilities to bank 
assets (that is loans). Lastly, the negative significance of credit growth implies that with 
efficient financial intermediation, income inequality abates in the country. 
 
For Kenya, the country’s financial dynamics responds to movements in its domestic credit 
provided by financial institutions and not that provided by banks. This is contrary to what is 
obtainable in the other three countries. By implication, this shows that shocks to credit provided 
by financial institutions will have more impact on its economy. Likewise, the deposit rate is the 
financial reform indicator that enhances both financial system stability and stimulates credit 
growth in the long-run. Other financial stability enhancers are broad money growth, per capita 
GDP and investment while the long-run stimulators of credit growth are broad money, per 
capita GDP and government spending while inflation, if not controlled, will be a drag on credit 
growth. Lastly, the positive significance of credit growth implies inefficient financial 
intermediation which aggravates income inequality in the country.  
 
Similarly for Nigeria, the deposit rate is financial reform instrument need to ensure financial 
system stability and promote credit growth in the long-run. Another observation is that 
Nigeria’s financial system responds to dynamics in its financial system deposits and not any 
other variant of deposit liabilities such as broad money and liquid liabilities as obtainable with 
the other three countries. The implication of this finding is that shocks to financial system 
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deposits will have more impact than those from any other variant of liabilities within the 
financial system. Lastly, the negative significance of credit growth implies efficient financial 
intermediation which has equalising impact on income inequality.  
 
Finally for South Africa, the deposit rate is financial reform instrument need to ensure financial 
system stability and promote credit growth in the long-run. Another financial stability enhancer 
is per capita GDP while the long-run stimulators of credit growth are broad money growth, per 
capita GDP and investment while inflation, if not controlled, will be a drag on credit growth as 
obtainable in Kenya. To sum up, the negative significance of credit growth implies efficient 
financial intermediation which has equalising impact on income inequality. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis is motivated by the high and rising income inequality in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) 
and it investigates the finance-credit-inequality nexus using a sample of 20 selected countries 
from 1980 to 2015. In executing the task, it was necessary to first determine if the financial 
sector is stable after financial reforms since stability engenders efficient financial 
intermediation and also, if the reforms stimulate credit growth as efficient intermediation is 
evidenced by increase in domestic credit. Lastly, to establish the nexus, the equalising impact 
of credit growth on income inequality is then analysed.  
 
Given the study scope, investigating this nexus took a different approach which makes the study 
unique. First, is the general-to-specific approach which investigates the nexus from the broader 
perspective of 20 countries before specifically analysing 4 countries - Cameroon, Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa. Second, is the use of different econometric tools to complement each 
other including such as pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE) and error correction model (ECM). Third, the analytical tactics employed include 
using 10-year non-overlapping window and the dividing the sample of countries across sub-
regions in a bid to understand variation across time periods and sub-regions. Fourth, is the 
recognition of the distinct heterogeneities across these four countries in order to reduce 
estimation bias to a minimal level. Therefore, this section concludes with a presentation of 
summary of the major findings and some policy recommendations. 
 
6.1 Summary of Major Findings 
From the sample of 20 countries, the descriptive analysis reveals that the average Gini index 
from the sample is very high and this is not significantly different from what is obtained across 
the sub-regions. Similarly, relative to the regional average and other sub-regions, the average 
domestic credit in Southern Africa region is higher, evidence of a more efficient financial 
intermediation while the average real interest rate (financial reform variable) is higher in 
Central Africa region relative to the regional average and other sub-regions. On the impacts, 
the findings reveal that the real interest rate, per capita GDP growth, broad money growth 
engenders financial sector stability and also stimulates credit growth. The implication is that 
these indicators are necessary to fostering financial stability and efficient intermediation in the 
region. On the contrary, per capita GDP growth and trade openness consistently distort both 
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financial stability and credit growth. This implies that in relation to the population, the growth 
rate of the GDP adversely affects the financial system. Likewise, the region’s international trade 
performance is not at a desirable stage to foster both financial stability and stimulate lending. 
In addition, the sub-regional analysis reveals that Central and East African regions have a more 
stable financial system relative to West Africa. This may be attributable to banks in these 
regions being controlled by their governments coupled with membership of the “Communauté 
Financière d'Afrique” (CFA) countries’ zone financial allegiance to France (and to the Euro) 
relative to financial independence that obtains in West Africa. For instance, Cameroon which 
is a member of the CFA made up of 14 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo DR, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) has monetary dependence relative to other countries in 
the region. The deposit rate for Cameroon is observed to be quite low which is probably not 
unconnected to the fact that the CFA franc is pegged to the euro and therefore follows the 
monetary policy dictates of the European Central Bank (Gulde & Tsangarides, 2008; Agbor, 
2012). Countries in the CFA have monetary regulations tied to that of the European Union 
which ensures stricter interest rate regulations. On the contrary, higher interest rates persists in 
non-CFA countries which are mostly in double-digits. This reflects their monetary 
independence and financial market competition. 
 
On measures that may stem income inequality in SSA, findings reveal that credit growth, GDP 
growth, primary education and natural resources have an equalising impact while government 
expenditures contribute to the widening inequality gap. These findings reveal that particularly 
for credit growth, efficient financial intermediation can close the gap between the rich and poor. 
It further validates the significance of credit availment. On the impact of GDP growth, this 
shows that if properly harnessed the gains from economic growth can drive down income 
inequality. Also, having access to a basic level of education can significantly reduce inequality 
level in the region. This result validates the effectiveness of human capital development on 
income distribution.  
 
Similarly, the availability of abundant natural resources if properly harnessed also contributes 
to reducing the inequality gap in SSA region. Furthermore, the age dependency ratio and the 
availability of natural resources show that each of these indicators can have both positive and 
negative impacts on income inequality. For instance, if the ratio of dependants (those with no 
income sources) rises relative to the working-age population, there will be some disequilibrium 
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in income distribution. However, findings on sub-regional levels are quite varying. Credit 
growth has an equalising impact in Southern Africa region but not significant to reduce 
inequality in Central and West Africa while it significantly escalates inequality in East Africa 
implying that financial intermediation requires strengthening in these countries. Lastly, 
comparatively, income inequality is lower in Central and East Africa while higher in Southern 
Africa relative to West Africa. 
 
For the individual countries, the summary is limited to long-run impacts. On financial system 
stability and credit growth, all the countries experienced some measure of stability after the 
financial reform even though the reform variables differ. For Cameroon, it is the real interest 
rate while it is the deposit rate for others. The implication of this finding is that identifying the 
appropriate reform variable is an important precursor for financial stability. Likewise financial 
reform stimulates credit growth across the four countries. The per capita GDP has proven to be 
a positive predictor of both financial stability and credit growth among the countries except for 
Nigeria. Noticeably, financial system deposits, broad money and broad money growth are also 
positive predictors of financial system stability and credit growth in all the countries implying 
that policies that promote liability generation of the financial system will invariably ensure its 
stability and efficiency. On the effect on income inequality, the findings reveal that financial 
intermediation evidenced by credit growth significantly reduce inequality in Cameroon, Nigeria 
and South Africa while it aggravates inequality in Kenya. This is an important finding and it 
implies that the financial systems in these countries have the capacity to reduce income 
inequality if given the necessary impetus. Hence, from the country-level studies, the finance-
credit-inequality is succinctly established for SSA. 
 
6.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
Having identified some gaps in the empirical literature, this research has contributed to the body 
of knowledge in the following ways:  
 
i. Due to the sparse finance-inequality literature exclusive to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this 
study contributes to the body of knowledge by examining the finance-credit-inequality nexus 
in SSA. The contribution is not only exclusive but comprehensive from both broad and 
specific perspectives.  
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ii. Given that, this study evaluates the extent of financial system stability after financial 
reforms, the impact of financial reform on credit growth and impact of credit growth on 
income inequality. Thus making it a novel study which its findings will be useful to 
stakeholders, policymakers and researchers in similar areas. To examine the interactive 
effects of financial reforms and credit growth on income inequality, a broad sample of twenty 
countries, sub-sample of four regions and four representing countries are analysed. In order 
words, the literature is enhanced with new findings on how these interactive effects affect 
SSA in general using different typologies of analysis and as such the findings can be 
generalised to other developing and emerging economies with common characteristics with 
SSA. 
 
iii. This study observes that there is not much examination about the stability of the financial 
sector after reforms as the bulk of extant literature is on the nexus between financial stability 
and economic growth. Hence, it provides evidence that it is needful to first ascertain the 
stability of the financial system after reforms. In other words, contribution to the literature 
is enriched with the results indicating that financial reforms enhance financial system 
stability in SSA. This findings are not only limited to the broad sample, but also evident 
across the four sub-regions and the four representing countries. It is expected that these 
outcomes will be useful to researchers and financial regulators that financial reform is an 
essential ingredient for sustaining financial system stability. 
 
iv. Another gap identified is the inability of studies to separately analyse the impact of financial 
reform on credit growth and the inability to separate the effect of credit growth from other 
financial reform indicators on income inequality. In order words, the finance-inequality 
literature has been unable to unbundle the cloudy effect of financial reform on income 
inequality. Given that credit growth is an outcome of financial reform, this research is able 
to contribute to knowledge by showing the channel of influence by which financial reform 
affects income inequality. In order words, findings reveal that financial reform has an 
indirect relationship with income inequality rather than a direct relationship as postulated by 
current literature. This is shown via the ability to separately analyse first, the impact of 
financial reform on credit growth and thereafter the impact of credit growth on income 
inequality. This is contrary to what obtains in the current literature.  
 
v. From the current finance-inequality literature, in analysing the relationship between finance 
and income inequality, domestic credit to the private sector/GDP (proxy for credit growth 
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and a measure of financial depth) is often included among the explanatory variables; thus, 
masking its impact on income inequality in addition to causing endogeneity bias among the 
explanatory variables. Thus, the study contributes to the literature by stating that the 
relevance of credit growth on income inequality is contingent on financial reforms. 
Unfortunately, the extant literature for the most part, has not explored the complex link, 
which this study has addressed. Consequently, contribution is made to the literature by 
improving the existing scholarship methodology. The empirical approach often used by 
researchers (several of whom have been cited in the literature review and theoretical 
framework) in evaluating the finance-inequality relationship is usually a single equation 
estimation technique which establishes the direct relationship between finance and income 
inequality.  
 
vi. The approach used in this study is that which has not been explored in the current literature 
which is the simulation of a two-equation analysis that shows the channel through which 
finance affects income inequality. An important outcome of this research is that financial 
reform has an equalising effect on income inequality through credit growth. In addition, the 
empirical approach used is that in analysing the indirect relationship between financial 
reforms and income inequality, the financial reform indicators (the real interest rate and/or 
the deposit rate) only explain credit growth while credit growth explains income inequality. 
This approach unmasks the transitory impact of financial reform via credit growth on income 
inequality and also removes any endogeneity problem that might arise from putting interest 
rate and domestic credit to the private sector/GDP in explaining income inequality as it is in 
current literature. Thus, contribution to literature is made by exploring this complex link and 
stating that the relevance of credit growth on income inequality is contingent on financial 
reforms.  
 
vii. This contribution, though not previously stated among the identified gaps in the empirical 
literature, shows that the choice of financial reform instrument is influential to the reduction 
of income inequality. That is, inappropriate financial reform instrument may exacerbate 
inequality. For instance, two financial reform proxies are used in the course of this research 
– the real interest rate and the deposit rate. On the broad sample, the four sub-regions the 
real interest rate in the reform instrument that enhances financial system stability and 
stimulates credit growth. For Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, it is the deposit that that 
enhances financial system stability and stimulates credit growth while for Cameroon, the 
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real interest rate in the reform instrument that enhances financial system stability and the 
deposit rate is the reform instrument that stimulates credit growth. The literature is enhanced 
with this contribution because it shows that a uniform reform instrument may not be 
applicable to every economy. 
 
viii. Lastly, given the analytical approach used, the literature is enriched given that the results 
obtained from this study can be generalised to other developing and emerging economies. 
With analyses carried out on the full SSA sample (a selection of 20 countries), the four sub-
regions and four countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa), generalising this 
analytical approach to other economies is intuitive as it may provide the avenue to 
identifying the channel which inequality can be reduced.  
 
6.3 Conclusion  
The finance-inequality relationship has received much attention in extant literature. However, 
there is a dearth of knowledge regarding this nexus in exclusive relation to SSA and also the 
channels of influence through which finance affects income inequality. This thesis broadens the 
frontiers of knowledge in this area by examining the channel through which financial reforms 
impact on income inequality in SSA from 1980 to 2015 using broad and specific analytical 
approaches in addition to using five estimation techniques. The broad (general) approach is a 
panel data analysis of twenty countries which are further divided along four sub-regional 
delineations (Central, East, Southern and West Africa). The specific approach is a country-level 
analysis of four representative countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) each 
from its sub-region.  
 
This analytical approach is intuitive in two ways: (1) to observe if findings obtained from the 
general approach hold when individual countries are considered and (2) to provide policy 
patterns such that whatever policies are applied to reduce income inequality in these 
representative countries, such policies may be applicable in reducing inequality in their 
respective sub-regions. Five estimation techniques are used evaluating these interactive 
relationships and in line with the theoretical and finance-inequality literature, the real interest 
rate, deposit rate, domestic credit to the private sector and the Gini index are the respective 
proxies for financial reforms, credit growth and income inequality. For the general approach, 
the estimators used are: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE), and system generalised method of moments (system GMM) while for the 
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specific approach the estimator used is the error correction model (ECM) of the autoregressive 
distributed lag framework (ARDL).  
 
Findings reveal that financial reform exhibits an indirect relationship with income inequality. 
That is, the equalising effect of financial reform on income inequality is through credit growth. 
Hence, contributions made to literature are summarised thus: (1) providing evidence that the 
reform-credit-inequality nexus exist for SSA, (2) improving the scholarship methodology by 
empirically unbundling the effect of financial reforms on income inequality by showing that 
finance exhibit an indirect relationship with income inequality and not directly as postulated by 
the current literature, (3) evidencing the channel of influence through which finance affects 
inequality which is via credit growth; (4) validating the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) hypothesis 
that at a higher interest rate, financial intermediation improves and (5) results also validate the 
extensive margin theory of Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990) that as credit is broadened and 
made available to those initially excluded due to price or other impediments, income inequality 
falls.  
 
Given these findings, some of the recommendation is that financial reform policies that drive 
financial intermediation (i.e. lending) be pursued by stakeholders as this will indirectly lead to 
a reduction in income inequality. In other words, the ability to stimulate credit growth may be 
one of the avenues to reducing the income inequality gap in SSA and in developing economies 
in general. In conclusion, stakeholders, monetary and financial regulators, policy makers and 
researchers in similar fields will find this study’s outcome relevant. The results can be 
generalised to other developing economies with characteristics similar to those of SSA 
countries (e.g. underdeveloped financial system) such that one of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (i.e. Goal 10) which is also linked to Goals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 – that is, to reduce inequality 
within and among nations – can be achieved. 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study, some recommendations that are relevant to reducing the 
level of income inequality in SSA are proffered, first, on the broad sample of selected twenty 
SSA countries and then on the four countries of Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
For SSA, given the positive significance of real interest rate on financial system stability and 
credit growth, policy makers must maintain a low level of inflation rate in order to enhance the 
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return on investment both for the borrowing public and the financial intermediaries. This is 
because a high inflation rate may lead to negative real interest which hampers lending and thus 
may further aggravate income inequality. Likewise, the negative significance of credit growth 
on income inequality signifies that increased lending will contribute to reducing inequality in 
the region, therefore monetary regulators must pursue programmes and initiate policies that will 
engender the dissemination of credit to the public and to poor households in particular. 
Similarly, with the noticeable significance of some control variables – per capita GDP, trade 
openness, GDP growth, natural resources and primary education on the two outcome variables 
of credit growth and income inequality, the following recommendations are made. The negative 
significance of per capita GDP on financial stability index and credit growth portends danger.  
 
Therefore, concerted efforts must be made to improve per income of populace by driving 
policies that will boost economic growth. In the same vein, the negative significance of trade 
openness is an indication that the region is yet to take advantage of its abundant resources and 
re-position itself in international trade negotiation. Thus, efforts must be by the respective 
governments to harness the opportunities embedded in international trade. Also, with the 
negative and significant effects of GDP growth rate, natural resources and primary education 
on income inequality, it is recommended that policies that will drive economic growth be 
pursued, potentials of SSA’s natural resources be harnessed and education be made free and 
affordable to all citizenry as these will drive down income in equality in the region. 
 
On the sub-regions, given the negative but insignificant effect of credit growth on income 
inequality in Central Africa, it is obvious that credit growth possesses an equalising effect but 
not significant in reducing inequality. Thus, it is recommended that policies that will encourage 
financial intermediation be pursued. It is also observed that the region has a more stable 
financial system relative to West Africa. This may not be unconnected to the fact that most 
Central African countries are CFA countries with allegiance to their colonial masters, France, 
and indirectly to the European Central Bank (ECB) which maintains strict financial discipline 
across its member-states. In East Africa, the cost of funds may be denying the public the 
opportunity to access credit. This is reflective of the positive and significant effect of credit 
growth on income inequality. Therefore, it becomes necessary to remove the impediments to 
accessing credit in the country. Likewise, policies that will positively drive GDP growth and 
the equitable use of government expenditures be pursued in order to reverse the adverse effects 
of these variables on income inequality. That primary education has a negative and significant 
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impact on income inequality, it is recommended that inclusive-education policies must be 
pursued by governments in that sub-region. For West Africa, since the equalising power of 
credit growth is not significant, it is recommended that pro-lending policies must be pursued to 
encourage efficient financial intermediation. Lastly, for Southern Africa, it is recommended 
that policies that promote lending be encouraged given the negative and significant effect of 
credit growth on income inequality. 
 
On the countries’ recommendations, Cameroon need to ensure that the inflation rate is 
maintained at a low level in order not to erode the influence of the real interest rate which 
enhances the stability of its financial system. Likewise, for the deposit rate which stimulates 
credit growth, it is recommended that the rate be maintained to stimulate saving in order to 
accumulate more loanable funds which ensure more financial intermediation. In the same vein, 
since broad money growth, per capita GDP and investment stimulate both financial system 
stability and credit growth, it is needful that policies that will further enhance the positive 
influence of these variables be promoted. The dis-equalising impact of liquid liabilities on 
income inequality requires that the financial sector and institutional regulatory need to fashion 
out ways of transforming liquidity into assets such that households and firms will have access 
to credit. Lastly, with the negative significance of credit growth on income inequality, it is 
recommended that the country’s monetary regulators must promote policies and programmes 
that will enhance lending.  
 
For Kenya, it is observed that the country’s financial dynamics responds to domestic credit 
provided by financial institutions rather than those by banks. Therefore, the entire financial 
system must be taken into perspective whenever attempt is made to measure the extent of credit 
disseminated in the country. Also, since the deposit rate positively drives both financial system 
stability and credit growth, it is recommended that the rate be made competitive in order to 
stimulate saving and boost the volume of loanable funds. For other control variables – broad 
money, broad money growth, per capita GDP, investment, and government spending - with 
positive effect on financial system stability and credit growth, the recommendation is that pro-
policies be pursued. The positive and significant effect of credit growth indicates inefficient 
financial intermediation in the country. It is therefore recommended that hindrances to efficient 
use of loanable funds by banks and other financial intermediaries be removed.  
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For Nigeria, it is recommended that the deposit rate be made competitive since it is the variable 
that enhances financial system stability and stimulates credit growth. Also, because the 
financial dynamics in the country responds to financial system deposits as opposed to other 
liability components of the financial system, it is recommended that policies that will enhance 
more financial system deposits be pursued. Given that credit growth has a negative impact on 
income inequality, regulators must pursue policies that enhance more financial intermediation. 
South Africa’s recommendations are similar to those given for Nigeria with the exception that 
per capita GDP enhances both financial system stability credit growth while broad money 
growth and investment stimulate credit growth. 
 
Summarily is the need for SSA countries to continually reform their financial sectors in order 
to ensure financial stability in addition to improving credit growth. Findings from this study 
show that financial reform further ensures efficient financial intermediation which is the 
improvement of lending roles of banks and other financial intermediaries in making loans and 
advances available and affordable to desired borrowers. Furthermore, efforts that improve 
financial intermediation will lead to a reduction in income inequality. That is policies that will 
enhance competition within the financial system be promoted such that the lending capabilities 
of financial intermediaries are enhanced evidenced by increased lending. These policies include 
but not limited to the relaxation of contractual agreements required for accessing credit because 
with stringent loan conditions, poor households will be exempted from engaging in mutually 
beneficial economic opportunities.  
 
The rationale for this is that with increased access to credit, the income disparity between the 
rich and poor will gradually reduce. Another policy that will enhance credit growth is the 
expansion of more branch networks to the rural communities to make credit more available to 
those at the lowest income strata. Related to that is the regulation of prevailing rates that is 
optimal in attracting both loanable funds from depositors and enhancing efficient financial 
intermediation. That is, if interest rates are not competitive and optimal, depositors will have 
no incentive to save which creates a shock to loanable funds and prevents effective and efficient 
utilisation of funds. This implication can be explained from two standpoints. When a shock to 
loanable funds occurs, financial intermediaries will have to raise the lending rate which has a 
negative effect on investors who are averse to borrowing when rates are high. The overall 
implication is that income inequality will increase. Be that as it may, due to the demographics 
of CFA and non-CFA countries in the region, a blanket monetary policy is not plausible. 
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6.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies 
The limited availability of inequality data for SSA countries is a major challenge despite rapid 
expansion of databases on inequality measures for developed economies – such as Household 
Budget Surveys (HBSs), Living Standards Measurement Study Surveys (LSMSs), 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICSs) – 
and the development of international databases on income inequality which have made the 
analysis of its levels, trends and determinants more feasible than in the past. Hence, this study 
joins in the call for the compiling of up-to-date data on measures of income inequality for the 
region. Another limitation is the inability to include the non-bank financial institutions in this 
study due to non-availability of data. This sub-sector of the financial system is also critical in 
the quest to solving the problem of income inequality in the sense that a sizeable proportion of 
the poor populace patronise these less-formal institutions for funds required to engage in 
economic opportunities. Hence, their incorporation into the study of reform-credit-inequality 
relationship will make analysis and evaluations more robust. 
 
On the suggestions for further studies, data on health, education, wealth and income inequality 
will encourage more studies understand the interaction between wealth, income, education and 
health inequality which will propel the attainment of SDGs. In addition, for the derivation of a 
financial stability index, this study uses macroeconomic indicators of financial stability. 
Therefore, suggestions may be to examine financial system stability using microeconomic 
dimension of financial stability. These microeconomic indicators entail the use of aggregate 
prudential ratios indicators of financial stability such as ratio of non-performing loans to gross 
loans which is relevant as a warning signal for systemic banking insolvency, bank capital to 
total assets ratio, net interest margin, bank non-performing loans to gross loans, stock market 
volatility, banking Z-score, stock market capitalisation growth rate, return on assets, return on 
equity, liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding. Another suggestion may be to test the 
impact of credit growth on other measures of income inequality such as the Palma ratio, 
Atkinson Index, Robin index and so on in order to evaluate if the same result holds. Also, given 
the distributional effects of income inequality, it is suggested that its relationship with welfare 
using the human development index be explored. These suggestions may be taken up to further 
expand the frontiers of this research. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.1:    Countries Representation by Average Gini Index, GDP and 
Population (1980 - 2015) 
S/No. Country Gini Index  GDP (US$)  Population 
1 Botswana 63.86499       6,530,000,000.00  2,333,201 
2 Burundi 56.46999       1,320,000,000.00  11,216,450 
3 Cameroon 58.07629      14,600,000,000.00  24,678,234 
4 Central African Rep. 63.07581       1,260,000,000.00  4,737,423 
5 Chad 57.57475       4,280,000,000.00  15,353,184 
6 Comoros 62.65013          304,000,000.00  832,347 
7 Congo, Republic 59.77403       5,060,000,000.00  5,399,895 
8 Gabon 59.01696       7,680,000,000.00  2,067,561 
9 Gambia 66.40229          613,000,000.00  2,163,765 
10 Kenya 60.34958      19,500,000,000.00  50,950,879 
11 Malawi 62.44683       2,990,000,000.00  19,164,728 
12 Mauritius 56.53348       5,200,000,000.00  1,268,315 
13 Namibia 63.09323       5,420,000,000.00  2,587,801 
14 Nigeria 56.56496    127,000,000,000.00  195,875,237 
15 Rwanda 58.71748       2,990,000,000.00  12,501,156 
16 Seychelles 58.49394          628,000,000.00  95,235 
17 Sierra Leone 62.53993       1,590,000,000.00  7,719,729 
18 South Africa 66.81614    187,000,000,000.00  57,398,421 
19 Swaziland 64.6626       2,050,000,000.00  1,391,385 
20 Tanzania 56.68555      17,200,000,000.00  59,091,392 
Source: Researcher's Compilation from Lahoti et al., (2016); World Bank (2016); 
http://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-africa-by-population/ 
  
A4.1 Derivation of Equation [4.16] 
The Cobb-Douglas production function for the experienced worker is given as: 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑒  = 𝐴(𝐿𝑡
𝑒)∝(𝐾𝑡)
1−∝       [4.15] 
 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝑒 also represents the total income of the experienced individual in period 𝑡;  𝐴 
represents expertise which is an outcome of education; 𝐿𝑡
𝑒 denotes labour hours for the 
individual; 𝐾𝑡 is physical capital stock (assuming no depreciation) employed at period 𝑡 and 
𝐴 is a function of human capital investment stock in the economy, (𝐻𝜑) such that 𝜑 ≥ 1. 
Hence, equation [4.15] becomes: 
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𝑌𝑡
𝑒  =  𝐻𝜑(𝐿𝑡
𝑒)∝(𝐾𝑡)
1−∝      [4.15′] 
 
and given that in equilibrium, the marginal productivity of labour equals the wage rate: 
 
  
𝑌
𝐿
= 𝑤 
 
then the wage rate of the experienced worker in period 𝑡 equals its marginal product, that is: 
 
[ 𝐻𝜑(𝐿𝑡
𝑒)∝(𝐾𝑡)
1−∝]
𝐿
 = 𝐻𝜑 ∝ (𝐿𝑡
𝑒)∝−1(𝐾𝑡)
1−∝, and this becomes:   
𝑤𝑡
𝑒  = 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑡
𝑒 , 𝐾𝑡) = 𝐻
𝜑 ∝ (
𝐾
𝐿
)
1−∝
     [4.16] 
 
 
 
Figure A5.1: Scree plot, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
 
 
172 
 
 
 
Figure A5.2: Scree plot, Cameroon 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
 
 
Figure A5.3: Scree plot, Kenya 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
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Figure A5.4: Scree plot, Nigeria 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
 
 
Figure A5.5: Scree plot, South Africa 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
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Table A5.1:       Correlation Matrix, Cameroon 
 
 
Table A5.2:       Correlation Matrix, Kenya 
 
 
Table A5.3:       Correlation Matrix, Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables FSI Gini DC RR DR Inf. Liq BMG PC Gr. GFCF GF. GR. Exp. Nat.
Financial stability index 1.000
Gini index 0.347 1.000
Domestic credit 0.146 -0.595 1.000
Real interest rate 0.249 0.398 -0.446 1.000
Deposit rate -0.236 -0.840 0.753 -0.532 1.000
Inflation (consumer prices) 0.111 -0.341 0.229 -0.428 0.389 1.000
Liquid liabilies 0.026 -0.375 0.848 -0.350 0.708 0.146 1.000
Broad money growth 0.492 0.156 0.122 -0.347 -0.041 0.428 -0.013 1.000
GDP per capita -0.121 -0.085 0.404 -0.087 0.311 -0.249 0.583 -0.411 1.000
GDP per capita gr. 0.185 0.154 0.021 -0.188 -0.238 0.346 -0.172 0.606 -0.535 1.000
Gross fixed cap. formation 0.299 -0.042 0.671 -0.144 0.246 0.101 0.566 0.088 0.360 0.259 1.000
Gross fixed cap. form. gr. 0.171 0.259 -0.072 -0.174 -0.300 0.146 -0.233 0.548 -0.486 0.818 0.163 1.000
Government consumption exp. -0.244 -0.199 0.230 0.192 0.391 -0.366 0.471 -0.623 0.634 -0.767 0.092 -0.543 1.000
Natural resources 0.011 -0.094 0.339 -0.539 0.118 0.353 0.259 0.563 -0.282 0.598 0.120 0.518 -0.507 1.000
Note: FSI : financial stability index; DC : Domestic credit; DR : deposit rate; RR : real interest rate; Inf. : inflation; Liq : Liquid liabilities; BMG : broad money growth; 
GR.: per capita GDP growth; PC.: per capita GDP; GFCF : gross fixed capital formation; GFCF Gr. : gross fixed capital formation growth; Exp. : consumption 
expenditures; Nat:  Natural resources 
Source: Researcher's Computation
Variables FSI Gini DC DR Inf. BM BMG Liq. GDP PC GFCF Exp. Pry
Financial stability index 1.000
Gini index 0.048 1.000
Dom. credit by fin. inst. 0.612 0.068 1.000
Deposit rate -0.003 -0.075 -0.015 1.000
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.214 0.084 -0.403 -0.081 1.000
Broad money 0.507 0.035 0.752 -0.408 -0.348 1.000
Broad money growth 0.520 0.121 0.151 -0.012 -0.074 0.164 1.000
Liquid liabilities 0.242 -0.192 0.452 -0.396 -0.015 0.815 0.020 1.000
GDP 0.155 0.181 0.407 -0.325 0.045 0.645 0.163 0.752 1.000
GDP per capita 0.122 0.155 0.339 -0.291 0.105 0.573 0.184 0.724 0.993 1.000
Gross fixed cap. formation 0.262 0.297 0.260 0.142 0.057 0.108 0.585 0.039 0.443 0.473 1.000
Government consumption exp. -0.179 -0.028 -0.309 0.189 0.198 -0.672 -0.109 -0.735 -0.752 -0.722 -0.253 1.000
Primary enrolment -0.285 -0.259 -0.250 -0.178 0.502 -0.209 0.163 0.181 0.327 0.398 0.285 0.119 1.000
Note: FSI : financial stability index; DC : Domestic credit; DR : deposit rate;  Inf. : inflation; Liq : Liquid liabilities; BM : broad money; BMG : broad money 
growth; PC .: per capita GDP; GFCF : gross fixed capital formation; Exp. : consumption expenditures; Pry:  Primary enrolment
Source: Researcher's Computation
Variables FSI Gini DC DR Inf. PC Gr. BMG FSD GFCF Pry.
Financial stability index 1.000
Gini index 0.425 1.000
Domestic credit 0.506 -0.077 1.000
Deposit rate 0.100 0.670 -0.250 1.000
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.179 0.265 -0.326 0.386 1.000
GDP per capita -0.220 -0.689 0.486 -0.456 -0.370 1.000
GDP per capita growth -0.109 0.131 -0.025 0.265 -0.068 0.210 1.000
Broad money growth 0.426 0.498 0.125 0.503 0.123 -0.020 0.178 1.000
Financial system deposits 0.418 -0.218 0.827 -0.383 -0.304 0.276 -0.244 -0.205 1.000
Gross fixed cap. formation 0.083 -0.584 0.062 -0.435 -0.089 0.101 -0.485 -0.389 0.375 1.000
Primary enrolment 0.184 -0.280 -0.030 -0.466 -0.281 -0.099 -0.148 -0.279 0.257 0.407 1.000
Note: FSI : financial stability index; DC : Domestic credit; DR : deposit rate; Inf. : inflation; BMG : broad money growth; FSD : financial 
system deposits; PC .: per capita GDP; Gr. : per capita GDP growth; GFCF : gross fixed capital formation; Pry:  Primary enrolment
Source: Researcher's Computation
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Table A5.4:       Correlation Matrix, South Africa 
 
 
Table A5.5:  Optimal Lags Selection (Bayesian Information Criterion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables FSI Gini DC DR Inf. BM LDR PC Gr. GFCF GF.Gr Exp. Pry.
Financial stability index 1.000
Gini index -0.197 1.000
Domestic credit 0.096 0.416 1.000
Deposit rate 0.103 -0.292 -0.582 1.000
Inflation (consumer prices) -0.170 -0.179 -0.853 0.570 1.000
Broad Money -0.030 0.634 0.775 -0.596 -0.524 1.000
Loan-to-deposit ratio 0.042 0.170 0.742 -0.175 -0.706 0.271 1.000
GDP per capita -0.034 0.511 0.722 -0.645 -0.549 0.879 0.146 1.000
GDP per capita  growth 0.159 0.004 0.455 -0.514 -0.562 0.314 0.389 0.272 1.000
Gross fixed cap. formation 0.050 0.107 -0.461 0.083 0.587 0.069 -0.779 0.023 -0.315 1.000
Gross fixed cap. formation gr. 0.359 -0.100 0.293 -0.166 -0.413 0.239 0.216 0.237 0.736 -0.103 1.000
Government consumption exp. -0.206 0.291 0.678 -0.302 -0.595 0.444 0.544 0.572 0.023 -0.633 -0.017 1.000
Primary enrolment 0.171 -0.080 0.397 0.324 -0.442 -0.074 0.655 -0.010 0.059 -0.649 0.224 0.469 1.000
Note: FSI : financial stability index; DC : Domestic credit; DR : deposit rate; Inf. : inflation; Liq : Liquid liabilities; BM : broad money; BMG : broad money 
growth; LDR : Loan-to-deposit ratio; PC .: per capita GDP; Gr. : per capita GDP growth; GFCF : gross fixed capital formation; GF.Gr. : gross fixed capital 
formation growth; Exp. : consumption expenditures; Pry:  Primary enrolment
Source: Researcher's Computation
Variables Cameroon Kenya Nigeria S/Africa
Broad money (log) - 1 - -
Broad money growth 0 1 2 -
Deposit rate 1 1 4 3
Domestic credit (log) 1 - 1 1
Domestic credit by fin. inst. (log) - 1 - -
Financial stability index 1 1 1 1
Financial system deposits (log) - - 1 -
GDP - 1 - -
GDP per capita (log) 1 1 1 2
GDP per capita growth 1 - 0 1
Gini index (log) 1 2 2 1
Government consumption exp. (log) 1 1 - 1
Gross fixed capital formation (log) 1 1 1 2
Gross fixed capital formation growth 1 - - 1
Inflation (consumer prices) 0 1 2 1
Liquid liabilities 1 1 - -
Loan-to-deposit ratio - - - 1
Natural resources 1 - - -
Primary enrolment - 1 2 3
Real interest rate 1 - - -
Source: Researcher's Computation
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Table A5.6:   Unit Root Tests, Cameroon 
 
 
Table A5.7:   Unit Root Tests, Kenya 
 
Level 1st Diff. Decision Level 1st Diff. Decision
Broad money growth -4.196
a
- I (0) -4.340
a
- I (0)
Deposit rate -2.403 -4.406
a
I (1) -0.145 -6.210
a
I (1)
Domestic credit (log) -0.956 -3.565
b
I (1) -1.423 -4.113
a
I (1)
Financial stability index -4.285
a
- I (0) -3.748
a
- I (0)
GDP per capita (log) -1.844 -3.538
b
I (1) -1.602 -5.226
a
I (1)
GDP per capita gr. -3.110
b
- I (0) -3.299
b
- I (0)
Gini index (log) -2.260 -3.569
b
I (1) -1.604 -4.656
a
I (1)
Govt. consumption exp. (log) -2.234 -4.235
a
I (1) -1.463 -4.691
a
I (1)
Gross fixed cap. form. gr. -3.201
a
- I (0) -3.425
a
- I (0)
Gross fixed cap. formation (log) -1.881 -3.966
a
I (1) -1.592 -6.016
a
I (1)
Inflation (consumer prices) -5.318
a
- I (0) -4.554
a
- I (0)
Liquid liabilities (log) -1.305 -2.870
c
I (1) -1.395 -4.620
a
I (1)
Natural resources -2.836 -4.983
a
I (1) -2.933
b
- I (0)
Real interest rate -2.138 -3.903
a
I (1) -2.823
c
- I (0)
DF-GLS
*
PP
Variables
Note: DF-GLS:  Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares; PP:  Phillip-Perrron; 
a, b, c 
denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% levels and 10% respectively. Estmations augmented with lag structures 
obtained from Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) using the varsoc  routine in Stata. 
*
Interpolated 
critical values from Elliot, Rottenberg and Stock (1996).
Level 1st Diff. Decision Level 1st Diff. Decision
Broad money (log) -2.241 -3.695
b
I (1) -1.522 -6.912
a
I (1)
Broad money growth -2.392 -4.522
a
I (1) -3.804
a
- I (0)
Deposit rate NA NA NA -1.915 -5.574
a
I (1)
Domestic credit by fin. inst.(log)-3.861
a
- I (0) -3.107
b
- I (0)
Financial stability index -5.200
a
- I (0) -7.828
a
- I (0)
GDP (log) -1.785 -3.382
b
I (1) 1.016 -4.170
a
I (1)
GDP per capita (log) -1.619 -3.433
b
I (1) 0.511 -4.176
a
I (1)
Gini index (log) -2.047 -2.929
c
I (1) -1.639 -4.123
a
I (1)
Govt. consumption exp. (log) -2.976
b
- I (0) -1.814 -5.275
a
I (1)
Gross fixed cap. Formation (log)-3.313
b
- I (0) -2.938
b
- I (0)
Inflation (consumer prices) -3.523
b
- I (0) -3.381
b
- I (0)
Liquid liabilities (log) -2.064 -3.655
b
I (1) -1.286 -6.118
a
I (1)
Primary enrolment NA NA NA -1.600 -5.459
a
I (1)
Variables
DF-GLS
*
PP
Note: DF-GLS:  Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares; PP:  Phillip-Perrron; NA  implies that the 
DF-GLS  process cannot be performed due to data gaps in the series. 
a, b, c 
denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% levels and 10% respectively. Estmations augmented with lag structures 
obtained from Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) using the varsoc  routine in Stata. 
*
Interpolated 
critical values from Elliot, Rottenberg and Stock (1996).
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Table A5.8:   Unit Root Tests, Nigeria 
 
 
Table A5.9:   Unit Root Tests, South Africa 
 
 
Level 1st Diff. Decision Level 1st Diff. Decision
Broad money growth -3.483
b
- I (0) -3.212
b
- I (0)
Deposit rate -1.473 -2.968
b
I (1) -2.661
c
- I (0)
Domestic credit (log) -3.335
b
- I (0) -2.847
c
- I (0)
Financial stability index -4.126
a
- I (0) -5.534
a
- I (0)
Financial system deposits -2.639 -3.899
a
I (1) -2.344 -5.254
a
I (1)
GDP per capita -1.511 -3.626
a
I (1) -0.294 -5.249
a
I (1)
GDP per capita growth -5.370
a
- I (0) -4.508
a
- I (0)
Gini index (log) -3.056
b
- I (0) -2.584
c
- I (0)
Gross fixed cap. formation -1.870 -6.489
a
I (1) -2.866
b
- I (0)
Inflation (consumer prices) -2.544 -4.233
a
I (1) -2.964
b
- I (0)
Primary enrolment NA NA NA -1.331 -2.745
c
I(1)
Variables
DF-GLS
*
PP
Note: DF-GLS:  Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares; PP:  Phillip-Perrron; NA  implies that the 
DF-GLS  process cannot be performed due to data gaps in the series. 
a, b, c 
denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% levels and 10% respectively. Estmations augmented with lag structures 
obtained from Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) using the varsoc  routine in Stata. 
*
Interpolated 
critical values from Elliot, Rottenberg and Stock (1996).
Source: Researcher's Computations
Level 1st Diff. Decision Level 1st Diff. Decision
Broad money (log) -1.904 -3.745
b
I (1) -0.561 -4.346
a
I (1)
Deposit rate -1.680 -4.796
a
I (1) -2.218 -3.772
a
I (1)
Domestic credit (log) -1.701 -4.395
a
I (1) -2.536 -5.487
a
I (1)
Financial stability index -3.400
b
- I (0) -5.535
a
- I (0)
GDP per capita (log) -2.146 -2.911
c
I (1) -1.209 -4.297
a
I (1)
GDP per capita growth -3.184
c
- I (0) -3.704
a
- I (0)
Gini index (log) -2.816 -4.978
a
I (1) -2.520 -7.978
a
I (1)
Govt. consumption exp. (log) -1.853 -4.774
a
I (1) -4.314
a
- I (0)
Gross fixed cap. formation (log) -1.657 -3.305
b
I (1) -2.006 -3.824
a
I (1)
Gross fixed cap. formation gr. -3.474
b
- I (0) -3.652
a
- I (0)
Inflation (consumer prices) -2.818 -5.408
a
I (1) -1.753 -5.450
a
I (1)
Loan-to-deposit ratio -1.524 -5.382
a
I (1) -2.592
c
- I (0)
Primary enrolment NA NA NA -2.159 -3.894
a
I (1)
Variables
DF-GLS
*
PP
Note: DF-GLS:  Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares; PP:  Phillip-Perron; NA  implies that the 
DF-GLS  process cannot be performed due to data gaps in the series. 
a, b, c 
denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% levels and 10% respectively. Estimations augmented with lag structures 
obtained from Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) using the varsoc  routine in Stata. 
*
Interpolated 
critical values from Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996).
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Figure A5.6: CUSUMSQ Graph, Cameroon 
Source:    Researcher’s Computation 
C
U
S
U
M
 s
qu
a
re
d
year
 CUSUM squared
1986 2014
0
1
